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SUMMARY
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• This thesis is concerned with techniques of changing the design of
jobs in organisations. Current job design theories appear to be derived
from four theoretical components: a theory of motivation, a model of the
situation to be changed, a statement of desirable job characteristics,
and a method of identifying and implementing appropriate changes. The
problems of current theories appear to arise from inadequate conceptual¬
isation of the situation to be changed. Changes in job design generally
begin at the interface between managerial and non-managerial tasks and
it is argued that a model of the management function is required in
order to identify design options.
• A method of organisational analysis, derived from a model of organ¬
isational information processing and control, is developed, and a general
theory of job and organisational design is postulated incorporating the
four basic theoretical components. Emphasis is placed on provision of
continuous learning as a desirable job characteristic. This theory
predicts that learning is related to involvement in organisational
information processing and control.
• The production control systems of two manufacturing units are analysed
and the value of the model in identifying design options is demonstrated.
These analyses also indicate that the transfer of information processing
tasks to operators may affect several levels of the management hierarchy.
• Behaviour of conventionally structured and autonomous unstructured
groups in a manufacturing simulation game are compared. The results of
this experiment suggest that learning is related to involvement in
information processing and control. Unstructured groups performed better,
avoided some typical production management problems, and focused
participants' attention on problems of organising work.
• This research indicates that existing job design theories cannot fulfil




The Importance of Job Design
Job design has been defined as:
"....specification of the contents, methods, and
relationships of jobs in order to satisfy
technological and organisational requirements
as well as the social and personal requirements of the
job-holder." (Davis, 1966, p.21)
A number of job design techniques are now advocated which set out -
(a) the types of characteristics that jobs should ideally have, and
(b) ways of changing existing jobs to bring them closer to the
"ideal". The generic term for these endeavours is here
taken to be "job design" and the various specific job design
techniques are named and described in the text below. Job design
techniques thus attempt to impose on the would-be job designer more
or less rigorous methods of determining job content in organisations.
A recent survey of over 180 reported job design experiments






















3. Worker Benefits - increased earnings
improved job satisfaction
These are the aggregated results of a number of applications of job
design techniques and one would not expect any particular application
to produce all of these results. Nevertheless, job design techniques
would appear to be fundamental to the economic performance of our
country, to the effectiveness of individual organisations and to the
psychological well-being of the working population. It is perhaps
not surprising, therefore, that the issue of job design is attracting
a good deal of attention in Britain at the moment; this may be
illustrated by the following examples:
• The Government, the Confederation of British Industry
and the Trades Union Congress formed a Tripartite
Steering Group on Job Satisfaction in 1973 (see their
booklet "Making Work More Satisfying", 1975).
• The Department of Employment established a Work
Research Unit in December 197^ to direct a research
programme on behalf of the Steering Group (see Jessup,
1975).
• The Administrative Staff College, Henley, has also
set up a Work Research Group under the directorship
of Professor Ray Wild (see the various publications
of Wild and of David Birchall).
• The Industrial Training Research Unit in Cambridge
is actively promoting job design projects (see
Waldman and Larkcom, 197^ and Pearcey, 1976).
• The Institute of Personnel Management recently
commissioned a survey of British job design practice
and the results of this survey have now been
published (see Carby, 1976).
• Trade urions are now attempting to expand the terms of
management-worker negotiations to include, amongst
other topics, the design of jobs. The unsuccessful
action of the Lucas Aerospace Combine Shop Stewards'
Committee is one example of this; their "alternative
company plan" dealt with changes to the company's product
line, job design and treatment of employees in general.
Their plan was rejected by the Lucas management in
June 1976.
The Problems of Job Design
Despite the apparent potential of job design techniques,
applications are not widespread. There have been a few reasonably
successful applications which have been well publicised, perhaps
giving the impression that the technique is more popular than is
actually the case. The small extent to which the techniques have
been used reflects a number of problems that are associated with the
formulation and practical application of job design theories and
techniques. These problems are due to a number of factors, including
managerial attitudes and assumptions, institutional inertia, the
influence of individual differences, the difficulties in conducting
properly controlled experiments, and the difficulties in making
prescriptions for job designs operational.
Managerial attitudes: Organisation structure, technology and the
design of jobs are not uniquely determined by any particular set of
objective factors. There is always some freedom of choice.
The attitudes that management has concerning the nature of
organisational functioning and the assumptions that are made about the
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nature and abilities of the workforce as a whole are important
determinants of the way in which organisations are structured and of
the way in which individuals are given jobs to perform. Job design
theorists generally expect management to alter its attitudes and
assumptions regarding the nature of organisational structure and the
nature and abilities of the workforce. The process of attitude change
is complex and, in the case of job design, frequently unsuccessful.
Institutional inertia: Changing organisational practices and routines
and the content of jobs that have operated for many years to some tolerable
degree of effectiveness is not an easy process. A quantity of detailed
investigation and planning is required before any change is considered;
the implementation of change may have to be a gradual one taking place
over a prolonged period; adequate evaluation of such changes may not
be possible until a "running in" period has been completed, during
which performance may fall endangering the whole project. Job design
is not a simple management technique. It in difficult to implement,
and for some managers it may be too difficult.
Individual differences: Most of the benefits of job design techniques
are attributed to the beneficial psychological effects on the work
force of changes to job content. The spread of individual differences
in the population of workers ensures that a change of job design in
a given direction will not be regarded in the same light by everyone
affected. Some people will welcome the novelty and the opportunities
that a change in job design may offer, other people will resent such
interference with a way of working that they are perfectly content
with. Job design techniques are thus liable to meet resistance from
both management and workers.
Experimental control: It is extremely difficult to produce unequivocal
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statistical evidence that the design of jobs in a particular way is
likely to produce particular results. In conducting a job design
experiment in an organisational setting it is impossible to control
for the influence of every possible variable that might affect the
results of the experiment. "Proof" that the results of job design
experiments have in fact been generated by the changes in job design
is frequently based on comparatively dubious evidence such as
management's opinions of the effects of the changes, or the results of
job satisfaction questionnaires administered to the workers affected
(and sometimes to an unaffected control group) before and after the
changes take place. Frequently, beneficial results may be attributed
simply to the eradication of ineffective work methods, to technical
rather than to psychological changes, or to other changes taking place
in the organisation at the same time as the job design experiment.
To be unable to produce adequate proof that the technique being
advocated does in fact work, simply exacerbates the problem of
attitude change mentioned above.
Making job design prescriptions operational: It is one thing to
specify that jobs should possess certain characteristics but quite
another to go about changing the content of jobs so that they do in
fact possess these characteristics. It is often suggested, for
example, that workers should be given more "responsibility" in their
jobs. A moment ' s thought will produce a large number of possible
meanings which this term could have when being put into practice on a
particular shop floor. How then does one compare the results of two
experiments in which the amount of "responsibility" given to the work¬
force has been increased? None of the job design techniques currently
available appears satisfactorily to solve this problem of turning
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prescription into action.
These, then, are some of the major difficulties that beset the
issue of job design. Together, they largely account for the lack of
application of job design techniques. The overriding purpose of the
research reported here has been to formulate solutions to some of
these problems.
The Objectives of this Thesis
This thesis has two major objectives:
1. To show why the techniques currently available for designing
jobs are inadequate; and
2. To derive and evaluate an approach to the design of jobs
based on a model of organisational analysis.
Job design theory has foundations in academic endeavour, but
however sound these are, the benefits that the technique can produce
can only be achieved if a proficient method for transposing theoretical
prescription into practical action is available. It is, therefore, to
the problem of formulating a technique for implementing job design that
this thesis is particularly directed. Current job design theories
take as their unit of analysis either the individual job or groups of
jobs. This thesis attempts to show that the unit of analysis that is
appropriate for the implementation of job design is the organisation
as a whole. Adopting this approach means that a model of organisa¬
tional functioning is required, a model of the oganisation as a whole
that can be used as a framework for organisational analysis and
change. This thesis attempts to formulate and to evaluate a general
model of organisational functioning that is based on concepts taken
from cybernetics and production control theory. This choice of
theoretical underpinning is rooted in the assumption that "management"
as a function (rather than as a group of people) can be regarded as
an information processing and control function. In arguing that
this change in the unit of analysis used in the design of jobs is
necessary, this thesis also argues that emphasis be placed on
organisational design rather than job design. The model of
organisational functioning that is developed here is used to
illustrate how job content is determined by organisational design.
The thesis is developed further, therefore, to specify a general
theory of job and organisational design.
The Origins of this Research
The research reported here began, not as a study of job design
technique, but as an investigation of management information
processing procedures in organisational control systems. (The
work was in fact restricted to production control systems, but the
approach uses a general model of organisational information
processing and control.) The project as it was originally
conceived was to have been exploratory in nature and the research
objectives were stated in rather general terms. Before the first
part of the fieldwork was under way, however, the potential
application of the model that was being developed, as a framework
for job design, was realised. The fieldwork then commenced with
two intentions; to investigate the nature of management information
processing in production control systems, and to evaluate the
information processing model used in the investigation as a frame¬
work for a theory of job design. The fieldwork involved detailed
analyses of the jobs of managers - from first line supervisors upwards
- concerned with production control. These analyses can be treated
as studies of managerial job content.
The returns for the companies that allowed access to their
personnel for the purposes of this research were not substantial.
One company studied had severe production scheduling problems, a
large backlog of overdue orders and consequent difficulties in
quoting accurate delivery dates. The other two production units
studied (both parts of the same company) suffered high rates of
labour turnover, undoubtedly due to the nature of the work on the
shop floor. It was suggested to the first company that an alteration
to the routing of certain products through the various production
stages would speed up the throughput of certain items and allow
accurate delivery dates to be calculated for most products. A
further suggestion - that the shop floor operators should be allowed
to determine the best routing for each item - was rejected with very
little discussion. None of these companies was prepared to accept
that job design could provide an answer (or a partial answer) to
their problems. This may have been partly due to the fact that the
research was not perceived to be directly concerned with job design
but with management information processing. But it is perhaps
mainly attributable to managerial attitudes and to the inability of
the researcher to change those attitudes.
Clarification of Terminology
There is a good deal of current interest and debate concerning
what has come to be called "industrial democracy" or "worker
participation". The Labour Government set up a Committee of
Enquiry into Industrial Democracy (the Bullock Committee) which
published its report in January 1977. The terminology of this
debate has become inordinately, and unnecessarily, confused, and
for the avoidance of doubt concerning the relationship between
these matters and the design of jobs, the terminology will be
examined and, it is hoped, clarified before proceeding with this
thesiSo The terms "industrial democracy" and "worker participation"
tend to be used synonymously and with little attempt at precise
definition of their meaning. The term "worker participation" has
always had a number of meanings. Clarke, Fatchett and Roberts (1972)
for example, distinguish two basic types - "poweivcentred" and
"task-centred" participation. The former is used to refer to
arrangements that allow workers to influence management decision
making at the highest level, in the boardroom. Giving workers more
control over their immediate working environment, on the other hand,
is referred to as task-centred participation„
Our society as a whole is run ''democrati cally"; by analogy,
it is commonly argued, society's dominant institution - industry -
should be run in a similar way. But as Carole Pateman ( 1970)
has argued, the word "democracy" does not have one definitive meaning.
Rousseau, Mill and Cole took the word to mean "participative
democracy"; to mean arrangements whereby eveiyone is involved in the
process of making decisions that affect them. Current use of the
word takes it to mean "representative democracy" in which a small
proportion of individuals compete for the votes of the mass of the
people and make decisions on their behalf as their elected
representatives. The Bullock Committee is not concerned with
"worker participation" (i.e. with task-cent red participation or
participative democracy), but with "worker representation" (i.e.
with power-cent red participation or representative democracy).
Improved representative arrangements in industry may facilitate the
introduction of desirable changes to job content, but do not in
themselves affect the daily working lives of anyone except the elected
representatives and those in higher positions with whom they have to
deal. What then, for example, does Carby (1976, p.63) refer to
when he discusses "The industrial democracy approach to job design..."?
Careful definition and use of these terms is not difficult.
Throughout this thesis, the term "job design" is used as a generic
term referring to the direct manipulation of job content. It is
not used to refer to forms of representative or consultative
arrangements. Job design used in this sense is also a more limited
form of social or organisational change than that implied by the term
"participative democracy",, Job design does, however, approximate
to the concept of "task-centred participation", but since the latter
is the more cumbersome term, it will not be used here.
The Structure of This Thesis
Immediately after this introduction, Chapter 2 presents a
chronological review of the literature concerning the development of
job design objectives and techniques. There are two basic approaches
to the design of jobs which differ principally in the respective
units of analysis that they have adopted. One approach takes as the
basic unit of analysis the individual job, and is here called the
"job restructuring" approach. The other approach takes the primary
work group (or a department or section of an enterprise) as the basic
unit of analysis and is here called the "work organisation" approach.
The reason for choosing these particular terms is explained at the
beginning of Chapter 2.
The development of the job restructuring approach is traced
through four main "generations" from its inception in work carried
out in the early 1920s. The literature has been divided in this way
in an attempt to illustrate as clearly as possible the main
theoretical and practical developments that have taken place during
the period covered. The work organisation approach is of
comparatively more recent origin; the review of this approach
begins in 1951- The review as a whole essentially covers the
period 1924 to 1975« The aim of the review is to illustrate -
(a) the general agreement between researchers (and practitioners)
in this field as to which types of job characteristics are
considered to be desirable; and
(b) the difficulty that all the techniques examined appear to have
in making the descriptions of desirable job characteristics
operationalo
It is argued that this failure to turn prescription satisfactorily
into action arises in both approaches to job design through the use
of inappropriate units of analysis, and that the appropriate unit
of analysis for the design of jobs is the organisation as a whole.
Most job design techniques advocate passing tasks that are normally
carried out by management (usually first and second line super¬
vision) to those working at the lowest level. Job design rarely
concerns itself directly with managerial jobs. But it is concerned
with the manipulation of managerial job content as a source of tasks
that can be used to improve lower level jobs. Thus, it is at the
interface between managerial and non-managerial jobs that job design
typically takes place. Job design requires, therefore, some method
of analysing managerial tasks.
A method of analysing managerial tasks is developed in Chapter
3. The organisational model that is described is based on a definition
of management as an information processing and control function and
it draws upon the theory of cybernetics and production control.
The model is developed as a framework for organisational analysis
and change; it is a normative, general model of organisational
information processing and control that specifies all the management
tasks that an organisation must allocate to its members if it is to
function effectively. It is not simply a method for the descriptive
analysis of organisational functioning, although it can be used as
such. As a normative model, it shows how an organisation should
function if it is to be effective, rather than how any particular
organisation does function.* The model itself says nothing about
how the tasks specified should be allocated to members of the
organisation, but the job designer with such a comprehensive
specification is in an excellent position from which to begin
allocating tasks in the manner considered to be most desirable.
This is, then, a framework for organisational design as much as a
framework for job design. The model is a general one and can be
applied to any type of organisation of any size.
The general model of organisational control described in Chapter
3 has functional properties in common with theories of human learning
that are based on cybernetic concepts. Chapter 4 illustrates how
this similarity may be exploited in order to operationalise
"desirable job characteristics" - the provision of continuous learning
and feedback of performance results in particular. Chapter 4 also
illustrates how other desirable job characteristics can be made
operational using the model of organisational control, and a general
theory of job and organisational design is developed combining the
model of organisational control and cybernetic models of human
learning. This theory shows how organisational and job design
* The word "normative" is used throughout in the sense indicated in
this sentence.
changes can produce work in which, participants can learn to improve
their performance, either by improving their performance of specific
tasks, or by rearranging and reallocating tasks amongst participants
to improve overall performance. If those performing jobs are allowed
to change the design of those jobs, this raises the question of what
is "designed" in the first place. It is argued that jobs as such
should not be designed at all, but that the method by which their
design is determined should be designed. The determination of job
content is a part of the management function. Having designed this
function and handed it over to those who perform the non-managerial
jobs, there is no need to design the non-managerial jobs as their
content will now be determined by the managerial function. Job and
organisational design, therefore, become the design of information
processing and control systems.
The production control systems of three manufacturing units
were studied using the model of organisational control as a frame¬
work for analysis. The results of two of these analyses are
presented in Chapter 5« These analyses can be regarded as studies
of managerial job content and they are used to illustrate how job
and organisational design choices can be generated through such an
analysis. The analysis produces three types of information:
1. It specifies the content of existing managerial jobs,
throughout the production control system, and their inter¬
relationships.
2. It indicates control system operations that are not being carried
out effectively, or that are not being carried out at alio
3. It provides a comprehensive framework for the reallocation of
tasks throughout the organisation, i.e. it provides a framework
of change for job and organisational design.
It was not possible to obtain permission from a local company
to manipulate job content along lines suggested by the model.
Chapter 6 describes a moderately successful attempt to test some of
the hypotheses generated from Chapter 4, within the confines of a
laboratory experiment. Two versions of a production system
simulation game were designed and used on a number of production
management courses run by the University of Edinburgh, Department of
Business Studies. (This resolved the problem of obtaining sufficient
participants.) One version of the game simulated a conventional
production control system with a typical information system; the
other version simulated a production system controlled "democratically"
(in the participative sense) by its members who were asked to use
a modified information system.
In terms of overall performance (measured by a number of
criteria) and "learning about production management" (measured by
content analysis of participants' essays) the "experimental" groups
performed significantly better than the "standard" groups, bearing
out the general predictions of the theory. The "learning" that
took place in the experimental groups, however, was not quite as
predicted. It was assumed that both game designs would confront
participants with essentially the same problems, but to different
degrees. But the experimental design appears to overcome come
conventional production management problems, and participants in
these groups faced problems that were different from those met by
the standard groups. The statistical evidence upon which this
inference is based, however, should be regarded with due scepticism.
Many of the results are derived from the content analysis of short
essays, and while every attempt was made to conduct this analysis
in a rigorous manner, the resultant categorisation of content is
subjective. This must be taken into account in interpreting the
statistical evidence that is presented.
A brief summary of the research, arguments and conclusions
described in Chapters 2 to 6 is given in Chapter 7. An attempt is
made in this Chapter to evaluate the success of this research in
meeting its stated objectives, i.e. in identifying the problems of
current job design theory and its implementation, and in the formu¬
lation and evaluation of an alternative approach to the design of
jobs that overcomes these problems.
Appendix I presents two additional case studies of production
control systems, in two "common ownership" companies. The analysis
of their control systems is conducted using the general model of
organisational control described in Chapter 3. These studies
indicate a degree of confusion over the meaning of the term "workers'
control". In one of these companies the workforce do control their
own work, taking all decisions affecting the company's operations as
a group. Only a small company can do this, and this one has
eleven employees. In the other company studied, the workers operate
under a conventional hierarchical management structure. They each
have a proportion of shares in the company (there are no outside
shareholders), the amount depending on the length of time they have
been working there. This could be described as "workers' ownership",
but in the management of the company, the workers have no control at
all.
Appendix II contains detailed descriptions of the designs of
the two versions of the production system simulation game and of the
manner in which these games were run. This experiment produced three
sets of results. The full analysis of these results is also contained
in Appendix II.
Appendix III contains various supplementary materials used in
the simulation games, such as the game Umpires' instructions and the
paperwork that was used in each version of the game.
Appendix IV contains a further case study that supports the
evidence presented in Chapter 5> and an ex,ample of how this type
of information was obtained is also included here.
CHAPTER 2:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF JOB DESIGN OBJECTIVES
MP TECHNIQUES.
34.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF JOB DESIGN OBJECTIVES MP TECHNIQUES
Introduction
The material dealt with in this Chapter covers ground which
has been trodden, and in some cases heavily trampled, by numerous
authors who have not necessarily concerned themselves directly with
the design of jobs. This is an indication of the multi-disciplinary
nature of the relevant work. Job design theory has been dependent
upon a number of disciplines for its development such as psychology,
sociology, social psychology, economics, production engineering
and systems theory. This Chapter is principally concerned with
job design objectives and techniques and it is not proposed to
present reviews of the development of admittedly closely related
topics such as job satisfaction and the motivation to work, although
it will be necessary to point to a quantity of work from these
areas which has particular relevance to job design theory.
There are currently two conceptually distinct approaches to
the design of jobs; one approach based on the analysis of
individual job content, and the more recently developed approach
concerning the manner in which work as a whole is organised.
A further distinction which may be drawn between these approaches
is that they were developed and are currently being applied on
opposite sides of the Atlantic, the former in North America, the
latter in Europe, particularly Scandinavia.
Davis and Taylor (1972) call these approaches "job-centred
studies" and "work-system studies" respectively; Herzberg (1974)
makes the distinction between "orthodox job enrichment"and
"social job design approaches"; Wild (1973, 1974a) refers to
"job and work changes" and "organisational changes". Any confusion
implied by this variety of terms is more apparent than real,
the disagreement is over what the approaches should be called, not
what they entail. The labels considered most apt and adopted
here are those used by Wild (1975) whose complete categorisation
scheme is shown in Figure 2.1, p.36. He uses the terms "job
restructuring" and "work organisation" which appear to summarise
concisely and accurately the somewhat diverse content subsumed
under each heading.
Generally speaking, the techniques of job restructuring were
the first to appear, and are dealt with first here. As will be
seen, early writers frequently advocated job rotation, now regarded
as a "work organisation" development; it is, however, included
without comment below in the job restructuring section partly
because of the time of its introduction in the literature, and
partly because the major form of work organisation development
concerns "socio-technical system design" and the concept of the
"autonomous group". Job rotation is sometimes implied in
autonomous group working, but the latter generally involves more
dramatic organisational changes than the original exponents of
job rotation conceived. Wild's categorisation is explained in
more detail below, p.238.
1. PROLOGUE
Industrial Engineers
It is customary for anyone now writing about the relationship
between man and work to begin by presenting the "scientific
management" theories developed in America during the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. Due to the vast amount of
discussion and criticism of this work already in existence only a
 
brief account will be given here, necessitated by one common
objective of modern job design theories - to replace those advanced
by the scientific management school. The originator of these
theories was F.W. (Speedy) Taylor, whose pronouncements are to be
found in his two major publications, "The Principles of Scientific
Management" and "Shop Management", both of which first appeared in
1911. In these works, Taylor expounded theories of organisation
structure, task design and worker motivation all of which are now
regarded as grossly inaccurate. His colleagues and subsequent
followers, notably F. and L. Gilbreth (initiators of "time and
motion study") and Charles Bedeaux, were to develop and modify
his ideas but left the fundamental principles intact. Leaving
aside Taylor's influential ideas concerning organisation structure
and "functional management", his methods of task design and theories
of worker motivation are of more interest here.
Taylor advocated two forms of division of labour, between
managers and workers, and between members of the productive work¬
force. Managers should concentrate solely on "brain work" and
the workers should perform only the "spade work" (or in the case of
the Dutch pig-iron handler Schmidt, "shovel work"). There should
be no overlap,workers being explicitly informed that they were not
paid to think, that this was management's job. Manual work,
argued Taylor, should be divided into small, easily learned units
so that the worker could quickly become "expert" at his particular
task. Part of the "science" came in determining the "one best
way" in which to perform these units, minimising unnecessary
movement through careful analysis of the task components, and
reducing fatigue still further with judiciously spaced rest periods.
Once the one best way is determined, the worker is expressly
forbidden to deviate from the given work methods.
Taylor did have dramatic success in improving productivity
using these methods, but his search for efficiency was regarded by
many who came in contact with it as a depressing and degrading
affair. Taylor always stressed that his task design methods
would only be effective if used in conjunction with a "scientifi¬
cally" designed piece rate incentive system. He regarded workers
as intrinsically lazy and if they were to agree to perform their
tasks his way, this would only be due to the promise of increased
financial reward.
At least two points may be made in mitigation of Taylor's
work, given the burden of criticism which it has had to bear.
First, the managerial methods advocated were regarded as admirable
solutions to the problems of American industrial society around the
turn of the century. Industrialisation and mechanisation were
proceeding apace, and the availability of large amounts of
unskilled immigrant labour enhanced the attractions of Taylor's
task design methods. Unskilled and unorganised, first-generation
immigrants experienced language difficulties and had no desire
for control over their work situation; so long as the work was
adequately paid, task specialisation was desirable and necessary.
Second, in explaining these techniques more or less systematically,
he influenced to a great extent the areas of investigation in
which later students were to work, and provided a theoretical
framework (however shaky) against which contradictory ideas could
be formulated and clarified. Very much a product of his time,
Taylor's work continued to stimulate research long after his death.
In practice, these theories have proved remarkably resistant
to change. Future students may point to the delay of over half
a century or more between the production of convincing proof of
the inadequacy of their assumptions and techniques, and the
beginnings of change in organisational settings on a meaningful
scale. Surveying the job design methods of two dozen American
companies, Davis, Canter and Hoffman (1955) found that tasks were
combined into jobs in order to maximise specialisation, reduce
variety and make the work as repetitive as possible in order to
minimise training time; exactly what Taylor suggested. In the
course of the well known "South Essex" studies, Woodward (1965)
encountered two companies using a form of Taylor's functional
organisation. His views on worker motivation and the incentive
power of money are widely shared in British industry to this day
and should require no example. Scientific management has thus
proved to be a popular and persistent ideology which has managed
to withstand practically unanimous academic opprobrium due to
its palpable success in practice. There are, however, signs that
this apparent immunity is neither impregnable nor permanent; as
investigation and experience continue to reveal the dysfunctional
side-effects of task fragmentation, and as the interest of management
and government in techniques of job design and worker participation
continues to grow.
Although numerous companies in America, Britain and Europe
eagerly implemented his methods, Taylor frequently had to contend
with argument from management and workers alike in his attempts to
implement the "Taylor system" (a term supplied by others, but which
he personally deplored as it detracted from the "scientific" essence
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of the technique). He never actually managed to apply scientific
management in full at Bethlehem Steel, the company with which his
name is frequently associated probably because that was where he
discovered his protege Schmidt, the inefficient pig-iron handler.
Bethlehem fired Taylor in 1901 after his persistent conflict with
the management. Further setback was to come with the Watertcwn
Arsenal strike in 1912 which was a direct result of the
implementation of Taylor's methods. The strike prompted an
investigation by a Special Committee of the House of Representatives,
and later unrest at the Arsenal prompted a further inquiry in 1914
by the United States Commission on Industrial Relations.
The first truly "scientific" investigations of Taylor's ideas,
however, began several years after his death in 1917, and these
took place not in America but in Britain. It is with these
initial investigations that this review properly begins. They
are called "scientific" because they were conducted by people
trained in the theory and research methods of the experimental
psychology of that time. They called themselves "industrial
psychologists" and although they did carry out some laboratory
work in this area, the majority of their studies took place in
industrial settings. The year in which this review starts is
1924; this is a convenient date being the year in which the first
(British) Industrial Fatigue Research Board report concerning the
problems of repetitive work was published, and the (American)
Hawthorne studies dealt with briefly below got under way in Chicago.
2. JOB RESTRUCTURING
British Industrial Psychologists
The Industrial Fatigue Research Board (IFRB) was established in
1918 principally to continue the work of the Health of Munitions
Workers Committee conducted during the First World War. The name
was changed to Industrial Health Research Board (IHRB) in 1929,
reflecting the changing and broadening emphasis and directions in
its work. In contrast to earlier work on the problems and
alleviation of worker fatigue, the IFRB launched in 1924 a series
of studies of a related, but distinctly different problem:
monotony and the unit of work or work cycle.
Several types of light, short cycle repetitive work were
studied in different factories and their effect on productivity
and worker attitudes examined. Repetitive work was generally
found to be boring, leading to systematic reductions in output.
Taylor advocated task specialisation which created repetitive work,
and the obvious antidote to repetitiveness was variety.
In a number of short cycle operations Vernon, Wyatt and Ogden
(1924) found that workers introduced variety into their tasks
themselves, either by doing other tasks, moving around or resting.
The type of tasks studied were:
in the boot and shoe industry -
• women stitching boot and shoe uppers, 1 minute work
cycle;
• men stamping pieces of leather to be built up into heels,
1 to 4 seconds cycle;
• men building heels, 30 seconds cycle.
and in the tin canister industry -
• women inserting linoleum and cardboard discs into tin
caps, 1 second cycle;
• stamping out tin lids, 0.7 second cycle.
Job rotation was found to increase both variety and output:
"When the form of activity is changed at intervals
of approximately half an hour, an increase in output
of IT to 20 per cent was observed in the case of two
operatives". (p.36)
A large number of changes in the course of the working day had an
adverse effect on production. It is significant that job rotation
is advocated in this report despite the fact that the highest output
in this experiment was achieved with the two operatives mentioned
working constantly, at the same task;
"... but the days of uniform activity were much
disliked by the operatives". (p. 36)
So the long-term effects of repetitive work were thought to be
substantially different from the short-term effects. It was
suggested that an optimum duration could be found for each worker
and for each kind of work after which it would be desirable to
rotate to another activity. These results were a direct challenge
to the prescriptions of scientific management and further studies
produced confirmatory results.
Wyatt, Fraser and Stock (1928) observed women wrapping soap,
folding handkerchiefs, making bicycle chains, weighing and wrapping
tobacco, making cigarettes and assembling cartridge cases; again
all light repetitive tasks. Output was lower and more irregular
with uniform than with more varied work, changes of activity every
lg to 2 hours being most effective.
Representing something of a departure from their previous
research methods, Wyatt, Fraser and Stock (1929) adopted the less
rigorous approach of asking ^9 workers for their subjective opinions
of their work. Boredom was found to be a common characteristic
of repetitive work; less than one third of their sample claimed
that they never experienced boredom. The experience of boredom
was also found to be associated with lower production and
fluctuations in work rate. The authors suggested that as bored
workers apparently overestimate time intervals, the working day
seems longer and they reduce their work rate accordingly! More
significantly, boredom was seen to be related to degree of task
mechanisation. Completely mechanised tasks allow the worker to
daydream or converse with other workers, and work which is
completely absorbing similarly precludes boredom. It was in the
semi-automatic processes that boredom was found to be most prevalent.
From this particular study came a number of conclusions which appear
in much subsequent research:
1. Repetitive work is associated with the mechanisation
of production; the experience of boredom at such tasks
has psychological effects on the worker and adversely
affects output. Fatigue and boredom are regarded as
distinctly separate phenomena.
2. The mediating effect of individual differences on the
experience and toleration of boredom is recognised,
workers of higher intelligence apparently becoming
bored more quickly.
3. The concept of "habituation" is outlined (although this
term is not used):
"Continuous exposure to monotonous conditions of work
causes adaptation to such conditions so that work
which initially is tedious and unpleasant may after¬
wards be tolerated or even mildly enjoyed".
(Wyatt, Fraser and Stock, 1929, p. 1+3)
H. The social conditions of work were found to have significant
(but not emphasised) consequences, boredom being less likely
to arise:
".... when the operatives are allowed to work in
compact social groups rather than as isolated units".
(p.1+3)
Task specialisation could thus perhaps produce improved results
in the short term, hut it was now clear that the "boredom induced
by such work more than offset any of its advantages. Suggestions
for counteracting boredom included increasing opportunities to
alter posture,spaced rest periods, grouping workers so that
conversation is facilitated, job rotation and even the broad¬
casting of music during work spells (Wyatt, Frost and Stock, 1931+) •
This latter idea was tested experimentally, and output was
mysteriously highest when music was played for 75 minutes at the
middle of the work spell (Wyatt, Langdon and Stock, 1937). The
female operators concerned, however, preferred to listen to it
during alternate half hour bursts throughout the day. (United
Biscuits currently spend between £70,000 and £90,000 per annum
maintaining a radio station broadcasting over G.P.0. land line
to their factories all over the country: Albert, 1971+*)
As toleration of boredom varied with individual differences,
it is natural that improved selection procedures should be
advocated, to screen out workers more likely to find repetitive
work intolerable (Wyatt, Langdon and Stock, 1937). Further
work by the IHRB in this area produced similar results and
offered similar solutions to the problems of machine paced,
repetitive work, the main ones being job rotation and improved
selection methods. These are, however, indirect solutions and
it was the work of the National Institute of Industrial Psychology
(NIIP) which advanced these findings into the area of job design.
The NIIP had been established in 1921, due largely to the efforts
of the influential C.S. Myers who became its director and who was
also a member of the Committee on Industrial Psychology at the
IFRB. Dependent upon consultancy fees for its existence, obvious
constraints were placed on the Institute's choice of research
activities and the publication of results. There was some
concern with the repetitive work problem, indicated in one short
report of part of a large scale investigation of assembly methods
at a company manufa.cturing wireless sets, Kolster-Brandes, Ltd.,
(Harding, 1931). The experiment reported lasted for three weeks
and involved two operators (one of whom ".... had to be dismissed
on the (third) Wednesday."). Performance at a "small" work unit
was compared with that on a "large" unit. These two work units
comprised, respectively, soldering either two or three wires to
each set, or eight to eleven wires. Harding's concern was to find
the optimum size of work unit. Initially, performance on the small
task was better, but this improvement was not persistent; the
workers preferred the larger task and performance at it was still
improving when the experiment was discontinued. These results are
consistent with the earlier results concerning the introduction
of variety through job rotation, but here the tasks themselves
were changed (in a minor way) rather than the workers' allocation
to tasks. Harding did not use the term, but this appears to be
the first report of a "job enlargement" experiment, albeit a
comparatively small scale one.
The Industrial Health Research Board was disbanded in 19^7,
and Wyatt became director of the Medical Research Council Group
for Research in Industrial Psychology. From within that group,
Walker and Marriott (1951) and Wyatt and Marriott (1956)
published the results of an attitude survey of 17U car and metal
mill production workers. Job satisfaction was found to be
highest amongst workers in jobs having not only variety but also
requiring some measure of skill and having opportunity for pride
in achievement. Satisfaction was found to be correspondingly
lowest with workers on simple repetitive tasks. Researchers
from the NIIP continuing this line of research predicted
difficulties in persuading management to allow experimentation
with varying work content, but some managements had by this time
recognised the problems of repetitive work for themselves and many
corporate member firms of the Institute welcomed the opportunity
to contribute to their investigation. Cox and Dyce Sharp (1951)
explored Harding's (1931) suggestion that an optimal work cycle
could be found. Discussing the results of ten field experiments
concerning the effects of work cycle and batch size on job
satisfaction and productive efficiency, a number of conclusions
were presented:
(a) Operators learning a task prefer small batch sizes;
experienced operators should be given batches lasting 1 to
1\ hours.
(b) A longer work cycle can increase output and quality.
Two examples are given:
(i) the average output and quality produced by one
girl assembling a hearing aid, with a 20 minute
work cycle, were higher than for a ten girl assembly
line working on the same product;
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(ii) in lingerie manufacture, reduction in team size from
6 to 4, and consequent increase in work cycle, raised
output to 43 per cent above its original level.
(c) lengthening the work cycle reduces problems of line
balancing; through the build up of buffer stocks, individual
operators can vary their work rate without affecting others.
(d) operators should have the opportunity to vary the task, e.g.
the sequence of operations or the batch size. This
increased freedom improves job satisfaction, output and
quality.
(e) lengthening the work cycle provides a more "meaningful" job.
(f) training of operators experienced in small work units to
perform large work units is quite feasible.
(g) the rhythm of the flow of work is for some a source of
satisfaction in repetitive work, and continuity should
wherever possible be maintained. (Baldamus (1951) referred
to this phenomenon as "traction".)
In theory at least, therefore, the notions of task specialisation
and the "one best way" were shown to be dysfunctional, and by the
early 1950's an advance had been made by adding to the term "variety"
as the antidote to repetitiveness (variety principally implying
job rotation), job enlargement and increased operator responsibility
for his work. These developing ideas concerning the relationship
of man to work went naturally hand in hand with administrative and
economic benefits. Job enlargement could alleviate some work
flow scheduling difficulties as well as reducing monotony and
improving output and quality. Taylor's view of the worker as a
machine driven by money had to be replaced with a more complex
model indicating the relationships between task characteristics,
individual differences, job satisfaction, and performance.
Research in Britain at this time was due to take off on a rather
different tack, and until part 3 below ("Work Organisation")
where those developments are taken up, almost all the research
mentioned is American.
During the period with which we have been dealing up to now,
American industrial psychologists were mainly preoccupied with the
application of psychology to advertising, and with devising
personnel selection tests. The first large scale applications of
the findings discussed above and their implications, however, took
place in America towards the end of the Second World War. The
initiative for this work came not from the earlier British research,
but mainly from managements acting on their own intuitions with
regard to the problems raised by their job design practices.
Academic involvement generally commenced once projects were under
way. Before turning to those experiments, a brief sketch of a
related facet of American research from the 1920's to the early
19^0's is given, not because it directly concerns job design but
because it instigated a somewhat dramatic revision of the way in
which man at work had come to be regarded.
American Industrial Sociologists
The infamous "Hawthorne Studies" which began in 192^ at the
Chicago factory of the Western Electric Company attempted initially
to examine the relationship between output and illumination. No
such relationship was found. The intended results of these
experiments were to have been the kind which appear as profits in
company accounts, not as papers in academic journals, and the
experiments were at first carried out by a research division
within Western Electric. The Harvard Business School, however,
became involved from 1927 onwards.
The precise nature of this research and the results are
matters which need not detain us here, and which must in any case
now be regarded as equivocal. Accounts are to be found in
Roethlisberger and Dickson (1939) and Whitehead (1938), and in
the various writings of Elton Mayo who had little to do with the
actual running of the experiments but who acted as something of a
publicity agent for the findings. The research methodology and
interpretation of the results of the Hawthorne studies have been
subjected to a mass of criticism and re-evaluation. Carey (1967)
for example argues that the results provide confirmation of the
influence of financial incentives on output and the efficacy of
authoritarian leadership, points which the original researchers had
claimed to have been largely disproved. Blumberg (1968) claims
that these should really be regarded as experiments in worker
participation due to the extent of consultation which took place
before any experimental changes took place.
The immediate impact of this work was in constructing a theory
of management based on the "rediscovery" of two subsidiary
findings of the earlier British industrial psychologists: that
workers improve their performance when someone (even a researcher)
takes an interest in what they are doing (Vernon, Wyatt and Ogden,
192U, p.15); and that the opportunity to interact freely with
other workers boosts morale. The researchers emphasised the
distinction between "formal" and "informal" organisation of workers
and the relationships between informal organisation and
performance. The resultant "human relations" school of
management emphasised the importance of the work group - Taylor's
worker required only money, the human relations school's worker
required group membership. The counselling programme at Western
Electric indicated the importance of supervisory style in the
handling of work groups, and this became a major area of research
for American industrial psychologists, inspired largely by the
work of Kurt Lewin and his associates. Changing leadership style
is not job redesign and this line of research is not directly
relevant here. The realisation of the importance of the work
group on the other hand is a topic to which much attention is
devoted below.
First Generation Theory : Job Enlargement Advocates
During the Second World War, American industry seems to have
become more acutely aware of the implications of job and
organisational design for productivity and associated costs
(Drucker, 19I+6) . One critic of the human relations movement,
Robert Merton (a sociologist at Columbia University), was very
much aware of the "social repercussions of technological change",
one of which would be to "affect the network of social relations
among workers engaged in production ...." (Merton, 19^T5 P-T9)-
He saw technological change enforcing obsolescence of skills,
loss of public identity in particular jobs through increased
specialisation and creating increased workplace discipline. In
this paper (which was about 25 years in advance of its time)
Merton also discusses the political implications of technology
which could he used as a weapon for subduing the worker by
promising to displace him unless he accepts proffered terms of
employment" (p.80). (For a more extensive contemporary treatment
of this point, see Dickson, 1971-) Merton thus makes a common
criticism of Mayo's sociology, that it is concerned with what
goes on in the individual factory; it focuses on "plant life" while
disregarding what is taking place in the garden as a whole.
Merton's caution over the limitations of a research approach
devoted solely to either the immediate work situation or to the
larger social structure went largely unheeded, at least where
job enlargement was concerned. One job enlargement advocate did
note that social characteristics of work groups influenced their
attitudes to work and affected morale which was generally lower
amongst workers from metropolitan backgrounds than those from
rural areas (Worthy, 1950, p.173).
The basic argument for job enlargement ignored such
complications. Morris Viteles, then Professor of Psychology
at the University of Pennsylvania, outlined the argument as
follows, and although it will be seen to have been derived from
earlier British research, Viteles was able to cite some similar
American research including Walker's (1950) case study described
below.
Increasing mechanisation of production, Viteles argued, creates
specialised repetitive tasks at which a large proportion of people
experience monotony and boredom. The experience of boredom has
an adverse effect on output and work rate?produces a higher number
of complaints, and generally reduces morale. Factory rules are
ignored and absenteeism and turnover increase. Selection should
screen out those unlikely to tolerate monotony, but since the root
cause is in the nature of the task, job variety should be increased.
This can be done through job rotation and job enlargement. (See
Viteles, 1950; and for a restatement of the same argument twelve
years later, Stephens, 1962.)
Problem:
Task
^ Monotony and Low Output
Specialisation Boredom and Morale
Solution:
Job Rotation and _• „+ir ^Interest and __Increased Output
Enlargement ^ Freedom and Morale
Figure 2.2 : First Generation Theory (Viteles, 1950)-
What are described here as first generation theories have the
somewhat simplified argument of Figure 2.2 in common, and research
was directed at obtaining a deeper understanding of the links in this
causal chain. One major investigation of the relationship between
technology and workers' job experience was conducted by Walker and
Guest from Yale University whose work "The Man on the Assembly Line"
(Walker and Guest, 1952) made an important contribution to this area.
(See also Walker, 195^+, and Guest, 1955, for brief summaries of the
major work.) In their attitude survey of 180 automobile assembly
workers, six characteristics of mass production work were identified:
"(l) Mechanical pacing of work
(2) Repetitiveness
(3) Minimum skill requirement
(h) Predetermination in the use of tools and techniques
(5) Minute subdivision of product worked on
(6) Surface mental attention." (p.12)
Jobs were scored in terms of these characteristics, and while
the workers were found to be satisfied with pay and conditions, workers
on jobs with a "high mass production score" exhibited a higher
absenteeism rate than those on jobs with lower scores (p.121).
They suggest that the undesirable characteristics of mass production
work can be improved by job rotation and enlargement (p.lU8).
Thus, although the solutions are the same, the problem is seen as a
somewhat more complex one with task characteristics other than
specialisation and repetitiveness (or rather derived from these
characteristics) seen to be important, e.g. the extent to which the
worker's abilities are utilised, how much control over work methods
he has, and how meaningful the task is to him. Nancy Morse
(Survey Research Center, University of Michigan) claimed to have
found a similar predilection for work involving skill, variety and
decision making amongst a large sample of (over 700) young female
white collar workers (Morse, 1953).
Working at Yale University with C.R. Walker, but researching
in another plant, A.N. Turner's attitude survey of over 200 "longer
service" auto assembly line workers indicated that both the job
and supervision affected worker morale (Turner, 1955 a). It
should be the task of the Foreman, therefore, to reduce the pressure
on workers created by mechanical pacing, and the "feelings of
impersonality" induced by task repetitiveness. Apart from the
"human relations" nostrums such as "establishing with each
one a personal relationship apart from the job relationship",
54.
Turner also suggested that the Foreman permit job rotation and other
methods of increasing variety in the work (Turner, 1955b, p.44).
Existing in harmony with, but not a central facet of the
human relations movement, job enlargement theory was well established
in America by the mid 1950's, and as the next section illustrates was
also fairly well established in practice.
First Generation Theory : Job Enlargement in Practice
In America in the early 1950's, job enlargement projects were
carried out in a number of different industrial settings, six of
which are mentioned here. Viteles (1950) gives an example of a job
rotation scheme, but these do not appear often in the literature.
This is undoubtedly a poor indicator of the extent of application in
practice since job rotation, involving no alteration to specific
tasks, is easily undertaken where simple repetitive work is concerned.
The focus here, then, is exclusively on job enlargement.
It is generally accepted that the first true job enlargement
project is that reported by C.R. Walker in 1950. The changes were
permanent and affected a substantial number of workers ("several
hundred") in contrast to Harding's previous experiment described
above. The project was conducted in the Manufacturing Department of
IBM's Endicott Plant on the initiative of the Chairman of the Board,
and it began in 1944 :
"Machine operators .... began in that year to make
their own 'set-ups'and do their own inspection. In
other words, their jobs were enlarged to include the
skills and responsibilities of 'set-up' men and of
inspectors." (Richardson and Walker, 1948, footnote
on p.12.)
In a well known paper in the Harvard Business Review, Walker (1950)
gives a detailed account of the job enlargement changes made at
Endicott. He gives no specific definition of the term, but makes
reference to "... enlarging and enriching the basic content of the
jobs ...." (p.5*0, and to ".... enriching the job in variety,
interest and significance ...." (p.55). (A more detailed definition
is given in "The Man on the Assembly Line":
"Job enlargement is simply the recombining of two or
more separate jobs into one This means a
lengthening of time cycles." (Walker and Guest, 1952,
p.151))
From the beginning, therefore, job enlargement was a
comparatively simple ad hoc antidote to the adverse effects of task
specialisation. The benefits of task recombination appeared to
have been improved product quality and a reduction in losses from
scrap, less idle time for men and machines, and a reduction of 95
per cent in set-up and inspection costs.
The apparent simplicity of this initial application of the
technique and its effects is dispelled, however, by a reading of
the full account of the company's organisational changes between
19^0 and 19*+7 given in Richardson and Walker's (19^+8) "Human
Relations in an Expanding Company." The job enlargement changes
were only part of a comprehensive organisational development
programme which took place over seven years. The authors list a
number of "non-typical changes in organisation" from this period.
Total plant personnel almost doubled, the machining section
increased by lii-T per cent and "educational" staff by *+50 per cent.
(Chapter 1.) There was a reduction in the number of hierarchical
levels of authority from 6 to 4, and there was also a reduction in
supervisory span of control. Not only operators had their jobs
enlarged; a similar policy for foremen began in 19*+0 with the
elimination of assistant foremen and keymen ("strawbosses").
Foremen were also given a number of functions previously carried
out by the Personnel Department, such as handling grievances.
(Chapters 2 and 3.) In addition, major changes were made to
the workflow system. Basically, the job lot manufacturing operation
was replaced by a "progressive assembly line"; this meant that
parts no longer returned to the central store after each operation
had been completed but continued directly to the next section and
the next operation. The previous system had entailed "multiple
handling" of all parts and the new system speeded up throughput,
greatly simplified the paperwork, and virtually eliminated production
hold-ups. (Chapter H.) This had the additional advantage of
reducing the ".... human fret, fatigue and frustration" (p.80)
characteristic of the old system.
Numerous other changes which took place included :
• the abolition of piecework in 1936 (p.13);
• an above national average rate of wage increases (p.28);
• additional "employee benefits" (p.28);
• weekly supervisory meetings (p.^5);
• the establishment of a Workers' Advisory Committee (p.^5);
• the education section started running courses for
supervisory personnel, from 19^+0, in a range of subjects
from cost analysis to human relations (p.U6).
The benefits attributed to job enlargement (with the exception
of reduced set-up and inspection costs), therefore, could equally
plausibly be attributed to various combinations of these additional
factors. The two most important are probably the reduction in
frustration through improvements in work flow, and increased training
and responsibilities (i.e. job enlargement) for first line supervision.
As a job enlargement "experiment" it was completely uncontrolled and
has been dealt with here in some detail as other similar case studies
are open to the same type of criticism. This lack of methodological
rigour, either in introducing the changes or presenting the results,
did not prevent uncritical acceptance of the technique by others who
cited this study as a model for other applications.
Subsequent applications of the job enlargement technique
involved clerks, typists and supervisors at Detroit Edison
(Elliot, 1953*); operators painting wooden toys at Hovey and Beard
(Strauss, 1955); accounting clerks at Colonial Insurance (Guest,
1957a*); assembly line operators at a hospital equipment
manufacturers (Guest, 1957b*); and sales clerks at Richardson,
Bellows, Henry and Company (Chain Stores) (Krugman, 1957). These
reports are anecdotal in style and only that of Marks (see footnote)
appears to have been conducted with any attempt at experimental
control. Bearing in mind that these studies all took place on
managerial, not academic, initiative, the technique attempted
to solve the following problems :
high absenteeism (Strauss, 1955);
- high labour turnover (Strauss, 1955; Guest, 1957a;
Krugman, 1957);
* Reports of these case studies can also be found in Walker, 1962,
pp.119-135. The second case study attributed to Guest (1957b)
was actually carried out by A.R.N. Marks, "An investigation
of modifications of job design in an industrial situation and
their effects on some measures of economic productivity",
unpublished doctoral thesis, University of California,
Berkely, 195^- More detailed accounts of Marks' study can
be found in Davis and Canter, 1956, pp.278-280, and Davis,
1957b, pp.176-178.
-
poor quality work (Strauss, 1955; Guest, 1957a);
- problems of work flow scheduling (Elliot, 1953);
lack of operating flexibility (Elliot, 1953); and
- low morale (Elliot, 1953; Strauss, 1955; Guest, 1957a).
Benefits claimed to accrue to the company from the respective
changes included :
improved productivity (Strauss, 1955; Guest, 1957b);
improved quality (Strauss, 1955; Guest, 1957a and b);
- easier to trace errors (Guest, 1957 a and b);
- reduction in labour turnover (Guest, 1957a; Krugman, 1957);
improved operating flexibility (Elliot, 1953; Guest, 1957a
and b);
reduction in idle time (Elliot, 1953);
reduction in labour costs (Krugman, 1957);
reduction in materials handling requirements (Guest, 1957b);
fewer bottlenecks in production (Guest, 1957a); and
reduced need for direct supervision (Guest, 1957b).
Operators also benefited from job enlargement :
increased satisfaction (Strauss, 1955; Guest, 1957 a
and b; Krugman, 1957);
increased understanding of operations (Elliot, 1953;
Guest, 1957a);
- more job variety (Elliot, 1953);
less monotony (Guest, 1957a); and
increased earnings (Strauss, 1955; Guest, 1957a).
With such a comprehensive list of tangible benefits, it is
little wonder that management should have readily embraced the
technique and there were probably numerous unreported applications.
Those which have been mentioned here were widely discussed and
publicised in a diversity of journals including "Occupational
Hazards" (195*0, "American Mercury" (Wharton, 195*+), and
"Nation's Business" (Lagemann, 195*0 •
First Generation Theory : Job Enlargement Critics
The model presented in Figure 2.2 above did not pass without
criticism. Three main links in the argument were immediately open
to question :
1. does repetitive work necessarily create boredom?
2. does boredom necessarily have adverse effects on
attitudes and output?
3. if 1 and 2 are true, does job enlargement provide an
adequate solution?
The first point had already been examined by industrial
psychologists in Britain whose work was replicated and expanded
upon, P.C. Smith (1955) suggesting a number of personality
characteristics which along with task characteristics could determine
the individual's susceptibility to boredom. Due to the spread of
individual differences, some workers could be expected to find
repetitive work tolerable, if not positively satisfying (Smith and
Lem, 1955; Brayfield and Crockett, 1955)- In a study of 115
electronic instrument assembly operators, Turner and Miclette (1962)
claimed (unconvincingly) to have shown that :
".... repetitiveness of a job is not an important source of
dissatisfaction or low morale." (p.215).
The work of these operators was certainly not typical repetitive work
the operators considered that they were serving their country (the
components were regarded as essential to national defense), although
repetitive the work was regarded as highly skilled, and operators did
have some control over work pace and methods.
With regard to the relationship between employee attitudes and
productivity, Brayfield and Crockett (1955), in an extensive review
of relevant literature, concluded that :
there is little evidence .... that employee attitudes
of the type usually measured in morale surveys bear any
simple - or, for that matter, appreciable - relationship
to performance on the job." (p.Uo8)
Kennedy and O'Neill (1958) could find no difference in attitudes towards
work and supervision between assembly operators on repetitive tasks
and utility men doing similar but more varied work. But other
utility men whose work had been upgraded and included responsibility
for work methods and operator training did have more favourable
attitudes. The original utility man's job illustrated, in comparison
to the assembly operators, what would now be called "horizontal" job
enlargement, i.e. more of the same type of task. The upgraded
utility man's job had in contrast been "vertically" enlarged.
Kennedy and O'Neill did not use these terms but were correct in
concluding that the changes which produced the attitude differences
were ".... along more fundamental dimensions ...." (p.375). This
also concerns the third point listed above.
In another somewhat unconvincing study, conducted by Kilbridge
(1960a), of over 200 assembly workers in a Chicago radio and television
factory, the majority of workers appeared to prefer, or were
indifferent to, smaller as compared to larger tasks, and conveyor
pacing. Kilbridge argued that these workers did not want their jobs
enlarged. There was, however, not much difference between the small
and large tasks considered, the former including 7 "elements of work"
and the latter fourteen. The company had a high rate of labour
turnover and Kilbridge included in his sample only those who had
been with the company for over a year (in fact the average length
of service was, for women, bl years, and for men, 6 years). Rather
than restrict his survey to this self-selected sample, he could
perhaps have also examined why the substantial numbers leaving
the company's employ were doing so. It is conceivable that those
workers who left could not tolerate the boring tasks they had been
requested to perform. In a confusing and brief account of a job
rotation scheme which backfired (confidently described as a job
enlargement scheme) Rosen (1963a) claimed that rotation does not
necessarily increase variety and this is not necessarily its only
consequence. What the workers in this instance seemed to want were
more flexible working arrangements which the company's rotation
plans did not provide.
These critics were on the whole unable to compete with the
impressive results which the technique seemed to produce. What
these reports did indicate, on the other hand, was the inadvisability
of making simplistic generalisations such as "all workers find
repetitive work boring", "dissatisfaction always reduces productivity"
and "job enlargement is a generally applicable panacea".
With the breadth of perspective which Merton considered
necessary, Georges Friedmann provides a more detailed and comprehensive
overview of the developments discussed up to this point. In
"Industrial Society" (Friedmann, 1955) he covers the scientific
management movement in America and the growing rejection of its
"technicist perspective". Friedmann also describes the application
of scientific management in Europe (e.g. the ridiculous use of time
study by Renault at Billancourt where some workers found that the only
way to maintain the established pace was by using their heads as well
as their limbs to operate the machinery; pp.b2 and 26H-266).
Published originally in France in 1956 as "Le Travail en Miettes"
(Work in Crumbs), "The Anatomy of Work" appeared in English in 1961
and Friedmann again displayed his acquaintance with the British and
American work mentioned so far. Friedmann introduced several themes,
which will be taken up in following sections, based also on the
work of previous political theorists, notably Durkheim. The
personality of the worker in repetitive work he claimed, finds no
means of expression, and the work is, therefore, alienating.
Friedmann also argued that over-specialised work affects mental
health through the generation of psychosomatic complaints and neuroses
in industrial workers. These were areas to be covered later, by
Blauner and Kornhauser, in more detail. Friedmann was critical of
solutions to these problems based on increased use of automation and
extended leisure time. Automation, he argued? cannot take place at
the speed predicted by its advocates; and those who find little
opportunity for self-expression at work tend to spend their time in
escapist activities rather than treating this as an alternative
avenue of fulfilment. In a particularly uncompromising criticism
of the leisure argument, which provokes an instant reappraisal of
one's own leisure activities, Friedmann suggests that the combination
of task fragmentation and increased leisure time will tend :
".... to arouse aggressive tendencies and outbursts of
savage self-assertion through indulgence in all kinds
of stimulants, in alcohol, in games of chance or luck,
or in habits or bouts of "conspicuous consumption",
brutal amusements like "stock cars" and mass-
spectacles disguised as "sport" or "artistic" events,
boxing, all-in wrestling, speed racing and crime and
horror films." (Friedmann, 1961, p.loH)
Unlike his contemporaries in this area, Friedmann claimed
that job enlargement and rotation were inadequate measures in
themselves to counter problems of repetitive work. He felt
that work should be a learning experience :
providing a worker with an elementary knowledge
of mathematics, the physical sciences, and drawing and
technology, such as will enable him to understand what
he and his fellows are doing - and so to control it."
(Friedmann, 19^1, p.100)
From his review of contemporary work, Friedmann thus
anticipated a number of directions which future research would
take, and some of its conclusions. His own work thus provides
a convenient link between this and the next section.
Second Generation Theory : A More Sophisticated Model
The increasingly cautious and critical approach developed
in the 1960's produced a realisation of three main groups of factors
that repetitive work may have consequences for the worker more
fundamental than boredom, that the relationships between workplace
and worker characteristics, productivity and satisfaction are
considerably more complex than had at first been supposed, and that
job enlargement as a management technique could be justified on
technical and economic advantages alone.
In his comparative study of work in four (American) industries
Blauner (196U) attempted to show how certain technologies produced
alienation in the workforce. Blauner's definition of alienation
comprised four ingredients : powerlessness, meaninglessness, social
isolation and self-estrangement. The printing industry, operating
mainly with craft work, is thus described as non-alienating, the
worker having complete control of the process and close association
with the finished product. The textiles and automobile assembly
industries, particularly the latter, are on the other hand described
as highly alienating with extremely mechanised repetitive production
processes. Technology, through alienation, Blauner argued,
contributes to the creation of distinct social personalities:
ideally, when work is non-alienating as in the printing industry,
it tends to produce:
".... a strong sense of individualism and autonomy,
and a solid acceptance of citizenship in the larger
society." (Blauner, 196k, p.176)
Blauner was, of course, taking the American printing industry as it
operated in the 1950's and 60's, and developments in the technology
of printing since then have probably removed most of what Blauner
saw as desirable in the industry. Blauner is so far in agreement
with Friedmann in suggesting that working conditions have repercussions
affecting not only working life but also the fabric of the worker's
social life as a whole. Blauner's more contentious argument,
however, is that alienation will eventually be eliminated by
technological progress. In support of this argument he cites the
example of the chemicals processing industry, which is highly
automated, as another example of non-alienating working conditions.
Friedmann would certainly not have agreed with this, and neither
did Blumberg (196U) who argued that automation, if it is a solution
at all, will not happen quickly enough, will not affect a significant
number of jobs, and is thus no answer to current problems. The
debate is still very much alive as to whether or not automated
industries offer jobs with more desirable characteristics; this
question is dealt with briefly below, pp.202-205^
Another reported effect of repetitive work concerned mental
health. In a survey of over hOO male shop-floor workers in thirteen
Detroit car factories, Kornhauser (1965) found that on his index
those performing skilled work were in better mental health than those
performing routine machine-paced work. The worker on the repetitive
task was no longer merely bored, he was alienated and his
psychological well-being had become questionable. This was the type
of problem for which job design in general had to provide some
solution.
The theory presented in Figure 2.2 was clearly inadequate and
as an example of the type of model which superseded it, Figure 2.3
has been derived from Katzell, Barrett and Parker (1961). This
model is indicative of the type of approach being adopted, different
researchers placing different emphases on the implied variables.
At this level of generality, the model is characteristic of what is



















Figure 2.3 : Model of the work situation; second generation theory
(based on Katzell, Barrett and Parker, 1961).
In presenting their argument, these authors criticised the over
simple two-variable research designs of the past; the arrows in
Figure 2.3 indicate expected interrelationsips which only a
multivariate approach could hope to illuminate. The work of
Turner and Lawrence (1965) illustrates the applicability of this
model fairly well.
Turner and Lawrence set out to examine the relationship
between job characteristics and worker behaviour. A method of
rating jobs was developed incorporating several main dimensions -
variety, autonomy, interaction opportunities (on and off the job),
responsibility, learning time; and subsidiary dimensions -
required interaction,task identity, cycle time and working
conditions. Having devised rating scales for each of these
dimensions, the resultant measure was the Requisite Task Attribute
(RTA)index, and Turner and Lawrence began to examine correlations
between RTA ratings, and job satisfaction and absenteeism, for
i+70 workers in b'J jobs in 11 different industries. The predicted
negative correlation between RTA rating and absenteeism was found,
i.e. workers on jobs with high ratings had significantly lower
absenteeism rates than those on jobs with low ratings. Their
results are so far consistent with those of Walker and Guest (1952)
whose "mass production" scores are similar to the RTA index.
No correlation was found, however, between RTA ratings and job
satisfaction until the study's population was divided into a "Town"
or rural group and a "City" or urban group. The former showed more
satisfaction with highly rated jobs (which Turner and Lawrence
called "complex" work) but City workers seemed to prefer jobs with
low RTA ratings ("simple" work). Not only did job characteristics
affect worker behaviour, subcultural factors (or "social system
variables") also appeared to have a significant bearing on employees'
expectations and attitudes towards work. These results are clearly
consistent with the second generation theory, but Turner and
Lawrence realised that the gross distinction which they had made
in order to explain their data had concealed a host of underlying
variables and that the detailed relationships, could they be
worked out, would not be simple ones. Insofar as the distinction
proved useful, however, the authors turn to Durkheim's theory of
anomie to suggest that urban and city environments contribute to
the phenomenon which they had discovered. (in fact, the
importance of subcultural influences on attitudes to work had
been suggested by Worthy (1950), and Katzell, Barrett and Parker
(1961).)
As far as job enlargement was concerned, any generalisation
with respect to its applicability and results became subject to
obvious qualifications. Others continue to assert that the
application of job enlargement should be carefully selective
(cf. Wild, 1969, 1970, 1973, and Scott, 1973), in view of the fact
that many workers reject such attempts to improve their lot, and
are contented with what appears to most (middle-class) researchers
to be dismal boring work. Before leaving Turner and Lawrence, it
is noteworthy that the list of task attributes which they found to
be significant included far more than variety and cycle time.
In practice, the technique of job enlargement had other
limitations. Stewart (1967) for example gives the following:
• there is an upper limit of job complexity, determined
by cycle times, beyond which a job cannot be enlarged;
• job enlargement often requires more space and duplication
of expensive equipment;
• job enlargement is often restricted by process limitations
• it generally requires extended (costly) training;
« unplanned absence creates replacement problems.
These, of course, reflect the earlier arguments for job simplification.
The emphasis on behavioural effects of job enlargement, therefore,
decreased in favour of a more careful appraisal of economic
considerations (cf. Schoderbek and Reif, 1969). Tuggle, for
example, states that job enlargement :
".... provides a way of effectively reducing assembly
labour costs with a minimum of worker resistance. It
can improve quality by emphasising craftsmanship and
creating worker identification with the product. At
the same time, it provides simple ways of tracing rejects
to workers who need additional training. Finally, it
affords greater scheduling flexibility than was ever
possible on the assembly line for variations in demand
up to 20 per cent." (Tuggle, 1969, PP* 28-29)
Job enlargement can thus be used to subject the worker to increased
managerial control as well as to grant more freedom at work.
By this point in time the technique of " job enrichment" (dealt
with below) had been developed and publicised, and from around 1968
there has tended to be some confusion over terminology. Lawler
(1969) distinguishes between two forms of job enlargement, horizontal
and vertical. (See also Gomersall and Myers, 1966, p.63.) The
former we have been considering up to now, the latter is more commonly
referred to as job enrichment. The distinction is as follows :
"The horizontal dimension refers to the number and variety
of the operations that an individual performs on the job.
The vertical dimension refers to the degree to which the
job holder controls the planning and execution of his job
and participates in the setting of organisation policies."
(Lawler, 1969; p.l6U in Vroom and Deci, 1970.)
Studies from this period onwards using simply the term "job enlargement
require examination to determine which variety is being referred to.
It is Lawler's conclusion that both are necessary to elicit intrinsic
worker motivation, but this is anticipating later developments.
Job enlargement in practice during the 1960's will first be examined.
Second Generation Theory : Further Applications of Job Enlargement
Job enlargement undertakings in the nineteen sixties and early
seventies have not been qualitatively different from their precursors.
Most involved the replacement of assembly line production methods with
individual assembly stations ( e.g. Kilbridge, I960; Biggane and
Stewart, 1963; Gbnantand Kilbridge, 1965; Pauling, 1968; Thornely
and Valantine, 1968; Philips Report, 1969 ) or in one case with
small assembly groups separated by buffer stocks (Van Beek, I96U).
Cotgrove, Dunham and Vamplew (1971 : "The Nylon Spinners, a case
study in productivity bargaining and job enlargement") report a
project in the traditional Richardson and Walker (19^8) style,
although the interpretation of their results is along more careful
lines. These projects are on the whole better observed and
documented than previous studies, but more emphasis has been placed
on economic than behavioural results. Kilbridge (1960b) for
example cites one case study which he claims was justified by
"tangible cost savings" alone (produced mainly through reduction in
idle time). The design of these "experiments" continued to attract
criticism from those who argued that the lack of experimental
controls left the results open to alternative explanations,
(cf. Schoderbek and Reif, 1969, P-15; and Bishop and Hill, 1971,
p.175.) Bishop and Hill, in fact, argue that, in terms of effects
on output and productivity, a change is as good as an enlargement.
They used as subjects U8 clients of an Employment Training Center at
Southern Illinois University (a sheltered workshop for the
rehabilitation of the mentally and physically handicapped). The
workers either changed during the experiment from sorting nuts to
sorting holts (or vice versa), or had their job enlarged to include
assembling nuts and bolts and packing them. The changes produced
similar results.
Some confusion over the nature of job enlargement effects had
occurred previously. Kilbridge (1960b) gives the following
definition :
"Job enlargement is the expansion of job content to include
a wider variety of tasks and to increase the worker's
freedom of pace, responsibility for checking quality and
discretion for method." (Re-stated in Conant and Kilbridge,
1965.)
Kilbridge was asserting that there should be more to job enlargement
than mere task recombination, claiming that :
"If connecting black wires is boresome, why should
connecting black and yellow wires be less so?" (Kilbridge,
1960b, p.358.)
This is the traditional criticism of horizontal job enlargement and
anticipates the development of job enrichment, the technique described
in the next section. Job enlargement lacked a systematic theory and,
more important, a methodology. From a postal survey (with a 75 per
cent response rate) of 276 companies selected at random from the
1965 Fortune Directory of the 500 largest American industrial
concerns, Schoderbek and Reif found that over 80 per cent of their
sample had never used job enlargement, and most of these had never
considered it. As part explanation for this, Schoderbek and Reif
said that they were :
".... unaware of any available guidelines at this time
which state how to go about enlarging jobs, determining
which jobs to enlarge, what problems to expect and how
to deal with them." ( 1969, p.34)
But an attempt had been made to provide a systematic solution
to these questions, by Frederick Herzberg whose technique of job
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enrichment had been published in 1968, (although the theory behind it
had been first published in 1959)- In summary, before turning to
Herzberg's work, four trends have been identified in the job
enlargement literature and these are briefly :
1. ambiguity with respect to what job enlargement (vertical
or horizontal) actually involves;
2. increased awareness of the complexity of relationships
between attitudes towards work and behaviour in general;
3. realisation of the importance of individual and sub-
cultural differences in attitudes towards work and
receptivity to job enlargement;
U. increased emphasis on the technical and economic advantages
of job enlargement and reduced emphasis on behavioural effects.
Third Generation Theory : Herzberg's Job Enrichment
Within the research tradition examined up to this point, no
author, with the possible exception of Blauner, had attempted to
construct a "general theory" of the psychological relationship
between man and work - in the sense that Keynes had provided
economists with a "general theory" (of employment, interest and
money) in 1936. Blauner's approach was a sociological one, dealing
with the relationships between organisations, technology, and sub-
cultural groupings; his direct concern was not with the individual's
relationship to his work. The work of Frederick Herzberg in this
latter direction is now widely known, and constitutes the focus of
attention of this section. The popularity of his work is excuse
for avoiding a greatly detailed description of it here.
Herzberg is now University Distinguished Professor at the College
of Business, University of Utah, and while his writings have attracted
much criticism, his effort in constructing a theoretical system of
the kind referred to above suffers inadequate appreciation. He has
attempted to relate what he takes to be human nature to the experience
of satisfaction at work, and to produce a comparatively simple
technique for rectifying the deficiencies in job content, creating,
in a sense, a "co-incidence of wants" between the nature of the
worker and the requirements of the job.
Herzberg's earliest work was carried out in the mid 1950's
while he was Research Director at the Psychological Service of
Pittsburg. An extensive review of the literature on job satisfaction
had revealed some anomalies with respect to the factors which
appeared to be associated with job satisfaction, and those associated
with dissatisfaction (Herzberg, Mausner, Peterson and Capwell, 1957)-
In order to explore these anomalies further, 203 Pittsburg engineers
and accountants were interviewed and asked to relate events which had
made them feel good about their work, and events which had made them
feel bad about it (Herzberg, Mausner and Snyderman, 1959)- Content
analysis of the interview protocols revealed that the factors given
as producing job satisfaction were different from the factors
producing dissatisfaction. The factors producing job satisfaction
are variously referred to as "satisfiers", "motivators" or "content
factors", and these include - "achievement", "recognition",
"responsibility", "advancement", "growth", and the "work itself".
Factors producing job dissatisfaction are termed "dissatisfiers",
"maintenance factors", "hygiene factors" or "context factors" and
these include - salary, company policy and administration, supervision,
status, security, and working conditions. The characteristics of
work conducive to job satisfaction are, therefore, qualitatively
different from those which produce job dissatisfaction. If
satisfied workers are motivated to higher productivity, the
implication for management policy is that this can be achieved with
a minimum of expenditure; increasing wages or improving working
conditions will probably not motivate employees to better performance
whereas providing responsibility and opportunities for growth in
competence probably will. Continuing the multiple terminology,
this is known as the "two factor" or "motivator - hygiene" theory
of job satisfaction.
In his third book, Work and the Nature of Man (l966), Herzberg
brings together his previous work, placing it within a more
comprehensive framework. This book, together with a paper published
in 1968, sets out the essentials of Herzberg's "general theory",
what is referred to here as third generation theory. The theory is
ambitious, but its breadth of scope gives it both advantages and
disadvantages. As his starting point, Herzberg describes the
"basic needs of man" and the primacy of desire for psychological
growth. One fundamental premise is that a society's dominant
institution, in our case industry, formulates a concept of the
nature of man which is in accordance with its own perceived require¬
ments for survival. Problems will arise where this formulation is
at odds with the true nature of man, and Herzberg argues that our
dominant institution has indeed got it wrong. The two factor theory
of job satisfaction illustrates man's striving (through his work) to
satisfy basic needs - through the hygiene factors - and to satisfy
the desire for psychological growth - through the motivator factors.
Herzberg makes the further claim here that those who seek the
motivators are mentally healthy, whereas "hygiene seekers" are
neurotic, having erroneously adopted the institutional concept of
their nature. In order to rectify this state of affairs,
Herzberg produced a ten step "check list" for implementing job
enrichment (Herzberg, 1968), which shows how the motivator factors
can be "built into" individual jobs.
While this "theoretical system" is consistent within itself,
any part of it may be modified without greatly damaging the
integrity of the other parts. Proof that job satisfaction and
dissatisfaction are affected by the same factors would not on its
own prompt a revision of the view of human nature proposed; the
job enrichment technique could, with supporting research results
from successful applications, be argued to have a validity
independent of the two factor theory. It is, however, worth
while looking at the three facets of the theory in a little more
detail because while it does not particularly matter what their
precise content is, it is important that Herzberg found it necessary
to bring these notions together at all. His concept of what such
a theory should be, and what it should take account of is more
important than whether or not his construction is correct.
Human Nature :
The relationship between man and work is mediated by human
nature, and man, argues Herzberg, has two sets of basic needs in
the form of -
(a) a constant need for cortical stimulation, and
(b) the need for psychological growth.
The former is a fairly well accepted phenomenon, supported by the
results of multifarious experiments concerning sensory deprivation
where lack of stimulation, or sensory input, can seriously disturb
those subjected to the treatment, producing hallucinations and
other undesirable side-effects. Cortical stimulation is thus
essential to mental health and Herzberg argues that psychological
growth has similar status; it possesses six characteristics,
three in a cognitive category and three in a motivational category:
Cognitive characteristics -
1. knowing more
2. acquiring relationships in knowledge
3. creativity
Motivational characteristics -
1+. effectiveness in ambiguity
5. individuation
6. real growth (perception of reality, self-perception),
Herzberg describes these characteristics at some length in "Work
and the Nature of Man", and full examination here would also require
a discussion of competing theories which is outwith the scope of this
review. Suffice it to say that the concept is value-laden as are
other similar formulations. (See, for example, the summaries of
the theories of Herzberg, Jahoda and Kornhause*" in Warr and Wall,
1975, Chapter 1.) On the other hand, this is not a reason for
avoiding the issue, for Herzberg thought it necessary to attempt
to establish a systematic link between human nature, the perception
of work, and mental health.
Jot Satisfaction:
This aspect of Herzberg's work has provoked much criticism,
argument and research, much of which is examined below. The first
prize now goes to a unidimensional theory of job satisfaction as
opposed to Herzberg's two factor theory, but the adjustment has been
one of emphasis rather than direction. The motivator factors appear
to have greater overall effect on satisfaction and dissatisfaction
than do the hygiene factors; the motivators are simply more powerful
all round. In dividing the two sets of job factors identified in
the Pittsburg study into satisfiers and dissatisfiers, the former came
to be called "motivators" because :
".... other findings of the study suggest that they are
effective in motivating the individual to superior
performance and effort." (Herzberg, 1966, p.7*0
Herzberg tends to use the terms "job satisfaction" and "motivation"
synonymously, but the implication is that the performance of the
motivation seeker who has found what he is looking for will be better
than that of one who has not, or indeed of a mere hygiene seeker.
The hypothesised relationship between job satisfaction and performance
had by 1966 suffered some rough handling as indicated above, but
Herzberg's formulation casts this hypothesis in a fresh light by
suggesting that only true job satisfaction - as opposed to lack of
job dissatisfaction - produces improved performance.Once again,
Herzberg is attempting to establish a link between human nature, the
perception of work and satisfaction with work, and worker behaviour.
Job Enrichment:
It is Herzberg's view that if work does not produce satisfaction,
but rather disrupts mental health, and is not in accord with man's
essential nature, then work must be changed; the approach to this
is through restructuring the individual job.
Towards the end of "Work and the Nature of Man", Herzberg makes
the following comment:
"What recommendations can be made to industry in order to
carry out the ideas propounded in this book? I am tempted
to reply that if I had the answers, I would program them
and make a living in a much easier way than by writing
books." (Herzberg, 1966, p.171.)
In answer to this plea, his well known article "One More
Time : How do you Motivate Employees?" appeared in the Harvard
Business Review in January 1968. In it he listed seven "principles
of vertical job loading" and presented a ten-point check-list, or
job enrichment programme, to implement them. The vertical job
loading principles, which are related to the motivator factors, are:
A. Removing some controls while retaining accountability.
B. Increasing the accountability of individuals for own work.
C. Giving a person a complete natural unit of work (module,
division, area and so on).
D. Granting additional authority to an employee in his activity;
job freedom.
E. Making periodic reports directly available to the worker
himself rather than to the supervisor.
F. Introducing new and more difficult tasks not previously handled.
G. Assigning individuals specific or specialised tasks, enabling
them to become experts.
(Herzberg, 1968: in Davis and Taylor, 1972, at p.119)
The ten-point check-list for implementation is, briefly, as
follows :
1. Select for enrichment those jobs in which -
"(a) the investment in industrial engineering does
not make changes too costly,
(b) attitudes are poor,
(c) hygiene is becoming very costly,
(d) motivation will make a difference in performance."
(in Davis and Taylor, 1972, p.123.)
2. Examine these jobs with the conviction that job content can be
changed.
3. "Brainstorm" a list of possible job enrichment changes (this
is also sometimes called "greenlighting").
Screen the list for hygiene suggestions, retaining those concerned
with motivators.
5. Screen the list for vague generalities, selecting specific
suggestions concerned with motivators.
6. Screen the list for horizontal loading factors.
7. Avoid employee participation in determining the changes to be
made.
8. Set up a controlled experiment to examine the job enrichment
effects.
9. Initial results will be poor, until employees become accustomed
to their new jobs.
10. Initial reaction from first-line supervisors will probably be
anxiety and hostility.
At the end of this article, Herzberg asserts that :
"If you have someone on a job, use him. If you can't use
him on the job, get rid of him, either via automation
or by selecting someone with lesser ability. If you
can't use him and you can't get rid of him, you will have
a motivation problem." (in Davis and Taylor, 1972, p.125)
The technique has obvious economic and behavioural attractions
for management; it appears to be comparatively straightforward and
logical, and capable of producing tangible results, and there is no
need to directly involve the employees in the process. (Herzberg
apparently told David Jenkins p,l69) that he was not in
favour of employee participation in the job enrichment process
because - " There is a danger you will participate beyond your
level of competence.") From the first point on the check-list,
however, Herzberg appears to be advocating job enrichment as a last
resort, useful only in situations where things are so bad that any
change which could be described as an improvement would produce
beneficial results. The recommendation that employees do not
participate is contentious, others having claimed that employee
involvement in the change process is desirable; see, for example,
Coch and French, 19^+8. Herzberg's recommendation has not always
been adopted in practice, various companies having involved their
employees in differing degrees in the job enrichment process.
In 197^5 Herzberg provided slightly more detailed advice
on what he believes constitutes the "ingredients of a good job".
These are :
Ingredient: Explanation:
1. Direct "(a) that the results of a person's
Feeback performance be given directly to him
rather than through any supervisor,
performance review, or bureaucratic
innuendo, and






".... that the individual has a customer
or client to serve, whether external to
the organisation or inside it."
3. New Learning ".... the opportunity for individuals to
feel that they are growing psychologically.
All jobs ought to always provide an
opportunity for the worker to learn
something purposeful and meaningful."




".... need for some personal uniqueness
at work - for providing aspects of jobs









".... enhances the growth potential of a




",... remove the crutch of inspection and
instead directly identify the performance
of the work with the individual."
(From Herzberg, 197^» PP-72 to 7*0
Apart from descriptions of applications of job enrichment in
practice, Herzberg has never described job enrichment in any greater
detail. Implementation is situational and is, therefore, flexible;
an obvious advantage in practical terms but one which as will be
argued below points to the inherent weakness of the technique as a
device for organisational analysis and change. This third facet
completes Herzberg's "general theory", backing up his theoretical
arguments with concrete guidelines for change and improvement.
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Third Generation Theory : Support and Development
Herzberg's ideas about human nature have not attracted a great
deal of attention, whereas his theory of job enrichment has attracted
a number of enthusiastic adherents. The two factor theory, on the
other hand, has been heavily attacked but its superficial attraction
created some initial support. Rosen (1963b)for example showed how
"intrinsic job demands" were more important to research and
development workers than salary appeared to be (a very attractive
finding indeed). The reasons why scientists and engineers either
stayed in or left their jobs also appeared to differ along the lines
predicted by the two factor theory (Friedlander and Walton, 196U);
i.e. their reasons for resigning were not simply the opposites of
their reasons for remaining. Personality differences in employees
at all levels in Texas Instruments Inc. (a company which applied
job enrichment in several areas, with much reported success) were
shown to differentiate between motivation seekers and hygiene
seekers (Myers, 196U). Saleh and Hyde (1969) asked 1200 employees
to rank in order of personal importance twelve work factors, six
of which were "intrinsic" and six "extrinsic". As the two factor
theory would predict, the "internally oriented group", indicated
a higher degree of job satisfaction than the "externally oriented
group." (The dominant orientation of men in this sample was intrinsic,
whereas that of woman was extrinsic.) Ford and Borgatta (1970)
identified clusters of factors from a job satisfaction survey which
indicated that factors associated with satisfaction were essentially
those which Herzberg had called "motivators". And Herzberg's own
ambiguously titled paper "The motivation to work among Finnish
supervisors" was an attempt to prove the cross-cultural validity
of the theory. (Herzberg, 1965.) Rather than being subject to
strict definition, the motivator factors can be expressed in a
variety of ways. Dickson (1971) for example suggests that the
key features of job content which influence an individual's
behaviour at work are :
1. predictability (related to discretion),
2. variety (of tasks),
3. meaning (degree of fragmentation).
The Manager of the Management Training Division of Chase Manhattan
Bank, New York, claims that job enrichment comprises five "structural
concepts", i.e. job content should incorporate:
1. natural units of work,
2. "client identification",
3. vertical and horizontal job loading,
k. feedback systems,
5. task advancement. (Greenblatt, 1973, pp. 32-33.)
The extent to which these re-statements of the original theory assist
the practitioner or develop the theory is debatable.
Herzberg's work at the Psychological Service of Pittsburg was
taken up by R. Hackman (who also took up Herzberg's job as Research
Director there). Hackman's continued support for the two factor
theory is based on a re-examination of Herzberg's original data and
further research of his own (mainly using the "Hackman Job
Satisfaction Schedule"). His position is similar to that of
Herzberg's, and he states that :
"Job conditions producing motivationally significant
feelings reinforce adaptive work behaviour and attitudes
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and serve the useful function of maintaining or augmenting
work effectiveness. Job conditions generating emotional
tension produce nonadaptive work behaviour and attitudes
and serve to reduce work effectiveness." (Hackman, 1969,
p.127.)
Hygiene seekers are re-named "responders" and motivation seekers are
re-named "stimulation seekers". (Hackman, 1969, p.29.)
Hackman's overt behaviourist approach thus reduces the practice of
job redesign to a manipulatory technique in which the task of the
manager is to :
".... try to adapt the available reinforcing agents to
the range of individual differences among the men he has
working for him." (Hackman, 19^9, p.155*)
In restating the theory in this manner, only a trace of Herzberg's
essentially humanistic theory is retained, and in so doing Hackman
has placed himself completely outwith the ethos of the research
trends with which we are dealing here.
Robert Ford, now well known for his direction of the implementation
of job enrichment in American Telephone and Telegraph has also tended
to deviate somewhat from the master's teaching, and in a more recent
paper describes how work can be organised beyond the enrichment of
individual jobs by "nesting". (Ford, 1973.) He also calls this
"work organisation", and this is almost the sense in which Wild
(1975) uses that phrase. With reference to an order processing
department, Ford describes the establishment of "minigroups" each
of which can handle the complete processing of an order from start
to finish, in place of groups which were functionally divided,
processing orders by passing them from group to group. Ford is
thus advocating the use of quasi-autonomous groups (of which more
will be said below) and Herzberg is clearly against this, critical of
the possibility of the "tyranny of the group" being used against the
individual (Herzberg, 197*0. On the precise practical details of
nesting, Ford is somewhat obscure, and in one particularly abstruse
statement suggests that jobs should be loaded horizontally -
"....until the base of the job is right", but gives no indication of
how to assess whether this stage has been reached.
Three articles which appeared in 1973 criticise not the
application of job enrichment but its indiscriminate application.
Sirota and Wolfson (1973) for example argue that the success of job
enrichment as a managerial technique is dependent upon correct
diagnosis of the presenting problem and that a "diagnostic approach"
should be adopted in order to discover "exactly what is bothering
employees". This is now called the "contingency" approach to job
enrichment, the central hypothesis of which is summarised by Morse,
who states that :
"Only when all three inputs - a job design, individual
predispositions and technological variables - are contingent
on and fit each other systematically is there likely to be
high employee motivation and high task performance."
(Morse, 1973, p.69.)
As Monczka and Reif (1973) point out, this is in fact a
"systems approach to job design" (p.11), but this should in no way
be confused with the 'bocio-technical systems" approach developed
in Britain. Much of the contingency approach is at least implicit
in Herzberg's own writings, e.g. the identification of jobs which
are suitable for enrichment taking into account workers' attitudes,
technological constraints, and supervisory and management reaction
to proposed changes. (See Herzberg, 1968.)
After much initial enthusiasm, therefore, even job enrichment
exponents are now careful to point out that the technique is not
generally applicable but, and this is probably true of all job
redesign approaches, that success is situational :
the concept works best in situations where the workers
seek fulfilment in their work and are eager to move to
enriched jobs, technological considerations are favorable,
and management is committed and capable of developing and
implementing job enrichment projects." (Monczka and Reif,
1973, p.12.)
In contrast to those who would limit the application of job
enrichment there are on the other hand those who argue that it is
necessitated by current social and economic conditions. Herzberg's
case for job enrichment rests on the disparity between human needs
and the extent to which these are expressed and unfulfilled in
work, but other commentators have attempted to justify its employment
with reference to the implications of various trends in (American)
society as a whole. Foulkes (1969), for example, claims that the
popularity of job enrichment has been due to five factors :
1. an increasing volume of behavioural science knowledge,
2. increased domestic and foreign competition,
3. growth of trade unions and management's dislike of
restrictive practices,
U. evidence of labour force discontent,
5. possible union interest in the technique.
Three further reasons for the necessity of job enrichment are given
by Maher and Piersol (1971) 'who mention :
1. government and "organised labor" involvement and concern,
2. predicted shortages of professional managerial personnel,
3. the attitudes and values of American youth.
Skinner (1971) in giving us his reasons for reappraising current
production methods, suggests a further reason :
1. technological change (in production and information handling),
as well as those covered so far :
2. changing (American) beliefs and expectations,
3. growing foreign competition.
From the Australian viewpoint, Elliott (1972) suggests that three
\
factors will further the application of job enrichment :
1. labour shortages created by a decrease in immigration,
2. increases in labour demands,
3. the consequent challenge to managerial authority.
The rejection of monotonous work by British youth, claim Mandle and
Lawless (1971) has contributed to the increase in sales of "soft"
drugs in factories and offices; and Sheppard and Herrick (1972)
provide extensive data on the extent of alienation amongst young
American workers.
There is, therefore, some agreement on a number of major social
trends taking place, at least in American society. But is job
enrichment really going to improve the individual company's market
position, assuage foreign competition, restrict the spread of
unionisation, mollify a discontented workforce and alleviate
manpower shortages? If the contingency approach advocates are
correct in their views on the use of job enrichment then the technique
is on the whole unlikely to have a tremendous impact on the social
trends which are said to necessitate it.
Before turning to the criticism and disputes which Herzberg's
theories have generated, it is appropriate at this point briefly to
summarise and review Herzberg's contribution to this field. There
are at least three points of note.
1. His theories have stimulated vast quantities of research
and debate concerning motivation and job design.
2. Management in America, and to some extent in Europe, has
become more aware through his writings of the problems which
give rise to the development of techniques such as job enrichment.
3. Whatever status it commands today it is significant that Herzberg
found it necessary in the formulation of his theory of job
design:
(a) to incorporate a theory of human nature,
(b) to show how man's basic needs manifest themselves in
the work situation, and
(c) to devise a practical technique by which job content
could be improved to attempt to fulfil human needs
expressed at work.
Herzberg has made no attempt to develop his ideas as they have
been presented above, but has been more concerned with publicising
them. His more recent articles (Herzberg, 1970, 19715 197M
essentially cover no new ground and merely restate his previously
published work. David Jenkins (197M is particularly harsh on
Herzberg in this respect, stating that :
".... he has concentrated primarily on his appearances
before management groups - a kind of globe-trotting
missionary, preaching the motivation-hygiene gospel with
great wit and dynamism. In these appearances he tends
to take a rather dogmatic view, implying that research
carried out since his own has been on the whole quite
unnecessary." (Jenkins, 197^+, p.169.)
Subsequent research does not seem to have materially affected the
application of job enrichment, especially in America, and for those
employed as consultants in this lucrative field, as indeed Herzberg
himself is, self-criticism may not be in their best interests. This
may also account for the "overjustification" of job enrichment by
Foulkes, Maher and Piersol, et al.
Keats, we are told, was overjoyed to discover ".... that one of
his poems had become a popular 'folk-song', whose author's name had been
forgotten and that this made him feel that he had
become so much a part of the country that only his work remained."*
Herzberg may now claim to hold an analogous position in the American
"psychology of work" tradition in view of the large number of reported
job enrichment case studies, and articles and books on job
enrichment "implementation strategies" in which no reference to his
name or to his writings can be found at all.
Third Generation Theory : Criticism and Refutation
The attack on Herzberg's theories has been made on two main
fronts. First, there is the question of whether job satisfaction is
a one-dimensional or a two-dimensional phenomenon, and second there
is the question of the universality of appearance of "higher order
needs" in man.
1. A one — or a two - dimensional theory?
It is now generally accepted (although perhaps not by Herzberg)
that the results of the Pittsburg study and subsequent similar
research are an artifact of the research methodology used. Vroom
(196H) suggested that the interview procedure adopted could have
evoked defensive and projective responses which in turn produced an
apparent divergence between the factors which produced, respectively,
job satisfaction and dissatisfaction :
".... obtained differences between stated sources of
satisfaction and dissatisfaction stem from defensive
processes within the individual respondent. Persons
may be more likely to attribute the causes of satisfaction
to their own achievements and accomplishments on the job.
On the other hand, they may be more likely to attribute
their dissatisfaction not to personal inadequacies or
deficiences, but to factors in the work environment, i.e.
obstacles presented by company policies or supervision."
(Vroom, I96U, p.129.)
* Robin Skelton, The Poet's Calling, Heinemann, 1975, P-155-)
Bobbit and Behling (1972) requested some respondents to complete a
critical incident type questionnaire in the belief that it was part
of an organisational review, whereas others completed it believing
that it was part of a university research project and individual
replies would not be reported. The predicted defensive responses
from those who were under the impression that their superiors
would see their questionnaires did not take place. The replies
of both groups were similar. Despite this attempt to disprove
Vroom's hypothesis, the weight of evidence points to the conclusion
that Herzberg's two factor theory of job satisfaction is method
bound, different methodologies producing different results. King
(1970) claims that lack of clarity in Herzberg's initial exposition
has led to at least five different interpretations of it being
used by others. None of these, however, fulfils the principle of
"multiple operationalism" which states that :
".... a hypothesis is validated only if it is supported by
two or more different methods of testing, where each method
contains specific idiosyncratic weaknesses but where the
entire collection of methods permits the elimination of
all alternative hypotheses." (King, 1970, p.29-)
Studies which have produced results confirming the two factor
theory have generally used the same or similar methodology as
Herzberg, and those which have produced disconfirming results have
generally used different methodologies. A review by Kaplan,
Tausky and Bolaria (1969) of 39 research reports concerning the two










Job satisfaction is thus now generally accepted to be a uni-
dimensional concept, with Herzberg's satisfiers and dissatisfiers
contributing to both job satisfaction and dissatisfaction with
differential effects. Dunnette, Campbell and Hakel (1967) state
that :
certain job dimensions - notably Achievement,
Recognition and Responsibility - seem uniformly to be
more important for both satisfying and dissatisfying job
events and that certain job dimensions - notably Salary,
Working Conditions, Company Policies and Practices,
and Security - are relatively less important."
(Dunnette, Campbell and Hakel, 1967,p. 169.)
The motivator factors appear to be more potent in their effect on
job satisfaction and job dissatisfaction than are the hygiene factors,
and the two factor theory is thereby invalidated. This conclusion
receives widespread support, e.g. from Ewen, Smith, Hulin and
Locke, 1966; Graen, 1966; Kaplan, Tausky and Bolaria, 1969; Locke,
1973; and Spillane, 1973. Herzberg attempted to answer his
critics on this point in "Work and the Nature of Man" stating :
"Employees who wish to make themselves look good are much
more prone to say that they are unhappy because they do
not have responsibility, are not getting ahead, have
uninteresting work, see no possibility for growth and
do not receive recognition than to say that their supervisor
is unfriendly, the administration is poor, the working
conditions are bad, their fellow workers are unsociable,
etc." (Herzberg, 1966, p.130.)
This is possibly the type of answer which the researchers would
have got had they asked their respondents to state whether they were
"unhappy" about their work and, if so, why. This was not one of
the questions used in the interviews, the technique involved asking
the respondent to relate a specific time bounded sequence of events
which had produced either good or bad feelings about the work.
Herzberg's retort simply reinforces the method-bound characteristic
of this type of data.
2. Is the pursuit of "higher order needs" universal?
Lupton (1971) describes Herzberg as belonging to that group which
he calls the "psychological universalists" (which also includes
McGregor, Blake, Likert and Argyris), whose approach relies on the
assumption that the theories which they have evolved apply equally
to all individuals, regardless of the situation in which they are
applied. The division of job content factors into motivators and
hygiene factors is closely related to the higher and lower order
need dichotomy in Abraham Maslow's "need hierarchy" theory.
(Maslow, I9U3.) Herzberg's argument, with which Maslow is in general
agreement, is that those who are concerned solely with the
satisfaction of their lower order needs - hygiene seekers - are
neurotic, and that the mentally healthy individual - the motivation
seeker - is characterised by the desire to gratify higher order
needs, particularly that of self-actualisation. (Herzberg, 1966,
pp.80-81.) A number of researchers have taken issue with this point.
Centers and Bugental (1966) found job level to be a crucial
variable in explaining differential orientations towards work in a
sample of 692 "employed adults" in the greater Los Angeles area.
Higher occupational levels (i.e. professional and managerial) tended
to value intrinsic job components, lower occupational levels (i.e.
semi-skilled or unskilled) valued extrinsic job components more.
Application of the two factor theory is similarly limited, argue
Blood and Hulin (1967), by the mediating effects of individual
differences and subcultural influences on a worker's response to a
job. (See also Hulin and Blood, 1968.) They suggest that extent
of "integration with middle class norms" is a fairly reliable
predictor of workers' response. This construct is conceived as a
continuum the extremes of which are integration with and alienation
from middle class norms :
"At the integrated end of the construct are found workers
who have personal involvement with their jobs and aspirations
within their occupations . Their goals are the type of
upward mobility, social climbing goals generally associated
with the American middle class. At the opposite pole of
the construct, workers can be described as involved in their
jobs only instrumentally; that is, the job is only a provider
of means for promoting extraoccupational goals. The
concern of these workers is not for increased responsibility,
higher status, or more autonomy. They want money, and they
want it in return for a minimal amount of personal
involvement." (Blood and Hulin, 1967, pp.28U-285•)
Sub-cultural variances in the expression of desires for higher
order need gratification indicate that for "alienated" workers, the
most desirable jobs are those which require a minimum of personal
involvement and a maximum financial return. This finding is in
accordance with that of Turner and Lawrence (1965), discussed above,
and of Goldthorpe et al (1968) in Britain. Hulin later argued
(1971) that the 1967 approach had been unnecessarily indirect in
attempting to identify "community variable^' which would assist in
the prediction of workers' attitudes to work. A simpler and more
direct approach, he claimed would be to examine "higher order need
strength" differences between individuals. The two factor theory
is inaccurate in the assumption that no such differences exist, and
Hulin is critical of the practice of "ethnomorphising" - imputing
one's own values to another sub-cultural group.
The above considerations raise the problem of direction of
causality; does incumbency of an alienating job generate alienation,
or do alienated workers select such jobs in the first place?
Goldthorpe et al (1968) state that their sample of car workers in
Luton consciously selected and remained in their generally
monotonous and tiring work solely for the extrinsic economic rewards
which it provided. Saleh and Hyde (1969) and Kaplan, Tausky and
Bolaria (1969) argue, with Hulin and Blood, that self-actualisation
is a motive acquired through socialisation. This would imply a
"cycle of alienation" in which one generation transmits its attitudes
and expectations concerning work to the next, perpetuating the
social conditions and types of work which generate that alienation.
The phenomenon is thus an interactive one and the problem of
direction of causality is of little consequence. The concern with
description and analysis appears to have precluded any consideration
of the desirability of this state of affairs, or with how it might
be improved or changed, and Blood and Hulin recommend that no attempt
be made to enrich the jobs of workers whom they describe as
alienated because such attempts will be rejected. This
recommendation is based on implicit assumptions for which they
produce no evidence. (See Shepard (197*0 whose criticism of such a
generalisation is briefly described below.)
The diverse manifestations of human nature makes it an extremely
difficult concept to define, and it is not surprising that the
Herzbergian archetype is not to be found throughout American society.
The expression of so-called higher order needs is far from universal,
but this in itself does not deny their potential existence. (Maslow
would argue that they have become "blocked" through lack of
opportunity to find satisfaction.) Nor is it necessarily true
that the non-conformist, the worker who eschews the pursuit of
higher order needs, is mentally unwell; the situation is summarised
by Locke who claims :
".... that satisfying and dissatisfying job incidents are
not solely a reflection of 'human nature' as such, but
that they also reflect differences in both the actual
structure of jobs and people's experiences in different
jobs." (Locke, 1973, p.76.)
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The Limitations of Job Enrichment
It matters little to the application of the technique of job
enrichment that the relationships between motivator and hygiene
factors and job satisfaction and dissatisfaction are not as Herzberg
originally claimed; improving the motivational content of a job
should still produce better results than improving its hygiene
context. The two factor formulation may have been reduced to one
factor, but the motivator factors are simply more potent in overall
effect than the hygiene factors. Suggestions that improving
motivational job content will not invariably produce improved
results, however, gave rise to the "contingency approach" outlined
above, but other commentators have gone much further in illustrating
the constraints upon the successful use of job enrichment.
Shepard (1974), while accepting the existence of a differential
response to job enrichment, claims that the contingency approach
may lead to :
1. the exclusion of urban-reared workers who would respond
favourably to job enrichment,
2. a "blanket rationalisation" against implementing job
enrichment at all, and
3. the probably false conclusion that negative attitudes of
workers doing repetitive jobs would not change with knowledge
and experience of job enrichment.
But other writers contend that the contingency approach does not go
far enough and that job enrichment is of even more limited
applicability. Maher (1971a) reports the only laboratory study of
job enrichment encountered in the compilation of this review. His
results are somewhat ambiguous and his conclusion is in accordance
with that of the contingency approach, that the technique is useful
only in certain circumstances. Reif and Luthans (1972) and Little
and Warr (197*0 question its application to blue collar workers at
all and argue that :
".... the evidence so far suggests that the approach is
more readily applicable to administrative, clerical,
supervisory and technical positions where there is
inherently more scope for initiative." (Little and Warr,
197*+, p.36.)
In addition, at least four typical worker reactions to job enrichment
must be surmounted, claim Reif and Luthans (1972), for it to
become a practical proposition, i.e. :
(a) anxiety, when presented with new skills to learn,
(b) fear, of failure and inadequacy,
(c) increased reliance on supervision, at least initially, and
(d) dislike of change.
Little and Warr (197*0 also suggest that job enrichment is constrained
to jobs at higher skill levels because -
(a) some jobs are so routine and repetitive that increasing
responsibility is impossible, and
(b) workers on piece-work may regard job enrichment as an
attempt at rate cutting.
The technique is constrained further, they argue by -
(c) the instrumental attitudes of many workers towards work,
(d) rejection of additional responsibility by those who
feel stretched already,
(e) the claim of some workers that their jobs are not
as boring as outside observers think,
(f) the expressed preference of some workers for simple
repetitive work, and
(g) managerial, supervisory and trade union resistance to
its implementation.
Successful applications it would seem, are therefore strictly
situational. Robert H. Schappe (197*0 from the Organisational
Research and Development Department of General Motors, Detroit,
provides an impressive list of "22 arguments against job
enrichment", at the end of which one is left wondering how job
enrichment could ever find application at all; but it has,
on a modest scale, and this aspect will be dealt with shortly.
The Politics of Job Enrichment
Job enrichment is a management technique which attempts to
improve productivity and reduce costs while leaving organisational
structure intact. (Supervisory roles are altered when certain
aspects of their work are given to their subordinates; the role of
the supervisor alters, therefore, but the organisation chart remains
the same.) Job enrichment does not have, (and indeed is not
intended to have) any effect on the overall balance of authority
within an organisation, workers may be given the opportunity to
participate in management in only the most trivial sense, and the
technique is, therefore, restricted to tinkering with the status
quo. This limitation is surely one of the most obvious criticisms
of job enrichment, but very few of those who work in the enrichment
field have noted it. One exception is Ritti (1971) who argues
(with particular reference to professional engineers and technicians)
that unnecessary constraints are placed on the enrichment process in
so far as organisation structure is left intact. Penzer (1973)
argues that within a year of having their jobs enriched, 200
clerical workers were again experiencing "the tedium of nine to
five" and after their original enthusiasm for the concept, job
enrichment had nothing more to offer them. Jenkins also supports
this point of view, stating (although misusing the term
"authoritarianism") that :
while such an approach is a worthwhile starting point,
it is only a first step in eliminating the basic ills
which arise from authoritarianism." (Jenkins, 197*+, p.5.)
Critical also of the deliberate exclusion of worker involvement in
the process, Jenkins argues :
"The way in which the job is enriched is decided, not
by the employees concerned, but by the job enrichment
experts. There is a fixed ceiling to the enrichment
process, and when this ceiling is reached, it is
finished. There is no provision for workers to discuss
matters and propose improvements. Herzberg is against
group action : Each individual is to be dealt with
individually." (Jenkins, 197*+, p.l69.)
The popularity of the technique amongst American managers, claims
Jenkins, is due to its being regarded as a "safe" technique,
demanding no alteration to traditional hierarchical structures;
when such alteration becomes imminent, the ceiling has been reached.
For management, therefore, job enrichment may be regarded as a
technique for maintaining the status quo in terms of distribution
of power and authority in our organisations, and also as a technique
for concealing or diverting attention away from other issues.
Hughes and Gregory, for example, argue that the rejection of job
enrichment by British trade unions is due to the fact that :
"They cannot forget other aspects of industrial life,
including the social impoverishment and physical
damage associated with low pay and excessive hours of
work; with shift working; with industrial accidents,
unemployment and job security." (Hughes and Gregory,
1974, P.387.)
An identical opinion is advanced by Dickson who states that :
"By placing relatively insignificant decisions in the
hands of the worker, such as the rate at which he decides
to work to meet a predetermined target, it is hoped that
pressure will be taken off demands on significant
issues,such as rates of pay, or the level of targets."
(Dickson, 197*+, p.l82.)
In spite of its humanistic underpinnings, the technique of
job enrichment can thus be used by management as a political tool
in attempts to mitigate the conflict of interests between management
and labour. It may be used either to limit the grounds for
discussion or to shift them into a different area. British trade
unionists are probably more conscious of such managerial manoeuvres
than their American counterparts.
One final criticism of job enrichment which provides an
excellent illustration of the technique^ apparent limitations is
provided by Werther (197*+); he points out that the predicted cost
savings from job enrichment projects could more easily be achieved
through the more extensive and imaginative use of part-time workers.
The boredom and fatigue of some jobs can more easily be tolerated
if the worker is not doing it all the time; there is no need to
enrich such jobs if a flexible employment policy allows greater use
of part-time workers.
The Practice of Job Enrichment
For the manager aspiring to the application of job enrichment
in his own company advice is plentiful. Apart from original report
of job enrichment projects, there are a number of general reviews
of selected projects, and much advice on "implementation strategies"
the latter are usually simplified for the practicing manager by
reducing exposition of the underlying theory to a bare minimum.
The manager is advised to concentrate on the economic rather than
upon the behavioural benefits to be gained from job enrichment
(Whitsett, 1971); he is advised on how to overcome union resistance
to its implementation (Myers, 1971); he may find that job
enrichment can be as simple as the establishment of monthly
"productivity committee" meetings (Scott, 197^). Reviews of
projects tend to concentrate on a "core" of the better known and
the better reported ones, some of which are mentioned below, and
the "implementation strategies" generally follow the pattern
suggested by Herzberg, often with more detail concerning, for
example, the training of supervisors in motivation theory, or the
running of "brainstorming" sessions. The advice offered by Ford
(1969), and outlined below on p. 110 is typical of many similar
presentations, and other guides and reviews available include:
Smith, 1968 Walters, 1972
Broad, 1970 Greenblatt, 1973
Gooding, 1970(a) Levinson, 1973
Gooding, 1970(b) Mills, 1973
Butteriss, 1971 Organizational Dynamics, 1973
Dickson, 1971 Penzer, 1973
Maher, 1971(a) Sirota, 1973(b)
Rush, 1971 Turner, 1973
Colosky, 1972 Yorks, 1973
Elliott, 1972 Tregoe, 197^
Grote, 1972 Maculoso and Taylor, 1975(')
Sirota and Wolfson, 1972(a) Walters, 1975
Sirota and Wolfson, 1972(b)
The best of the above is that of Harold Rush (1971) whose concise
and clear expositions of the theories of Lawler, Herzberg, Maslow
and McGregor are presented along with seven case studies illustrating
the varied application of available job design techniques. These
studies are not all well known and include job enrichment projects
carried out at Monsanto Chemicals, PPG Industries, Valley National
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Bank, Weyerhaeuser, the Internal Revenue Service, Texas Instruments
and Arapahoe Chemicals, On the other hand, Maculoso and Taylor
(report undated, probably 1975) review a total of 87 "job
enrichment" projects under the headings :
1. employee group
2. year initiated






This paper is a valuable source of references but is apt to be
misleading because :
(a) all projects cited are described as "job enrichment"
projects, no attempt being made to differentiate either
between job enlargement and job enrichment, or between
job restructuring and work organisation changes; and
(b) reference to primary sources shows their analysis to
contain a number of errors both of fact and of
interpretation, many in the direction of overestimating
the impact of the projects examined.
Emphasis is placed on the former point because Maculoso and Taylor
are not alone in their lax use of the term "job enrichment".
The majority of the articles and books listed above are not
of an academic nature (although this in itself is not a criticism),
are' repetitive in content, and frequently appear to have been written
mainly to attract publicity. One is frequently left in some doubt as
to whether one has read an account of job enrichment or an advertise¬
ment for a firm of management consultants : David Sirota, for
example, is Associate Professor of Management at the Wharton School,
University of Pennsylvania, and he is also President of David Sirota
Incorporated, Management Consultants; Lyle Yorks is Senior Associate
with Drake-Beam Associates; Roy W. Walters works for Roy W. Walters
and Associates; Benjamin Tregoe is a founder member of the
consultancy firm of Kepner-Tregoe; William Penzer works with
W.N. Penzer and Associates, and with its division Morale Incorporated;
Lynda King Taylor is employed by PA Management Consultants Ltd.
But whatever the source and quality of this work, it provides some
indication of the extent of (at least American) management awareness
of the job enrichment technique and the problems giving rise to it.
There are a large number of reports principally concerning
specific job enrichment applications, but as mentioned above, many
particular applications are described in a number of reports in
varying amounts of detail and with varying accuracy. So to avoid
a repetitious exposition of all these reports, the following procedure
has been adopted :
1. two typical American and British job enrichment applications
are described in some detail; these particular applications
have been chosen because they are comparatively well known,
and because they are fairly well reported;
2. a list of similar studies of reported applications is
presented along with the names of some of the companies which
have used the technique;
3. a brief critical summary of these reports is then given.
Ray Wild and his associates have conducted extensive reviews
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and analyses of the literature on job design, producing a
taxonomy of job design strategies within the basic
theoretical dichotomy. Wild's work is considered in
detail after the socio-technical systems design approach
has been examined, and a more detailed analysis of the
job enrichment studies is, therefore, inappropriate at
this point.
Job Enrichment in America :
American Telephone and Telegraph (AT & T).
In "Motivation Through the Work Itself", Robert N. Ford (1969)
describes 19 job enrichment projects carried out in the Bell system
of AT & T between 19&5 anc^ 1969, affecting over 1000 jobs. The work
was inspired by that of Herzberg, and the book not only describes
the various projects (complete with the experimental controls
proposed by Herzberg) but also presents substantiating results and
offers advice and recommendation on how other companies should
implement the "work itself approach" - i.e. job enrichment.
Employee dissatisfaction at AT & T appeared to be due to
undesirable jobs, and job enrichment was considered to be an answer
to the problem of the increasing costs associated with labour
turnover. One of Bell's personnel men is quoted as having
remarked "Our company has lost too many men who are still with us!"
(Ford, 1969, p.16.) Of the 19 studies which Ford describes, 9 were
considered "outstandingly successful", 9 were "moderately successful"
and only one was a "flop". Overall the results included :
(a) reductions in labour turnover of job enriched ("achieving")
groups, with turnover increases in control groups;
(t>) improvements, or at least no deterioration in, productivity,
quality of performance and customer reaction;
(c) 77 new applications subsequently started at time of writing;
(d) over 50 companies outside Bell requesting information.
The two projects which Ford reports in the greatest detail will be
examined here.
1. Shareholder Correspondents, Treasury Department,
New York (Trial No. l)
(Ford, 19695 Chapter 2, pp.20-^U and Appendix A, pp.203-208.
This is also the project which Herzberg used to illustrate
his 1968 Harvard Business Review article. All page references
in this and the following case study are to Ford, 1969.)
This was the original AT & T Irork itself experiment" and
it was conducted between March and September 1965. The group which
underwent systematic job enrichment (the "achieving group") consisted
initially of 28 female shareholder correspondents. Only 20 of
these girls remained at the end of the study, but it is not clear
what happened to the other eight; one, we are told, resigned
(p.3^), and Ford mentions that a larger proportion of promotions
were being made from this group (p.35). Four other groups were
involved in the study, a "telephone group" of 16 girls which was not
set up as an achieving group but which experienced similar changes,
a "control" group of 20 girls, and two "uncommitted" groups of 19
and 20 respectively. These figures indicate the group sizes at
the end of the experimental period, the total group having been
reduced from 120 to 95-
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Ford lists five project objectives :
"1. Improve the quality of service (we have an index).
2. Maintain or perhaps improve productivity levels.
3. Improve the turnover situation.
4. Lower costs.
5. Improve employee satisfaction in job assignments." (p.26)
Operators and first line supervisors were not, as Herzberg had
advised, "in" on the project. Third and fourth level supervisors
agreed on seven possibilities for change :
1. appointment of subject matter experts whom other group
members could consult without going first to a supervisor;
2. correspondents could sign their own letters;
3. verification of work of experienced group members reduced
from 100 to 10 per cent;
4. reduction in pressure for production from supervisors;
5. supervisors ceased to monitor outgoing work;
6. correspondents held fully responsible for the quality
of work (previously shared with verifiers and supervisors);
7. "form-letter" approach discouraged, correspondents encouraged
to reply in a more personalised manner.
(pp.29-30.)
These changes were introduced "quietly", after discussion with
second-line supervision, at the rate of about one per week. No
important changes were made to "hygiene" factors such as wages,
hours of work, company policies, training, the physical work
environment, or transfers of supervisors. It was in addition
seen to be :
"
. . . . very important that none of the lH first-level
supervisors or their people was ever told that a study
was in progress." (p.31.)
The results of the project fe.ll under nine main headings and were
as follows:
A. A "job reaction survey" was conducted in March and again
in September 1965, using a simple l6-item scored multiple
choice questionnaire. The achieving group average rose
15 points (from 39 to 5^; maximum score is 80). The
average of the control group dropped H points (from Hi
to 37)• The telephone group score rose from about H7
to 50, and the two uncommitted groups also remained about
the same at between Ho and H5. (pp.31-33 and 37~39-)
B. A "customer service index" was prepared taking into
account correctness of response, speed of response and
accuracy of detail. This index was computed on a
sampling basis and results were produced monthly for
groups, not for individuals.
All groups showed an improvement on this index, the
achieving and telephone groups being well ahead of the
others. (The telephone group in fact came out best by
about 5 points; maximum score is 100.) As predicted,
the performance of the achieving group fell dramatically
in May, but quickly recovered. (pp.32-3H.)
C. Labour turnover was greatly reduced, but no data are
presented to illustrate this claim. The one girl
resigning from the achieving group did so because "She
did not like the added responsibility and felt that other
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employees should verify a correspondent's work."
(pp.3U-35-)
D. Absenteeism had previously been an insignificant problem,
running at around 2 per cent, and it remained so. (p.35-)
E. Productivity is obviously difficult to measure in this
kind of work but, although again there are no data given,
previous levels appeared to have at least been maintained.
(p.35.)
F. Promotions were being made more frequently from the
achieving and telephone groups (no data), but this may
have been because the structure of the work now made it
easier for supervisors to differentiate between the
competent and the less competent correspondents, (p.35.)
G. Cost reduction was not a major objective of the project,
but it was estimated that over the first 18 months of
the study $558,000 had been saved. (p.Uli.)
H. A number of "subjective results" are presented concerning
the favourable attitudes of correspondents and supervisors
to the changes. (pp.36-37.)
I. Subsequent follow up study of the project over the next
year indicated that the above results had not been
transitory but had persisted. There was an increasing
need to replace correspondents from the achieving group as
experienced girls were promoted, and the customer service
index stabilised at a very high level.
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2. Framemen, Long Lines Department, New York
(Trial No. lU)
(Ford, 1969, Chapter 3, pp.51~60 and Appendix B,
pp.211 to 256.)
The Long Lines Department had a number of serious operating
problems, for which job enrichment was again considered to provide
a solution :
"l. Low productivity.
2. High frame errors.
3. Due dates missed.
U. Circuits that did not meet quality standards,
5. High overtime.
6. Grievances." (p.52.)
The study commencing in January 1967, took place over eight months.
Initially there were bO framemen in the department employed in private
line telephone circuit installation work -
"Within a huge central office, these men cross-
connect wires of a long-distance switching point for
telephone messages and many other kinds of communications."
(p.52.)
The framemen worked in teams of three, but the division of the work
between team members was considered to be unsatisfactory :
"One worked at one end, soldering to a frame. The
second ran the wire to a third man, who soldered the
other end to a frame elsewhere in the huge building."
(P.52.)
Other craftsmen were responsible for translating the service order
into instructions for the necessary frame work, and other "circuit
test" groups checked the work of the framemen. The latter never
knew whether a particular circuit was adequate, and the circuit test
men never knew whose circuits they were checking. The framemen
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spoke of themselves as "frame apes" and complained that the job
required little ability and that anyone could do it.
The procedures for determining the changes to be made, and
for implementing them, were similar to those described above for
the shareholder correspondents. Based on a list of thirteen
"greenlight" items, the change made was simply this : each team
now does all the work from receiving the order to turning over
the working circuit to the customer, This was expected to take
at least two years, and Ford's report describes only the initial
stages of the project. He describes the proposals thus :
"The two second level supervisors .... suggested
combining the frame cross-connection group with the
test group, dropping a cross-connection man, and
adding a test man so that each three-man team has a
test man on it from the start. ( ) Note that
the supervisors plan eventually to collapse all five
jobs so that every team has in it all five
capabilities." (p. 53.)
(The "five capabilities" are, respectively,
• private line service order
• loop testing
• circuit order write-up
• circuit testing
• cross connections.)
Individual differences in capability and aspiration, argued Ford, could
be catered for in this way :
".... this approach, with its elastic job boundaries
permits flexibility in dealing with people." (p.59-)
By the end of the initial eight month study period only lU of the
remaining 35 framemen had taken on even half of the new responsibilities
offered to them, but encouraging results had nevertheless been
achieved :
A. The percentage of circuits completed on schedule increased,
between January and September, from 50 per cent to 100
per cent. (pp.55~56.)
B. The number of overtime hours worked fell by 50 per cent.
(pp.56-57.)
C. The number of circuit order items completed monthly rose
from TOO to lU00. (pp.57-58.)
D. The number of frame errors fell from 12 per cent to 3
per cent. (pp.58-59•)
E. Union opposition precluded effective use of the "job
reaction survey." (p.2^8.)
F. Absenteeism did not alter over the study period. (p.2^9.)
G. A number of subjective results are again cited indicating
the favourable attitudes of supervision and framemen to the
changes. For example :
"Now the men talk about 'my circuit' and 'my customer'.
They established work priorities themselves and start the
day immediately; no queuing up and waiting for the
supervisor to give them work. And, when leaving a tour,
they hand work directly to those coming in, which pleases
supervisors too. Not only do the men enjoy checking
circuits to see if they will meet test standards the
first time; they are also asking when they will get
certain new training." (pp.58-59•)
Other employees in nearby groups started requesting to
be transferred to the frameman project.
Ford also includes in "Motivation Through the Work itself"
his ideas concerning "The Art of Reshaping Jobs" and "Following
Through to an Improved Job" (Chapters 7 and 8 respectively).
He offers some detailed advice on the following points:
1. Selecting problem jobs.
2. Arranging workshops for appropriate managers to
introduce motivation theory and "greenlight" lists of
possible changes.
3. The organisation of "greenlighting" (or "brainstorming")
sessions.
Determination of a "natural work module".
5- Evaluating suggestions in terms of both jobs and costs.
6. The importance of providing individual feedback to job
incumbents.
7. Implementation of the job enrichment programme (in a
two-phase, ten-step schedule).
8. Having supervisors implement the changes gradually.
9. Measurement and recording of results.
These two chapters present in detail a distillation of
AT & T's practical experience of job enrichment over a period of
U years. While clearly based on Herzberg's work, there is, however,
one fundamental contradiction in Ford's "Motivation through the
work itself": the final objective of Trial No. lU is the establish¬
ment of composite autonomous groups of framemen in the Long Lines
Department.
Job Enrichment in Britain : Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI)
W.J. Paul and K.B. Robertson in "Job enrichment and employee
motivation" (1970) give accounts of eight job enrichment projects
carried out in ICI in 1967 and 1968. Five chapters each describe
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the application of the technique to a white-collar job, and one
chapter ("Related shopfloor studies") briefly describes a further
three blue-collar applications.
As with Ford, this was a direct application of Herzberg's
theories and technique which meant that, throughout, "hygiene
factors" remained constant, experimental and control groups were
established in each application, and workers and first line
supervisors were not privy to the knowledge that they were being
experimented with.
Five white-collar jobs underwent enrichment - those of sales
representatives, design engineers, experimental officers,
draughtsmen, and production and engineering foremen. With the
exception of the draughtsmen application, these projects are also
described in Paul, Robertson and Herzberg, 19&9- So here we shall
examine the job enrichment of ICI draughtsmen, and one of the blue-
collar applications which had not been implemented, but remained in
the form of a proposal, at the time of writing.
1. Draughtsmen
(Paul and Robertson, 1970, Chapter 8, pp.56-61. All page
references in this and the next case study are to Paul and
Robertson, 1970.)
The routine nature of their work, and the frustrations generated
by design modifications and delays, made job enrichment appear the
ideal solution to the draughtsmens' problems. One unit, "K", was
about to commence work on the design of a large new chemical plant,
and this was designated the experimental group, comprising 21
draughtsmen. It was to be compared with a previous project of a
similar nature carried out by unit "J". (All the other projects
used formal control groups to assess results, but this was not
possible in this case.) The trial period in this case was from
September 19&7 to September 1968.
Three types of changes were made to the work of the draughtsmen
First, an attempt was made to weld the "K" unit draughtsmen
into a composite task force for the project." (p.57) Specific
measures adopted to achieve this were (p.57) :
1. locating the entire unit in one project office;
2. making demarcation boundaries flexible;
3. creating small sub-groups to deal with specific aspects
of the project;
1+. early appointment and involvement of the new plant's
operating manager;
5. site visits by draughtsmen;
6. having draughtsmen on site to assist the construction.
Second, attempts were made to ensure that the draughtsmen were well
briefed about the project through (p.57):
1. an initial briefing session on the "philosophy and
objectives" of the design;
2. allowing draughtsmen to establish their own completion dates;
3. six-monthly interviews with section leaders to discuss
work preferences and ambitions.






5- liaising with suppliers;
6. initiating materials requisitions.
There are no data presented in the evaluation of this project
which is supported entirely by managerial judgement :
A. No (anticipated) complaints arose when the entire staff
was moved to inferior premises. (p.59)
B. Flexible demarcation boundaries lea to ".... greater
freedom of discussion and easier consultation ...." (p.59)
C. The success of the initial briefing session led to subsequent
ad hoc sessions being held. (p.59)
D. The "selected few senior designers" who had been granted
additional responsibility ".... were said to have done
it well." (p.60)
E. Management believed that morale and team spirit were
comparatively high in the "K" unit project. (p.6o)
F. A job satisfaction survey similar to that used by Ford
indicated no significant changes in job satisfaction
over the trial period, although the experimental group
had increased its score slightly. (p.6o)
2. Fitters and Operatives.
(Paul and Robertson, 1970, Chapter 10, pp.73-82.)
The "job restructuring" approaches to job design have been
so named because their basic unit of analysis is the individual job.
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This particular job enrichment proposal (it had not been implemented)
is described here at some length because it contradicts that
fundamental premise and deals instead with the work group as a whole.
Paul and Robertson claim to have included it ". . .. to illustrate the
possibilities for job enrichment on the shop floor." (p.8l)
Changes affecting the plant operatives were to have :
1. established self-supervising teams;
2. transformed the role of the foreman into a purely administrative
one;
3. made the "leading hands" into team leaders and spokesmen.
It is worth noting in detail what these changes actually involved :
"Inspectors were to be eliminated from the teams; the
men would be responsible for checking the quality of
their own work at each stage of assembly, equipment
being made available for this purpose. The men would
be able to organise their own job rotation within the
team and would have some say in recruitment into it.
Teams would become responsible for their own stocks and
material usages; they would also have authority to
reject components unacceptable to them on grounds of
quality. They were to be consulted on the design and
methods of assembly of the products, and would be encouraged
to make changes when appropriate. Their responsibility
was to be extended to complement that of process
operators in ensuring the correct use of the products in
the plant: they would be given a regular feedback on
performance, both good and bad, and would be sent to
the plant to deal with complaints." (pp.81-82.)
The job changes proposed for individual fitters were as follows :
1. certain fitters were each to be mainly allocated to
certain plants;
2. process staff could approach the fitter directly;
3. he would be consulted on design and quality of equipment-
purchased, constructed or used, and on arrangements for
procuring spares;
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he would he involved in training new process operators;
5. he would he given more feedback on performance;
6. he would have more freedom to plan his own work;
7. fixed breaks would he abolished;
8. he would have authority to initiate workshop orders;
9. he would be provided with - drawing office facilities,
- a mobile compressor,
- a pool of bicycles;
10. he would be given training in specialist functions.
The changes proposed for operatives and for fitters are of a
totally different order to any discussed elsewhere in the book, and
Paul and Robertson do not state why these proposals were not
implemented. It is tempting to speculate on the omission from
the article of which Herzberg was co-author (Paul, Robertson and
Herzberg, 1969) of the draughtsmen application. The trial cannot
have been completed too late for inclusion in that article as the
study period ended in September 1968, at the same time as that for
the sales representatives which is described in the 19&9 article.
Unlike the four other white-collar applications which Paul and
Robertson describe, that concerning the draughtsmen involved the
formation of a "composite task force" which approximates to the
concept of a composite autonomous group. Herzberg's antipathy
towards "social job design approaches" has already been noted, and
this is possibly the reason for the 19&9 article's exclusion of the
draughtsmen application. Speculation aside, Paul and Robertson's
work contains the same inconsistency as that of Ford : in a so-
called application of Herzberg's job enrichment technique we find the
establishment (or in the case of the plant operatives the proposed
establishment) of composite autonomous groups. In this respect,
the applications of job enrichment described above are not entirely
typical of job enrichment studies in general; of the 27 other job
enrichment studies examined, 10 describe some form of group or team
working changes :
Sorcher and Meyer, 1968
Donnelly, 1971
Hays and Saballus, 1971
Weed, 1971






Other "orthodox" job enrichment studies (which include some well
known company names) are to be found in the following :
(GEO - American)
(Polaroid, Texas Instruments)
Gomersall and Myers, 1966





Maher and Overbagh, 1971
Mandle and Lawless, 1971 (Hoover)
Rush, 1971 (Monsanto Chemicals, Texas
Instruments)
Employee Relations Bulletin,1972 (Motorola)
Plant, 1972
Powers, 1972








European Industrial Relations Review, 197^ (United Biscuits)
Jenkins, 197^ (Several companies)




The job enrichment applications detailed above are typical in
a number of other respects, and in summary, the following points may
be said to apply to the technique in general :
1. there is some underlying confusion with regard to the
precise nature of the technique in practice. This is partly
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due to the tendency for the term "job enrichment" to be
used to cover a variety of practices, but is also due to a
more fundamental deviation from Herzberg's original
formulation of the concept and its application to individual
jobs;
2. both application and evaluation of the technique are
subjective; the requirements of each situation determine
the nature and extent of the changes made, and assessment
of particular projects is generally based on management
opinion;
3. the majority of reported case studies are non-academic in
origin and content. A number consist only of descriptions
of individual company experience, generally lacking any
attempt at experimental control. Their results, such as
they are, are not, therefore, cumulative;
U. the job enrichment technique makes no alteration to
organisational structure, and a means of analysing its
possible impact on organisation structure is lacking. The
ambiguous position of first-line supervision which many
of the case studies illustrate is indicative of this gap
in the theory, as there is no method for systematically
assessing in advance the effect of job enrichment changes
for operatives on their supervisors. This constitutes
an inherent weakness of job enrichment as a technique
for organisational analysis and change;
5. as with job enlargement, increasing emphasis has been placed
on the economic advantages of job enrichment rather than on
the behavioural advantages. The following pessimistic
quotation from Whitsett, another American management
consultant, aptly illustrates this trend :
I do not find that job satisfaction, improved
job attitude, happiness or for that matter, mental
health are saleable quantities in and of themselves.
As a consultant, I have found it difficult, if not
impossible, except in rare instances, to sell job
satisfaction or mental health; so, I sell human
resource utilisation in the form of job enrichment."
(Whitsett, 1971, p.31).
Fourth Generation Theory : Expectancy Theory
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Over the past ten or twelve years emphasis in work motivation
research has shifted from two factor theory to "Valence -
Instrumentality - Expectancy" theory, generally and more conveniently
referred to as expectancy theory. Expectancy theory has a much
lengthier pedigree than two factor theory and may he traced hack to
the utilitarian writings of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill.
(Mill's essay on "Utilitarianism" was published in l86l.)
Psychology as a science has developed out of philosophy, and as
one illustration of this, the modern theories of learning and
motivation which will concern us here clearly reflect these early
influences.
Current theories of learning and motivation are not unified
hut are divided, generally, into two groups, each dominated by a
different view of the nature of man:
"One represents man as being driven by inherited,
conflicting, unconscious drives that cause him to
behave in instinctual and, at times, self-destructive
ways. The second view represents man as rational
and aware of his goals and as behaving in those
ways that he feels will help him achieve his goals."
(Lawler, 1973, p.^.)
These two groups of theories are commonly referred to as "stimulus-
response" find "cognitive" theories respectively; the former considers
that human behaviour is reflexive, the latter that it is goal
directed or purposive. Expectancy theory is cognitive in its
approach and was initially formulated by Edward C. Tolman, as a
challenge to the stimulus-response theories of his contemporaries
Clark Hull and Kenneth Spence:
"The expectancy theories of Tolman and (Kurt) Lewin
picture behaviour as being determined by people's goals
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and the expectancies people have that various behaviors
will lead to the goals. The drive theories of Hull and
Spence emphasise that behavior is determined by drives
and by learned associations between situation and behavior."
(Lawler, 1973, p.^.)
Drive theory is simply another name for stimulus-response theory.
A more detailed treatment of this aspect of the topic may be found
in Lawler (1971, Chapters 5 and 6; 1973, Chapters 2 and 3) who
compares in detail the respective attributes of drive theory and
expectancy theory, and discusses the advantages of the latter with
respect to the explanation of work motivation. A detailed
exposition of Tolman's expectancy theory, and a summary of current
developments which reflect his influence, is to be found in Hilgard
and Bower (1975, Chapter 5)-
In the field of work motivation, early support was provided
for this approach by Georgopoulos, Mahoney and Jones (1957) who
developed what they termed a "path-goal approach to productivity"
for their study of some 620 workers in a household appliances
company. The assumptions upon which their model is based illustrates
its nature as an expectancy theory :
".... individual productivity is, among other things, a
function of one's motivation to produce at a given level;
in turn, such motivation depends upon (a) the particular
needs of the individual as reflected in the goals towards
which he is moving, and (b) his perception regarding the
relative usefulness of productivity behavior as an
instrumentality, or as a path to the attainment of these
goals." (Georgopoulos et al, 1957, p.238 in Vroom and
Deci, 1970.)
Expectancy theory thus hopes to explain why (all other things
being equal) individuals are motivated to produce at different
levels. Motivation is hypothesised to depend upon the outcomes
which a person values and upon his expectation that a particular
level of performance will lead to those outcomes. An individual
will, therefore, tend to produce more if high productivity is
seen as leading to the attainment of valued goals. Conversely,
if low productivity is seen as leading to valued goals, the
individual will tend to produce less. From their research
questionnaire, Georgopoulos, Mahoney and Jones found that workers
with a "positive path-goal perception" (i.e. high productivity leads
to valued goals) tended to produce at a higher level than workers
with a "negative path-goal perception" (i.e. low productivity leads
to valued goals). The goals which appeared to be particularly
important for this group as a whole were -
• making more money in the long run,
• getting along well with the work group,
• promotion to a higher base rate.
Ten such job-related items were used, we are not told what the other
seven were, and no selection criteria for the ten items are
described. Vroom (1962) criticised Georgopoulos et al for their
preoccupation with immediate, extrinsic, rewards arguing that
reward values of all the anticipated consequences of a level of
performance should be taken into account as well as the immediate
reward value itself in an explanation of work motivation.
Victor H. Vroom (Professor of Industrial Administration,
Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburg) is in fact accredited with
having provided the first systematic formulation of an expectancy
theory of work motivation (see Lawler, 1973, p.^5). For Vroom
(196H), the preference which an individual has for a particular goal
or goals is termed "valence", defined as "affective orientations
toward particular outcomes" (p.15). Valence refers to the
anticipated rather than the actual satisfaction to be gained from an
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outcome, and it may, therefore, be negative, neutral, or positive.
In Vroom's expectancy equation, it can take on a value between
-1 and +1. The (subjective) probability that a given act will lead
to a particular outcome is termed an "expectancy", which may, therefore,
be given a value between 0 and 1. The "force", or motivation, to
perform an act is thus a function of both valence and expectancy,
and Vroom expresses this relationship as -
F = E x V
Where F = force to perform an act,
E = the expectancy that the act will be followed
by a particular outcome, and
V = the valence of the outcome.
Since in most situations a number of outcomes will result from a
particular act, the equation should be summed across all of them,
and the final version of the relationship is therefore -
F = E(E x V).
Expectancy and valence are hypothesised to combine multiplicatively
because when either is zero, force, or motivation, will also be
zero, and this is in accord with common sense: if a person perceives
a very high probability that a particular act will lead to a
particular outcome, but he places no value on that outcome, there
will be no motivation to perform the act. Conversely if a person
places a high value on a particular outcome but perceives no probability
of his effort attaining it, motivation will again be zero. Only
when both terms are positive will motivation be positive.
Expectancy and valence combined additively would produce different
predictions, and this is rejected as unrealistic.
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Expectancy theory is thus a type of hedonism; it postulates
that individuals strive towards outcomes which they anticipate will
bring them pleasure, and avoid outcomes which may produce discomfort
or pain. Handy (1976) refers to the expectancy equation as the
"motivation calculus" (p.33); while dealing with subjective
perceptions of situations the theory imparts at least a kind of
rationality to man's decision making with regard to his behaviour.
It should also be noted that as a general theory of motivation,
expectancy theory can deal with why people eat ice-cream or go
ballroom dancing as well as with behaviour at work. It is, of
course, only the latter aspect with which we shall be concerned here.
Following Vroom's formulation, expectancy theory has been
subjected to significant modification and development, and to
numerous empirical tests of its validity. Empirical tests of the
theory have tended to become increasingly complex due to the growing
number of variables which appear to have to be taken into account in
attempts to improve its predictive power. In both the development
and testing of expectancy theory, the contribution of one American
researcher has been particularly significant - that of Edward E.
Lawler III, currently at the University of Michigan. Lawler has also
been responsible for pursuing the implications of expectancy theory
in the field of job design and it is this aspect of his work which is
of most concern here. Lawler is a prolific writer and only a sample
of his work, and that of his colleagues, is mentioned here.
Lawler makes two main criticisms of Vroom's exposition of
expectancy theory. First, Vroom does not discuss the particular
rewards which human beings may consider as relevant outcomes of
behaviour. Second, Vroom confuses the act of behaviour with its
outcome or outcomes, when these are conceptually distinct from one
another; a person attempting to perform well does not necessarily
perform well as a result, and Lawler's formulation of the theory
attempts to take account of this. With regard to the first
criticism, Lawler and Porter (1967) suggest that emphasis be placed
on the hierarchical list of needs given by Maslow (19^+3, 197o)*
A subsequent, more comprehensive, review of the literature on this
subject prompted Lawler (1973) to suggest the following list of
human needs which appeared to be particularly relevant to the work
situation :
"l. A number of existence needs - primarily sex, hunger,
thirst, and oxygen.
2. A security need.
3. A social need.
U. A need for esteem and reputation.
5. An autonomy or freedom need.
6. A need for competence and self-actualisation."
(p.32)
Lawler further suggests that these needs are arranged in a two-step
hierarchy (in contrast to Maslow's original five-step hierarchy).
The higher order needs, Lawler suggests, do not come into play until
existence and security needs have been satisfied, but he claims
that there is little evidence to indicate that the higher order
needs are themselves hierarchically organised. With regard to the
criticism that acts and outcomes tend to be confused, Lawler and
Porter (1967) define expectancy, or "effort-reward probability" as
".... an individual's subjective expectancy about the
likelihood that rewards that he desires will follow from
putting forth certain levels of effort, and is similar
to the concept of subjective probability. Such an
expectation can be thought of as representing the
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combination of two separate subsidiary expectancies, namely;
(a) the probability that rewards depend upon performance;
and (b) the probability that performance depends upon effort."
(Lawler and Porter, 196j, p.257 in Vroom and Deci, 1970.)
Two types of expectancy are, therefore, postulated - the probability
that performance leads to reward (the "instrumentality" term) and
the probability that effort will lead to performance or accomplish¬
ment of what is attempted. Lawler and Porter's complete model is
shown in Figure 2.b. Two obvious mediators of the relationship
between effort and performance are shown, the individual's ability
and his perceptions of his role. In subsequent research, Lawler
(1968) claimed to have shown that expectancy attitudes do in fact
determine performance; the possibility that the reverse holds, i.e.
that performance determines expectancy attitudes, is ruled out.
An example of the way in which the model's components can be
operationalised in order to test the theory is given by Hackman and
Porter (1968), and this practical illustration also serves to provide
a clearer idea of the nature of expectancy theory. Hackman and
Porter set out to test the ability of expectancy theory to predict
the work effectiveness of 82 telephone company service representatives
(female) using Vroom's formulation of the theory,
n
F = . 2 , E. x V. ,
i = l 1 1
where n is the number of possible outcomes. In order to determine
the employees' motivation levels, therefore, three types of information
had to be obtained:
"(a) a list of outcomes which they expect to obtain as
a result of "working hard" on the job;
(b) an estimate of the level of certainty they have
that outcomes will in fact be obtained as a result











(c) an estimate of the degree to which they like
or dislike the outcomes (V^)." (Hackman and
Porter, 1968, p.l+l8.)
Hackman and Porter argue that obtaining a list of expected outcomes
is simplified if only those beliefs which are held in common by a
group are taken into account, because this procedure does not affect
the level of prediction. They therefore interviewed two dozen
service representatives and the ll+ outcomes mentioned by 3 or more
of the interviewees were then taken to represent the group's expected
"consequences of working hard". These beliefs range, for example,
from "Time will seem to go faster", through "She is likely to gain
admiration and respect from her fellow workers" to "She is likely to
receive a raise more quickly". Four "moderately negative" beliefs
were added to the list by the researchers, and the complete list
of 18 items is to be found in Hackman and Porter (1968), p. 1+21.
A questionnaire was then administered to the service
representatives to obtain indices of expectancy (E^) and valence
(Vi). To measure expectancy, they were asked questions in the
format:
"If a person works especially hard on this job, she is
more likely to feel a sense of completion and accomplish¬
ment at the end of the day." (p.U20)
Answers were indicated on a seven point scale, ranging from "not at
all true" (i.e. the employee did not expect that working hard would
lead to this outcome) to "very true". Valence was measured in a
similar manner, the outcomes themselves (e.g. "feeling a sense of
completion and accomplishment") being rated on a seven point scale
ranging from "very good" to "very bad" with "neither good nor bad"
at the midpoint.
The outcomes which employees consider to result from working
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hard on the job have been determined, and the expectancy and
valence terms have been operationalised and measured. All that
remains is to enter the values obtained into the expectancy
equation (2 E x V) for each individual to determine her motivation
(F). At this point, however, the authors consider it necessary to
enter a footnote bringing attention to the fact that the measurement
processes do not meet the criteria for ratio scales. (They do not
in fact meet the criteria for an interval scale either.) The
argument used to circumvent this problem is that:
".... the predictor is viewed as a numerical score which,
given the measurement and arithmetic operations employed
to obtain the score and the theory from which the operations
were derived, should reflect gross differences in the
motivation of subjects to work hard. ( ) .... such
procedures are reasonable, as long as the scores are
substantively meaningful on extramathematical grounds and
so long as the scores do in fact relate to the criterion
variables of interest." (p.U2l)
This "ratio scale problem" (see Locke, 1975, p.H6U) applies to all
attempts to operationalise the theory's components, regardless of
the precise nature and definition of the variables used.
The next step in the research was to correlate the motivation
score of each individual with each of five performance criteria:
1. Job involvement and effort; determined by supervisory ratings
on four scales.
2. An employee appraisal form; part of the company's standard
appraisal system, again using supervisory ratings this time
on seven scales.
3• Error rate )
) from company records.
k. Sales data )
5. A composite criterion based on criteria 1, 3 and ^ above.
The expectancy predictor (Z E x V) correlated .bO with the composite
criterion, number 5> and smaller positive correlations were obtained
for the other criteria. These results thus provide some evidence of
the predictive properties of the theory. Hackman and Porter go on
to suggest that the theory indicates three changes in organisational
practice which should lead to improved performance:
"(a) instituting new outcomes which will be valued by the
performer and which will be seen by him as resulting
from hard work;
(b) changing the expectancies of existing outcomes so
that the link between hard work and positively valued
outcomes is strengthened and that between hard work
and negatively valued outcomes is weakened; and
(c) changing the valences of existing outcomes."
(Hackman and Porter, 1968, p. 1+25.)
The first two of these, it is pointed out, are more amenable to
manipulation than the third.
Hunt and Hill (1969) briefly examine the results of four other
studies which provide support for the predictive potential of the
theory. Graen (1969) and Mitchell and Albright (1972) illustrate
the trend mentioned above for empirical tests of the theory to
become more complex. None of these reports is of particular
relevance to the topic in hand and further explication of their
content would require a lengthy and somewhat unnecessary digression.
Hackman and Porter's (1968) research is a good illustration of
expectancy theory in practice, but it incorporated neither of the
modifications suggested by Lawler and Porter (1967). There are
different interpretations placed upon what expectancy theory actually
should be. As a representative of the current status of the theory,
Lawler's account appears to be the most comprehensive, and lucid,
available. What is here described as fourth generation theory,
therefore,is illustrated in Figure 2.5, from Lawler (1971). This
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Figure2.5:Lawle 's"motivationmod l";four hgen ratioth ory(fromLawler,1971<p.108).
&
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particular model is an undoubtedly popular one, but it is given here
as a representative of its kind and significant variants of the
theory are used.
Vroom argued that outcomes achieve valence through their
perceived relationship to ends; outcomes leading to desirable
consequences are positively valued, those leading to undesirable
consequences will be negatively valued. He did not say which ends
or consequences could be desirable or how an end or consequence came
to be desirable. Lawler, as mentioned above, chooses to rely on
a number of content theories of motivation, mainly that of Maslow
(19^3), which are directed at this question. From Figure 2.5 it
will be seen that (for Lawler) the individual's motivation to
perform at a given level is determined by two variables:
1. ".... the person's belief concerning the probability that
if he puts effort into performing at that level, he will
be able to perform at that level (Box l)." (Lawler,
1971, p.107.)
This belief is a subjective probability and can, therefore, vary
from 0 to 1.
This belief is influenced by two factors, self-esteem (Box 3) and
previous experience (Box 4). Self-esteem and previous experience
are in turn both influenced through time by feedback concerning
job performance (loop a). Thus,
".... the higher the person rates his self-esteem and the
more he has been able to perform effectively in similar
stimulus situations, the higher will be his effort »■
performance (E *"P) subjective probability."
(Lawler, 1971s p.107.)
2. "The second factor that influences motivation is really made
up of a combination of beliefs about what the outcomes of
accomplishing the intended level of performance will be and
the valence of these outcomes (Box 2)." (Lawler, 1971,
p.108.)
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This gives the term 2 Ep —*■ o) x (vD , where P —+■ 0 is the
probability that performance will lead to a particular outcome, and
V is the valence of that outcome. The term is summed across all
possible outcomes. Valence can take on a value between -1 and +1,
and the term P ► 0 is another subjective probability - the
"instrumentality" term - and, therefore, has a value between 0 and 1.
If only one E —P probability were to be taken into account
(the probability that trying to perform at a particular level will
lead to performance at that level), the equation would simply read:
F = (E —^P) x 2 [[f —0) (V)] .
It has been noted, however, that trying to perform at a particular
level does not necessarily produce that level of performance.
If the E —P probability is less than 1, therefore, it may be
necessary to consider the probability that trying to perform at a
particular level will lead to performance at a different, presumably
lower, level. Such an additional E —■» P probability would then be
combined with the respective (P —*-0)(V) values for that level
of performance. This is the reason for the sigma sign preceding
the first term of the equation (Box l). The necessity for taking
into account additional E —^ P probabilities is illustrated by the
situation in which strong negative consequences are likely to result
from poor performance. Regardless of the positively valued outcomes
of successful performance, motivation may be significantly reduced if
failure to perform at the intended level is seen as leading to
substantial negative outcomes.
The model (Box 7) shows motivation to be affected by the
extent to which an individual believes that he can influence out¬
comes and events personally (internal control) or whether outcomes and
events influence him (external control). (See Lawler, 1971,
p.110 or Lawler, 1973, p.57.) Feedback loop b allows for possible
learning of performance 9* outcome probabilities over time.
Paradoxically, it need not be the case that motivation is
highest when E —probability is high; no great value may be
placed upon the performance of acts which are easy to perform well,
where effort is certain to lead to good performance. Feelings of
achievement and accomplishment may be aroused more when the E —*• P
probability is around 0.5. The E —P term thus has an influence
on the P —*■ 0 term and this is indicated by the line marked c.
Effort and ability (Box 9) are hypothesised to combine
multiplicatively, for precisely the same reason that the expectancy
theory's main components are combined in that manner; if either
effort or ability is zero then performance will be zero.
Box 8 refers to what has previously been called role perceptions
'the person's perception of how his effort can best be converted into
performance." (Lawler, 1971, p.113.) This is again shown as
combining multiplicatively with effort since if role perceptions
are inaccurate, performance will be low (or zero) regardless of effort
expended.
The valence of outcomes is seen to be influenced by the extent
to which they satisfy the individual's needs (Box 5) (and here
Lawler is refering to his two-step need hierarchy), and by the extent
to which the individual's input (effort) - outcome balance is
perceived to be just (Box 6). This latter proposition is derived
from equity theory; (this is discussed at length in Lawler (1971)
Chapter 5, and Lawler (1973) Chapter 2).
In his more recent book, Lawler (1973) summarises the theory
with some minor changes in emphasis. He gives the following lists
of the determinants of E —P and P ► 0 expectancies:
Determinants of E —P expectancies(p.55)
• Self-esteem
• Past experience in similar situations
• Actual situation
• Communications from others
Determinants of P » 0 expectancies (p.58)
• Past experience in similar situations
• Attractiveness of outcomes
• Belief in internal versus external control
• E —^P expectancies
• Actual situation
• Communications from others
The "Actual situation" and "Communications from others" appear to he
new terms incorporated into the model.
The complexity of expectancy theory has led a number of critics
to question the extent to which the individual either carries out the
analysis implied by the theory before undertaking some particular
behaviour, and to what extent the individual is indeed capable of
making such calculations. This is not of great importance since, if
the theory is shown to be an accurate predictor of performance, it
will be enough to say that the individual makes decisions with regard
to his behaviour as if the expectancy equation had in fact been worked
out. Lawler, however, stresses that man's rationality, while evident
is limited, and that behaviour exhibits "satisficing" (after Herbert
Simon) rather than "maximising" characteristics:
"It must be remembered that man bases his behavior on
perceptions that are simplified and that he does not
consider all factors. Thus, carried to all its
permutations and combinations, our model would
undoubtedly be much more complicated than the models
that people actually use. The model of course does
not have to be carried to all the combinations. It
can be viewed as considering a limited number of
alternatives, just as people do. The important thing
the model does is to show the kinds of cognition
people have and how these interact to influence
behavior." (Lawler, 1971, p.ll6.)
Expectancy Theory and the Design of Jobs
Lawler initially argued that job design changes influence
motivation through their potential effect upon P —^ 0 beliefs:
"They can do this because they have the power to influence
the probability that certain rewards will be seen to
result from good performance, not because they can
influence the perceived probability that effort will
result in good performance." (Lawler, 1969, p.l62
in Vroom and Deci, 1970.)
Lawler has revised this view and has indicated that job design change
may influence all three components of the expectancy model :
P —0 beliefs, outcome attractiveness, and E * P beliefs.
(Lawler, 1973, Chapter 7=)
With regard to effect on P —^ 0 beliefs, job design determines
not only the kinds of rewards that are available, but also what the
employee must do in order to obtain these rewards. Job design
changes can potentially increase performance by influencing an
individual's beliefs concerning the outcome of good performance.
Intrinsic rewards, claims Lawler, are more important in this respect
than extrinsic rewards because the relationship between good
performance and intrinsic rewards is more direct than that for
extrinsic rewards.
With regard to outcome attractiveness, an individual discovers
the outcomes of task performance through performing various kinds of
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task. The design of the job or jobs which an individual does can
therefore have a bearing on which outcomes come to be valued by the
individual. Lawler cites evidence to suggest that certain kinds of
task can arouse latent (or dormant) achievement motivation in some
individuals, leading in effect to a change in an individual's
motivational state.
With regard to E —P beliefs, job design can affect the
perceived relationship between effort and good performance. On
many tasks, e.g. those on an assembly line, the relationship between
an individual's effort and performance is a fairly clear one, most
people being able to perform such tasks successfully. With some
managerial jobs, on the other hand, expenditure of effort does not
guarantee good performance and the relationship between the two is
not so visible.
From examination of previous research (his own and that of others),
Lawler claims to have identified three job characteristics which have a
significant influence on the motivation to work; in particular, he
hypothesises that:
".... satisfaction should be obtained when an employee
works effectively on a job that (l) allows him to feel
personally responsible for a meaningful portion of the
work, (2) provides outcomes that are intrinsically
meaningful or are otherwise experienced as worthwhile,
and (3) provides feedback about what is accomplished."
(Lawler, 1973, p.158.)
It is not an objective assessment of the job which is important in this
respect but the individual's perception of his job in these terms.
Individuals react to job characteristics in different ways, and Lawler
argues that the main determinant of such individual differences is
higher-order need strength. Jobs which are rich in the three
characteristics mentioned are more likely to motivate, and satisfy, those
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individuals who value intrinsic outcomes such as feelings of
accomplishment, growth or competence. Individuals who do not value
these outcomes are likely to respond to such comparatively demanding
jobs with irritation and frustration.
In order to measure jobs using the three characteristics given,
Lawler used four of the attributes on the Turner and Lawrence (1965)





These are referred to as the four core dimensions of job design and
their precise derivation is described in more detail below.
To summarise so far, the theory predicts that the greater the
individual's higher-order need strength and the job's ratings on the
four core dimensions, the higher will be the individual's motivation,
performance and satisfaction. Note that here satisfaction is said
to depend upon performance, not vice versa.
An attempt to test this theory is reported by Hackman and
Lawler (1971). The subjects of their study were 208 telephone
company employees working in 13 different jobs. Two independent
variables were examined; (a) strength of desire for satisfaction of
higher order needs, and (b) descriptions of the 13 jobs in terms of
the four core dimensions (autonomy, task identity, variety and feedback).
It was predicted that when a job is rated high on the four core
dimensions, employees having a strong desire for higher order need
satisfaction would tend to have high motivation, high job satisfaction,
be absent infrequently and perform better.
Hackman and Lawler considered that the measurement of
individual differences directly would be of greater value than the
examination of subcultural variables. Blood and Hulin (1967), as
mentioned above (see p.92 ), had previously applied this criticism
to their own research concerning the apparent effects of subcultural
variables. In adopting this approach, however, Hackman and Lawler
admit one problem, in that:
".... it requires prior specification on a conceptual
level of what specific differences among people are
responsible for the results reported by Turner and
Lawrence (1965) and Blood and Hulin (1967), i.e. what
is it about people that moderates the way they react
to their jobs." (Hackman and Lawler, 1971, pp.261-262.)
Their conceptualisation of this interaction between job
characteristics and individual differences is based upon five
propositions derived from expectancy theory, dealing with the
influence of job design on employee motivation. These are, briefly
1. An individual will undertake those behaviours which he
believes will lead to valued (intrinsic and extrinsic)
outcomes.
2. The outcomes which are valued are those which lead to
satisfaction of physiological and psychological needs,
or which lead to other outcomes which are expected to
satisfy such needs.
3. Employees will, therefore, tend to work hard if jobs are
such that their needs can be satisfied by working hard.
U. Lower level needs (physical well-being, security) are
generally fairly well satisfied in our society, but higher
order needs (personal growth, accomplishment feelings)
are not always satisfied to the same extent.
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5- Higher order need satisfaction is achieved through
accomplishment of something worthwhile or meaningful
for the individual. To arouse intrinsic motivation,
a job must be high on all four core dimensions.
Hackman and Lawler in fact measured six of the job dimensions
from the RTA index:
Variety:
"the degree to which a job requires employees to perform
a wide range of operations in their work and/or the
degree to which employees must use a variety of equipment
and procedures in their work."
Autonomy:
"the extent to which employees have a major say in
scheduling their work, selecting the equipment they will
use, and deciding on procedures to be followed."
Task identity:
"the extent to which employees do an active or whole
piece of work and can clearly identify the result of
their efforts."
Feedback:
"the degree to which employees receive information as they
are working which reveals how well they are performing
on the job."
Dealing with others:
"the degree to which a job requires employees to deal
with other people (either customers, other company
employees, or both) to complete the work."
Friendship opportunities:
"the degree to which a job allows employees to talk
with one another on the job and to establish informal
relationships with other employees at work."
(Hackman and Lawler, 1971, p.265.)
The last two dimensions are based on the RTA index dimensions
"required" and "optional" interaction respectively. Questionnaire
measures of each of the dimensions were developed; these are based on
employees' subjective assessments of task characteristics. Objective
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(i.e. researcher) ratings on these measures were also obtained and
a high degree of correlation was found between the two sets of results
(except for ratings on the "feedback" dimension which appears to have
been ambiguously defined). Hackman and Lawler then correlated ratings
of each of the dimensions with the dependent measures of satisfaction,
performance and absenteeism, controlling for need strength which was
also measured by questionnaire. (Their measure of desire for satisfaction
of higher order needs was developed "on an a priori basis".) The
relationship between perceived job characteristics and behavioural and
attitudinal reactions of employees was then examined for each of the
13 jobs, and the hypothesis that only jobs rated highly on the
four core dimensions are conducive to high satisfaction and
performance was tested.
Hackman and Lawler found that the employees who rated their
jobs highly on the core dimensions tended to do higher quality work,
were regarded as more effective performers, and reported "feeling
internal pressures to take personal responsibility for their work"
(p.27 3). Jobs rated highly on the core dimensions were also
related to overall job satisfaction, and to lower absenteeism.
Four satisfaction items in particular were related to the core
dimensions: (in descending order of strength)
• opportunity for independent thought and action,
• feeling of worthwhile accomplishment,
• opportunity for personal growth and development,
• self-esteem and self-respect attached to the job.
The four satisfaction items least strongly related to the core
dimensions were: (in ascending order)
• pay,
• opportunity to develop close friendships,
• opportunity for promotion,
• respect and fair treatment from superior.
The hypothesised relationship between the core dimensions and the
satisfaction of higher order needs (the fifth proposition of Hackman
and Lawler) is thus given substantial support by this set of results.
Neither of the interpersonal relationships - "dealing with
others" and "friendship opportunities" - showed any strong or
consistent relationship to attitudes or to performance. The
researcher's explanation for this is that the consequences of jobs
rated highly on these measures are primarily social in nature, and
they are not, therefore, relevant to motivation and performance.
In summary, Hackman and Lawler had proposed the following
"scenario":
(a) jobs rated highly on all four core dimensions
performed by
(b) individuals with strong higher order need strength
lead to
(c) the experience of pressure to take responsibility for one's
own work
and also to
(d) high intrinsic motivation,
(e) high performance quality and performance effectiveness,
(f) high job satisfaction and job involvement, and
(g) low absenteeism.
Generally speaking, all of these expectations were supported by the
results of the study, except for that concerning absenteeism where
the differences observed were in the expected direction but were not
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statistically significant.
Overall, the results of the research of Hackman and Lawler
(1971) provide impressive support for their expectancy theory of
job design. Not so impressive, however, is their first job design
project which attempted to test the theory in practice (Lawler,
Hackman and Kaufman, 1973). (This study is also summarised in
Cameron, Orchin and White, 197^-) The project was carried out in
the company in which Hackman and Lawler had conducted their earlier
(1971) research. The researchers' previous involvement in the
company had stimulated this project which was reported as a test of
the theory that had been developed. The job design changes
affected female telephone operators whose office was originally
organised in the following way:
Job Title Number
Chief Operator 1
Group Chief Operators (GCO's) 7
Service Assistants (SA's) l4
Operators 39
There were two types of operator job; the "directory assistance" job
which involves what we would call "directory enquiries", and the "toll"
job, which involves placing, timing and charging long distance calls.
All employees up to CGO level were given a revised version of the
questionnaire used by Hackman and Lawler in 19715 2 weeks before any
changes were made, and again 6 months afterwards. Due to turnover and
scheduling problems, only 17 operators completed the questionnaire on
both occasions. Unstructured interviews were also held with all the
GCO's, 5 SA's and 8 operators.
The changes took place under the name "Initiative and Judgement
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Programme", and this was conducted by two members of the company's
staff. Operators and SA's were not involved in the redesign process.
The changes which took place were as follows:
1. Operators were given more freedom to choose what phraseology
to use with customers, instead of being restricted to a number
of set phrases.
2. Operators were allowed to omit reference to their operator
number at the start of each call.
3. Operators were allowed to leave their stations to check records
and look up non-public numbers without obtaining their
supervisor's permission.
k. Directory assistance operators were free to assist on the
toll job at their own discretion if the latter appeared to be
overloaded.
5- Operators were free to service a customer who had a large
number of requests at their own discretion, or to call the
customer back when the work load fell.
6. Operators were free to visit the ladies' room without the
supervisor's permission and without signing out on a
blackboard.
7. Operators themselves reported the numbers of calls they had
handled.
The immediate effects of these changes comprised a reduction in
the training time for directory assistance operators from 5 days to 2,
and major changes in the Service Assistants' jobs. The latter now
spent much less time on "minute - by - minute" office management and
on operator training than they had previously. One of the main
results of the study is illustrated in Figure 2.6. The directory
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assistance job appeared to have been changed on only two of the four
core dimensions - variety and autonomy. The absolute level of the
job on these two dimensions, however, was still low even after the
changes, in comparison with the 13 other jobs in the company which
had previously been studied. (The toll job had remained unchanged,
and this was verified by the operators' ratings.) No significant






Task identity 5.80 6.12
Feedback (from work itself) 4.63 4.72
Feedback (from management) 4.13 4.76
* Statistically significant
Figure 2.6: Operators' ratings of directory assistance job
(based on Lawler, Hackman and Kaufman, 1973, p. 54).
The increased motivation and satisfaction expected from the
changes to the directory assistance job did not occur, and satisfaction
with interpersonal relationships decreased significantly. The SA's
also indicated decreased satisfaction with the items concerning:
"(a) a stimulating and worthwhile medium of expression;
(b) satisfying interpersonal relationships; and (c)
job security." (Lawler, Hackman and Kaufman, 1973, p.57-)
These results were apparently not due to low higher order need strength,
but data on tenure showed longer serving employees to be generally more
dissatisfied with the changes than comparatively new employees.
Lawler et al attribute failure of the project to two major factors;
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first, even after the changes had been made, the job of directory
assistance was still comparatively low on the four core dimensions;
second, the changes affected only two of the four core dimensions,
and the theory requires improvement in all four simultaneously.
Altogether, therefore, it was not surprising that the changes had
no significant effect on intrinsic motivation.
Of more interest, perhaps, was the effect of the changes on
the SA job:
"When the operators began performing some of the tasks
that previously had been done by the SA's, existing
relationships between operators and SA's apparently were
severely disrupted. No longer did the SA's make many
decisions for the operators, and no longer did the
operators come to them with their problems. This
decreased the feelings of 'job security' of the SA's,
and it substantially affected the way they related to
the operators." (Lawler, Hackman and Kaufman, 1973,
pp .60-6l.)
Any positive motivational changes in the operators may, therefore, have
been counteracted by the subsequent behaviour of the SA's. The authors
considered the benefit which may have been gained by involving the SA's
in the redesign process from the start, and admit that they had paid
insufficient attention to how the SA's job would be affected.
The company, however, considered the project to have been a
success, for four reasons:
1. cost reductions through shortened training time;
2. possibility of reducing the number of supervisors;
3. absenteeism and turnover fell during the study; and
4. productivity and work quality were unaffected.
This job design project, therefore, provides equivocal support for the
expectancy theory of job design. The model appears to lack at least
two fundamental aspects: a means of predicting how proposed job design
changes are likely to affect employees' ratings of a job on the four core
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dimensions, and a means of predicting similar effects on related
jobs, particularly those of immediate supervisors.
The expectancy theory of job design of Lawler and Hackman
incorporates only two of the three characteristics of Herzberg's
theory of job design. Lawler and Hackman have adopted (with
modification) a view of human nature based on Maslow's need hierarchy
theory; they have developed an expectancy theory of work motivation to
explain how these needs may be satisfied in the presence of certain
job characteristics, leading to higher performance and employee
satisfaction; what their theory lacks is a technique for analysing
an existing work situation and implementing the desirable job design
changes. The strategy adopted in the 1973 project seems to have
been very loosely based on that advocated by Herzberg (1968). This
lack of technique is clearly a weakness in the expectancy theory of
job design.
A British researcher, Robert Cooper (now at the University of
Lancaster), has arrived at a list similar to that of Hackman and Lawler,
of ".... characteristics of industrial tasks which serve to arouse
and/or satisfy the intrinsic motives." (Cooper, 1973b, p.389.)





• goal characteristics (Cooper, 1972, 1973a, 1974.)
The first three (variety, discretion and contribution) correspond
closely with three of the characteristics suggested by Hackman and
Lawler (variety, autonomy and task identity). Cooper does not treat
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feedback, the fourth "core dimension", as a separate factor, but as
a characteristic which can "shape up" employee perceptions of goal
characteristics. Cooper argues that goals have two main properties -
clarity and difficulty. Performance, therefore, is said to depend
on goal structure, i.e. the clarity and attainability of the goal.
Clarity of goal expression is likely to produce better performance
than a goal stated in vague terms. Tasks which are of medium
attainability (i.e. not too hard and not too easy) are likely to be
the most motivating. Thus goals which are stated in unambiguous terms
and which are fairly difficult to achieve will tend to lead to higher
performance than goals which are not clearly defined and which are
either easy or very hard to achieve. Cooper argues that maximum
motivation will be aroused when all four characteristics are amply
represented in a job, variety being the least important. (Cooper,
1973a.)
Cooper is not an expectancy theorist, but his approach is clearly
similar to that of Hackman and Lawler. In comparing the two approaches,
confusion may be introduced by considering Cooper's goal characteristics
in expectancy theory terms. Goal clarity relates to "Performance" in
the expectancy formula, i.e. what performance is required? Goal
difficulty or attainability is analagous to the Effort —•••Performance
probability, i.e. will a given amount of effort lead to success? In
Cooper's terms, goal clarity and goal difficulty are objective
characteristics of a particular job, whereas in the expectancy theory
of Hackman and Lawler they are part of the individual's subjective
assessment of his job. Variety, discretion and contribution (or
variety, autonomy and task identity) are conceivably measurable in
objective terms. The "objective" ratings which Hackman and Lawler
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(1971) made of the jobs which they examined correlated highly on
these three characteristics with the workers' "subjective" ratings.
It is difficult, however, to see how the characteristics of goal
clarity and goal difficulty could be objectively measured. The
individual differences which one would expect to find in perceptions
of these characteristics in a particular job would suggest that it
may be more fruitful to view these not as objective job characteristics,
but as characteristics of the individuals with which one is dealing.
It is this latter approach which Hackman and Lawler have adopted.
Cooper gives little indication of how the job characteristics
he has suggested can be operationalised, and he makes no recommenda¬
tions concerning how to redesign jobs to incorporate these particular
characteristics. He has been more concerned with developing a
theoretical framework for use in further study of work motivation.
Cooper's theory fits uncomfortably into the expectancy model, and
it is argued here that the formulation of Hackman and Lawler is
preferable.
Expectancy Theory : Criticism
Some criticism of the expectancy theory of job design has been
mentioned above. Criticism of expectancy theory itself will be dealt
with in this section. Expectancy theory has tended (slowly) to replace
two factor theory in research concerned with work motivation. It is
still undergoing a process of development at both theoretical and
practical levels. There is still, for example, debate concerning
the conceptualisation of the theory and of the terms which comprise
it (valence, instrumentality, expectancy), and a number of difficulties
arise over the operationalisation of these terms, regardless of how
they are defined: how are the components to be measured, which
components are to be measured, should measures of role perceptions
be included, how should intrinsic and extrinsic outcomes be
differentiated, which performance measures are relevant, how can
causality be assessed, how are extraneous variables to be controlled.
The term valence, for example, is sometimes used to mean
experienced satisfaction (value) and not anticipated satisfaction
(valence) as Vroom originally suggested. Such inconsistency is
clearly unsatisfactory. Miner and Dachler (1973) claim that,
overall, support for the theory is weak and contradictory with
different studies indicating support for different components of
the model. This state of affairs is neatly summarised by Locke
(1975) who states that:
".... there are no consistent findings regarding which
components are the best predictors of performance.
Sometimes V works best. Sometimes I works best.
More often E works best. The total V - I - E formula
may predict performance better than any component by
itself, or it may not. An additive model may work
better than a multiplicative one, or there may be no
difference. There have been no convincing
explanations offered as to why whatever does work
works, or why whatever does not work does not."
(Locke, 1975, p.U58.)
Having examined a much larger sample of expectancy theory research
than has been examined here, Miner and Dachler, and Locke, have
noted that correlations between VIE constructs and objective
performance in real life settings are generally low. In a recent
comprehensive critique of expectancy theory, Locke (1975) deals
with seven problem areas, some of which may contribute to the
unsatisfactory results which the theory has produced.
1. Expectancy theory as psychological hedonism.
The hedonistic hypothesis states that humans strive for the
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maximisation of pleasure, or the minimisation of pain. Writing in
l86l, J.S. Mill stated the utilitarian hypothesis in similar terms:
"The utilitarian doctrine is, that happiness is
desirable, and the only thing desirable as an end;
(....) the sole evidence it is possible to produce
that anything is desirable is that people do actually
desire it." (Mill, 1962, p.288.)
This argument, however, is circular if it is merely assumed that when
a person performs an act he is motivated by the pleasure which he will
obtain from it; that is, because a person actually wanted to do this
and not that, this "proves" that he was motivated by pleasure to do
the former. A critique of hedonism applies to expectancy theory in
so far as it makes similar assumptions. Pleasure, Locke points out,
is not the sole basis for motivational preference. This may be seen
in the existence of alcohol and drug addiction, neurosis, suicide,
and of people who consciously renounce pleasure such as monks and
nuns. Pleasure to the ascetic is not the same as pleasure to the non-
ascetic .
This criticism does not apply to Lawler and his colleagues.
Lawler cites evidence for a two step hierarchy of innate human needs
("pleasure" is not one of them) and his expectancy theory attempts to
explain people's behaviour in the satisfaction of these needs. The
theory only assumes that people's behaviour is goal directed and does
not assume that any particular goal or need (such as pleasure) will
be pursued or satisfied in a particular way. Behaviour is, therefore,
largely determined by the individual's attitudes and beliefs concerning
his various needs and the means available to satisfy them.
2. Individual differences in time-span.
There are enormous individual differences in ability to consider
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outcomes and consequences at points in the future. Expectancy theory
tends not to take account of this, apparently on the assumption that
in this respect all individuals are alike.
3. Individual differences in cognitive load capacity.
There are also significant individual differences in mental
capacity (cognitive load capacity) and differences in knowledge;
individuals vary widely, therefore, in the number and types of
actions which are considered when making decisions. This involves
differences in what people see as important, and differences in
persistence and self-esteem. Expectancy theory again ignores this
problem, assuming that individuals behave alike when searching for
consequences, terminating their search and integrating the information
obtained:
"This assumption is exemplified in the typical research
study in which the experimenter defines for the individual
the precise outcomes and behaviors he is to consider
when forecasting his actions, and even makes the
subsequent V - I - E calculations for the subject -
calculations which he would not make consciously, and
may not actually make at all." (Locke, 1975, p.U63.)
h. Subconscious motivation.
Individuals are not always conscious of their motives,
premises, values, expectancies and the like. It is not, therefore,
justified to assume that the individual consciously calculates the
expected pleasure and/or pain associated with various outcomes.
Individuals again differ in the extent to which they are aware of
the content and processes of their minds.
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5. Impulsive, expressive, neurotic and habitual behaviour.
A number of actions can be described as non-instrumental,
performed without calculation and having a zero projected time span.
Expectancy theory fails to take account of these.
6. The ratio scale problem.
This was raised by Hackman and Porter (1968), as mentioned
above. Locke states that:
".... there is as yet no known method of measuring
values or valences on a ratio scale (or even a true
interval scale). Thus the form of the theory assumes
the existence of measurements which do not exist."
(Locke, 1975, p.H6H.)
This is a more extreme view than that of Hackman and Porter who clearly
felt that this was not a serious problem at all. Until the use of
rating scales in measuring expectancies and valences can be replaced
by a method which generates results with ratio or interval scaling,
this criticism will remain valid.
7. The infinite regress problem.
The valence of a particular outcome equals the sum of the
products of the valences of all other outcomes to which that outcome
leads and the instrumentality of that outcome in producing these other
outcomes i.e. Zj(P *"0) (V). Locke continues:
"Thus, (theoretically) each particular valence is
explained on the basis of other valences. Taken
literally, this leads to an infinite regress, since
each valence would have to be calculated by associating
it with other valences and so on ad infinitum."
(Locke, 1975, pp.U6U-U65.)
Individuals would not, of course, deal with such calculations, and
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neither could the theory. As we have noted, Lawler has never
intended that the theory should take account of all possible
variables and their combinations for precisely the reason that man
is incapable of doing this.
Expectancy theory and the expectancy theory of job design are
still undergoing a process of development, and it is difficult to
predict the directions which this will take. The aspects of the
theory concerned solely with job design do not seem to advance the
technique much beyond that of Herzberg, with particular reference
to its implementation. The core dimensions given by Hackman and
Lawler bear a close resemblance to Herzberg's motivator factors,
and the techniques used to redesign jobs along the lines suggested
are very similar. Expectancy theory also suggests how the effects
of the job changes can be assessed, but some applications of job
enrichment have used Herzberg's "job reaction survey", which differs
in content (being directed at job satisfaction rather than task ratings)
but has a similar objective. The expectancy theory of job design
does not appear, however, to have been adequately tested and further
applications may lead to improvements in both theory and technique.





At the "beginning of this Chapter, two conceptually distinct
approaches to the design of jobs were identified. The approaches
which have been examined up to this point have taken as their basic
unit of analysis the individual job. The approach to be examined
in this section, on the other hand, treats the primary work group
as its basic unit of analysis (e.g. see Trist, Higgin, Murray and
Pollock, 1963, p.8). Job restructuring approaches do not adopt
an explicit model of organisation structure and functioning but
restrict their analysis to the individual worker and the tasks which,
taken together, comprise his job. In taking the group as the basic
unit of analysis, the work organisation approach requires a model
which describes the group's relationship with the rest of the
organisation; this approach requires a model of organisational
functioning.
The work organisation approach conceptualises the organisation
as an open socio-technical system, and the primary work group as a
sub-system which also has open socio-technical system properties.
A further characteristic of job restructuring approaches to the
design of jobs is that their development has taken place mainly in
America. Austrian born Ludwig von Bertalanffy is attributed with
the conception of "general system theory" (von Bertalanffy, 1950,
1968) but the development of a socio-technical system theory of
organisation has taken place mainly in Britain. This work has been
carried out by a number of industrial consultants, working at the
Tavistock Institute of Human Relations in London, such as F.E. Emery,
E. Trist, A.K. Rice, E.J. Miller and P.G. Herbst,and a number of others.
155.
The Tavistock Institute was founded in 19^7 as "an agency for
psychologists with interdisciplinary inclinations to make available
to industry the expertise they had accumulated on personnel and other
problems in the war." (Rose, 19755 p.177.) Their theoretical
framework has been developed through consultancy experience in a
variety of enterprises - the Glacier Metal Company and the Durham
Coal Mines in Britain, and the Ahmedabad Manufacturing and Calico
Printing Company in India were among the first, and the literature
concerning them is now widely known. Before examining the specific
projects which have guided this development, some of the basic
concepts of systems theory will be examined.
Systems Characteristics
The word "system" is in common everyday use in the English
language; we talk about the solar system, traffic management systems,
communications systems, waste disposal systems, and so on.
Intuitively, the word "system" presents little or no problems of
understanding, but it is inordinately difficult to define with rigour.
On a superficial level, a system may be defined as something which
functions by virtue of the interdependence of its component parts.
While basically true, such a definition is of limited value since it
can be seen to apply to practically anything - to a can opener, for
example, or to the human body. The human body may clearly be described
as a system, i.e. as an interdependent whole. Human visual perception,
however, can also be described, and analysed, as a "system" in its
own right. So might the digestive system, the autonomic nervous
system, and any other "sub-system" of the whole body. We shall see
below how groups of humans can also be described and analysed as systems.
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The point is that what one defines as a system (or where one draws
the system "boundaries") depends entirely upon what one wants to
examine and why. The system boundaries are determined by the reasons
for looking at that system in the first place.
Can openers and human bodies, while both capable of being
regarded as systems, have fairly obvious fundamental qualitative
differences. The most important difference (at least in systems
theory terms) is that the human body interacts purposively with its
environment, whereas the can opener does not. The human body takes
into itself (imports) air, food, drink and a diversity of perceptual
information; it transforms (converts) these imports into energy; it
disposes of (exports) this as waste products and as selected manners
of behaviour. The human body must carry out these import -
conversion - export processes in order to survive. The can opener,
of course, can do none of these things, nor does it have to. Its
existence is not dependent upon transactions with its environment.
The can opener is a "closed" system, unlike the human body which in
common with all living things is an "open" system. All living
systems are open systems in that they are dependent upon transactions
with their environment in order lo survive. Living systems at the
biological level are also able to re-establish their internal states
after a disturbance. The human body, for example, has built-in
mechanisms which maintain the body's core temperature at around 96.^
degrees fahrenheit, within certain extremes of ambient temperature.
This general property of "self-regulation", or "homeostasis" as it
is sometimes called, is said to apply to all open systems.
The results which closed systems are capable of producing are
wholly determined by the initial configuration of the system. A
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chemical reaction is a closed system, and the final result is dependent
upon the concentration and quantity of the chemicals used to begin
with. Open systems, on the other hand, are capable of achieving a
particular end result from a variety of initial configurations. Such
behaviour is called "equifinal"; one irritating example of equi-
finality lies in the capability of some common garden weeds to
continually reappear no matter how badly damaged they have been by the
spade.
To summarise, open systems have the following characteristics
in common:
1. they are dependent upon matter - energy exchanges with
their environment for survival;
2. they are self-regulating;
3. their behaviour shows equifinality.
Socio-technical system theorists have assumed that these characteristics
apply to industrial organisations, as these can also be regarded as
open systems. (For a more thorough introduction to systems theory,
see von Bertalanffy, 1968, and Emery (ed.), 1969; these are perhaps
the best and certainly the most easily available introductory texts on
systems theory and Emery's readings include several that deal with
human organisations from the systems point of view.)
Enterprises* as Open Socio-Technical Systems
An enterprise is comprised of human beings, therefore, it is a
living system and may be conceptualised as an open system.
* The theorists whose work is examined here tend to use the term "enter¬
prise" to refer to a company, and to use the term "organisation" to
refer either to a company, or to "the patterning of activities" in an
enterprise. (Miller and Rice, 1967, p.33.) The less ambiguous of
these two terms, i.e. enterprise, will be used throughout this section.
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Further support for this contention may be obtained by looking at
how the enterprise maintains itself. It imports capital, materials,
equipment, labour and information; it converts these into goods or
services; it exports finished products or satisfied customers,
dividends and waste materials. The activities of every enterprise
can be described in terms of its import - conversion - export processes.
This view of the enterprise is commonly referred to as the "organic
analogy". Rice (1963), for example, states that:
"This book seeks to establish a series of concepts
and a theory of organisation that treats enterprises
as living organisms." (p.179-)
And in the Introduction to a later book, Miller and Rice (1967) write:
"Any enterprise may be seen as an open system which
has characteristics in common with a biological
organism." (p.3.)
Enterprises, therefore, also have the properties of self-
regulation and equifinality. Emery and Trist (i960) argue that if
this is so, it follows that:
". such systems may spontaneously reorganise towards
states of greater heterogeneity and complexity and that
they achieve a 'steady state' at a level where they
can still do work. Enterprises appear to possess at
least these characteristics of 'open systems'. They grow
by process of internal elaboration and manage to achieve
a steady state while doing work, i.e. achieve a quasi-
stationary equilibrium in which the enterprise as a
whole remains constant, with a continuous throughput,
despite a considerable range of external changes."
(p.282 in Emery (ed.), 1969.)
Thus, unlike closed systems which maintain or move towards states
of greater homogeneity, open systems tend to develop greater internal
elaboration or heterogeneity through a continual rearrangement of
their component parts. These processes can be readily identified in
enterprises.
Eric Trist was originally responsible for the idea that an
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enterprise may be conceptualised, not simply as an open system, but
as an open socio-technical system. (See Trist and Bamforth, 1951.)
The interdependence of social and technological aspects of organisation
had become apparent during the work with the Durham coal mines
(discussed below):
"Trist's concept of the socio-technical system arose from
the consideration that any production system requires
both a technological organisation - equipment and
process layout - and a work organisation - relating
those who carry out the necessary tasks to each other."
(Rice, 1963, p.182.)
While the form of work organisation is constrained to some extent by
the demands of the technology in use, it has its own independent,
social and psychological properties. A third factor must also
be taken into consideration - the economic environment of the
enterprise. It is this economic dimension which provides a
measure of overall system effectiveness. When optimum conditions
are achieved for one of these dimensions, this will not necessarily
produce optimum conditions for the system as a whole. The socio-
technical system approach, therefore, relies on the "joint
optimisation" of these three system characteristics, resulting in
a less than optimum state for each separate dimension. (See Trist
et al, 1963, p.7')
Enterprises are purposive, goal-seeking entities, and at
least for the kind of enterprise considered here the ultimate goal
is survival. Rice considers it more useful, however, to discuss the
objectives of an enterprise in terms of its "primary task", i.e.,
". . . . the task that it must perform to survive." (Rice, 1963, p.13.)
The import - conversion - export process of the enterprise as a whole
is its primary task, and this process relates the enterprise to its
environment. There are four basic points to note in analysing the
primary task of an enterprise:
1. . The constituent parts of an enterprise usually have their
own discrete primary tasks to perform. These may conflict
with each other, in the way that the objectives of
marketing and production departments often seem to do.
2. An enterprise as a whole may have more than one primary
task. Teaching hospitals have two primary tasks -
treating patients and instructing medical students.
3. Where an enterprise has more than one primary task the
question of task priority arises. Prison authorities
must compromise between the primary tasks of confinement,
punishment and rehabilitation. This is frequently a
source of confusion and a rational solution may not be
available.
U. The definition and performance of the primary task (or
tasks) is constrained by environmental factors (political,
legal, economic), and by the resources available to the
enterprise (human, physical, scientific, technological).
As these constraints are liable to change, the primary
task must be periodically reappraised and, if necessary,
redefined.
As enterprises increase their size they tend to differentiate
internally into constituent sub-systems each with its own discrete
primary task, and each carrying out its own import - conversion -
export process. In a "simple" enterprise, one "operating system"
may perform this entire process or the major part of it. In a
"complex" organisation, on the other hand, there may be several
operating systems:
"When a complex enterprise is differentiated into parts,
the sub-systems that carry out the dominant import -
conversion - export process, that is, perform the primary
task of the enterprise, are the operating systems."
(Rice, 1963, p.18.)
There are three basic types of operating system:
(a) import operating systems, concerned with the acquisition
of materials;
(b) conversion operating systems, concerned with the process
of transforming imports into exports; and
(c) export operating systems, concerned with disposing of
the results of the import and conversion operating systems.
This raises the problem of identifying operating system boundaries.
It was noted above that a system is assumed to have a boundary which
separates it from its environment. Boundaries are created by
discontinuities of some kind or another; Miller (1959) postulated
that there are three bases, or types of discontinuity, which
distinguish the boundaries of enterprise operating systems. These
are technology, territory and time:
"Whenever forces towards differentiation operate upon
a simple production system, it is one or more of these
dimensions that will form the boundaries of the
emergent sub-systems and will provide the basis for the
internal solidarity of the groups associated with them."
(Miller, 1959, p.2U6.)
Rice argues further that when an enterprise has become
differentiated into a number of operating systems, a concommitant
differentiation of management is required to cope with the new
arrangements:
".... a system external to the operating systems is
required to control and service them. This is the
managing system." (Rice, 1963, p.21.)
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The managing system contains differentiated "maintenance" and
"regulatory" activities*. The maintenance activities are those which
produce and replenish the resources that produce operating
activities." (Miller and Rice, 1967, P-6.) This includes purchase
and repair of machinery, and personnel management services.
Regulatory activities are those which " . . . . relate operating
activities to each other, maintenance activities to operating
activities, and all internal activities of the enterprise (or unit)
to its environment." (Miller and Rice, 1967, p-6.)
Miller and Rice make a further distinction "between two
types of regulatory activity - monitoring and boundary control
activities. Monitoring activities are those concerned with checking
that an operating system is performing its task satisfactorily.
Boundary control functions are defined as follows:
"Regulatory activities that relate a system of activities
to its environment occur at the boundary of the system
and the environment and control the import and export
transactions across it. Boundary regulation is
therefore external to the operating activities of the
system." (Miller and Rice, 1967, p.8.)
Maintenance and regulatory activities may also be described
in import - conversion - export terms. Boundary control functions
import information based on measurement or observation of the process
being controlled; conversion consists of comparing this information
with objectives or performance standards; exports consist of
decisions to modify or stop the process (or not to modify or stop it),
or to accept or reject the product.
* This is the terminology used in Miller and Rice, 1967; these were
previously called "service" and "control" functions respectively,
as indicated in the above quotation from Rice, 1963. See also
Miller, 1959, P-2^3.
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The boundary of an enterprise, and of its sub-systems, thus
has two properties:
(a) it represents a discontinuity in terms of either territory,
technology or time, or some combination of these factors;
and
(b) it implies the existence of a region of control.
Miller and Rice (1967) explain at length the difficulties which arise
when system boundaries are either poorly defined or are defined
inappropriately in terms of the two properties mentioned above. The
main argument to which this exposition is leading is that the key
function of management is boundary control. It is only at system
boundaries that performance (that is, the difference between input
and output) can be measured. It is the function of management,
therefore, to define the boundaries of enterprise sub-systems,
and to control transactions across these boundaries. This includes
management of the relationships between the constituent systems of an
enterprise, and the relationships between an enterprise and its
environment. Rice refers to this latter function as "the primary
task of leadership." (Rice, 19&3, P-15-) more specific terms,
the tasks of the leader, or manager, are to:
(a) manage relationships between the enterprise and its
environment;
(b) define the primary task(s);
(c) review this definition and the constraints imposed upon it;
(d) recruit resources;
(e) control resource use;
(f) assess results.
(See Rice, 1963, p.206.)
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Rice recognised that some groups (such as the Durham miners
and the Indian textile workers both discussed below) are capable
of handling differentiated role systems without any formal management
structure, and with only those decisions relating to the external
environment being handled through management and unions. There
comes a point, however, where the quantity of administrative and
co-ordinating work that has to be done requires " . . . . somebody who
spends the majority of his or her time on control and co-ordination
rather than on operation." (Rice, 1963, p.215.) While certain
factors may postpone this differentiation, the implication is
that it is inevitable:
"It can be inferred that, in any expanding or changing
system .... there is an optimum or 'natural' stage for
creating a new level of management. This is applicable
equally to the initial transition from a simple system
to a complex system and to the addition of a new level
of an already complex hierarchical system."
(Miller, 1959, p.248.)
To summarise briefly up to this point, it has been argued that










2.2.2 Boundary control functions
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The socio-technical system framework attempts to show how
enterprises cope with variety in their environment by means of
internal elaboration and differentiation, the purpose of which is to
increase the system's independence of predictable environmental
fluctuations. Along with social and technological factors, market
pressures are thus regarded as a determinant of organisation structure.
This type of response, however, may render the enterprise less able
to cope with unpredictable environmental changes. Miller has noted
two "resilience factors" which prevent or at least postpone the
onset of internal differentiation; (a) the absence of permanent
sub-groups within the enterprise, and (b) a high degree of inter¬
dependence between existing sub-systems. (Miller, 1959? p.2^8.)
Rather than maintaining flexibility by internal restructuring which
keeps these resilience factors in operation, an enterprise may
attempt to directly influence its environment. Moving into new
markets or changing existing ones are ways of doing this. The concept
of resilience has been developed much further in the more recent
work of Miller and Rice (1967), which is concerned primarily with forms
of organisation which possess intrinsic flexibility in coping with
environmental change. This work will be discussed shortly.
In any enterprise, the optimum form of organisation is that
which is most conducive to satisfactory task performance. Miller
and Rice, however, regard human needs as major constraints on task
performance (see Miller and Rice, 19675 P- xi). They have developed
a theory of human needs based on the work of W.R. Bion, a
psychoanalyst from the Melanie Klein School at the Tavistock Clinic
in London. Bion used his wartime experience with group selection
methods and small therapy groups to produce a reformulation of
psychoanalytic concepts to explain group as well as individual
behaviour. Bion hypothesised that groups operate on two levels
simultaneously. On a conscious level, the "work group" meets
to perform a specific task. For the group as a whole, work performs
a function analagous to that of the individual ego in relating the
group to reality and to its environment. On an unconscious level,
the "basic group" operates unanimously on one of three assumptions:
".... to obtain security from one individual upon whom
its members can depend, to preserve the group by
attacking someone or by running away, or to reproduce
itself." (Rice, 1963, p.182.)
These basic assumptions are also referred to, respectively, as
dependence, fight-flight and pairing. The emotional associations
which group members have concerning these assumptions may interfere
with task performance. (Bucklow, 1966, gives a concise summary of
Bion's influence on socio-technical system theory: other socio-
technical system theorists, concerned more directly with the
organisation of work, have adopted a view of human motivation which
is not based on psychoanalytic concepts. This will be discussed
below.)
Again following Bion, Rice also postulated the existence of
"powerful social and psychological forces" which generate a capacity
for co-operation in the performance of the primary task of the
enterprise. (Rice, 1958, p.33.) Effective performance is regarded
as an important source of satisfaction for those involved. Task
performance must be organised in a particular manner, Rice argued, if
such satisfaction is to be obtained. Rice had first developed a
theoretical "ideal" work group organisation through his own work as a
consultant in India. The socio-technical systems theory outlined
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here, however, received a further major development explained in the
later (1967) "book by Miller and Rice, before Rice's death in 1969.
It will have been noted that this book has been referred to frequently
in the above passages, but one of its key arguments has not yet been
touched upon. Through their accumulated experience in a variety of
different enterprises, Miller and Rice came to regard their earlier
prescriptions about work group formation as a special case of a
general series of propositions. Successful formation of work groups
was now seen to be contingent upon the rate of change in the
environment of an enterprise. Thus the type of work group set-up
appropriate to one particular enterprise in a given environment
would not be suitable to another enterprise in a different
environment.
The chronological sequence of this chapter is deliberately
broken at this point in order to discuss these theoretical adjustments
made by Miller and Rice. They are discussed because they are relevant
to the theory of socio-technical systems, and because they are relevant
to the thesis developed in the following chapters. Their arguments
appear to have had no great effect upon either the objectives or
the techniques of job design, however, and the continuity of the
material discussed below is better maintained by looking at their
arguments here.
Task and Sentient Boundaries
In "Systems of Organisation, the Control of Task and Sentient
Boundaries", Miller and Rice (1967) are concerned principally with the
design of organisational forms which simultaneously satisfy (a) the
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needs of the enterprise to adapt continually to technological change,
and (b) the needs of members of the enterprise for security and
affiliation. Their socio-technical system perspective has not,
therefore, altered; their main concern is with organisational design
rather than with work group formation; generalisations about "ideal"
work group formation give way to a contingency theory of
organisational design.
Bion's distinction between the "work group" and the "basic
group" has already been described. The "discovery" in the Hawthorne
studies of the relative importance of "informal" as opposed to "formal"
organisation has also been mentioned (p.49 above). Miller and Rice
present a similar dichotomy of organisational groupings, between what
they call task groups and sentient groups:
".... the task group being the group that comprises the
individuals employed in an activity system, and the
sentient group being the group to which individuals
are prepared to commit themselves and on which they
depend for emotional support." (Miller and Rice, 1967*
p.253.)
The sentient group is also defined as one ".... that demands and
receives loyalty from its members." (Miller and Rice, 1967, footnote,
p.xiii.)
The Tavistock researchers through their earlier experiences in
coal mining and textile manufacturing had come to regard the "right"
organisation as that in which "the human groups required for task
performance were always identical with those required to satisfy the
social and psychological needs," (Miller and Rice, 1967, p.xiii.),
i.e. in which the boundaries of task and sentient groups (or systems)
coincided. Rice had always regarded resistance to change as "a
natural phenomenon of all living organisms." (Rice, 1963, p.275.)
and, therefore, as an undesirable property of an enterprise which has
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to adjust to technological change. But where task and sentient groups
are coincident, and group members invest their loyalty and commitment
in their group, the process of change will be inhibited should that
particular task grouping become inappropriate. The members will not
wish to relinquish that membership. "To maintain adaptiveness",
Miller and Rice argue, "the greatest sentience must remain vested in
a group committed to change." (1967, p.260.)
Group sentience may be generated in a variety of ways and may
have different meanings at different times. Sentience is strengthened
(a) by the coincidence of task and sentient boundaries, (b) by a
common belief in the group's objectives, and (c) by the members'
belief in the complementary nature of their respective contributions.
Sentience is vulnerable, on the other hand, (a) where task and
sentient group boundaries are not coincident, (b) where group members
are seen as complementary to the point of individual indispensability,
and (c) where individual members are completely interchangeable and
are thus dispensable.
In the coal mining and textile manufacturing projects discussed
below, coincidence of task and sentient boundaries was contrived.
The formation in both cases of internally led, composite autonomous
primary work groups had the human advantages of compensating for job
breakdown and loss of traditional craft skill, and the organisational
advantages of increased production, higher quality and reduced costs.
In some situations, however, task and sentient boundaries are naturally
coincident. An example given by Miller and Rice is the small family
business in which task and sentient boundaries coincide by definition.
Certain tasks on the other hand preclude task and sentient group
coincidence, particularly tasks that are temporary and transitional.
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The flight crew of an aircraft is one example; the nature of the
task and the stringent safety regulations render it prohibitive to
continually roster the same plane, aircrew and cabin crew together.
The flight crew is thus transient and temporary and is broken up
at the end of each flight and reformed. Salesmen, whose task in
obtaining customer orders is also transient, are another example
of the natural impossibility of task and sentient group boundaries
coinciding. The task of the Salesman crosses the boundary of the
enterprise for which he is working and the task groups that he enters
comprise himself and a member of another enterprise. There are
obvious limits to the sentience which either member of this task
group can invest in it. The loyalty and commitment of the Salesman
must be directed mainly at his own enterprise (or perhaps at other
Salesmen) and only partially towards his customers.
Miller and Rice adopt the argument that sentience is necessary,
that the affiliation motive is innate:
"Social science studies in industry have emphasised the
importance of the individual's affiliation to his
primary work group and the deprivation and alienation
created by technologies and forms of organisation that
inhibit the building of such groups." (Miller and Rice,
1967, p.227.)
Contrived coincidence of task and sentient boundaries is one way of
creating sentient groups, but this will be undesirable if it inhibits
change. Miller and Rice, therefore, consider other ways of generating
sentience. For the aircrew, "The significant sentient grouping
within the organisation is then the pool of flying crew." (1967, p.206.)
For Salesmen, on the other hand, there is often no such sentient group.
Miller and Rice suggest appointing a supportive manager to whom
representatives can turn for help or advice. Another possible solution
which thqy suggest is the creation of small groups of Salesmen who
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together handle sets of accounts normally divided between them. In
suggesting these solutions, Miller and Rice note the lack of success
which traditional measures for generating sentience have had, e.g.
pension and housing schemes, staff parties, rallies, exhibitions,
house magazines, sports clubs, profit-sharing and co-ownership schemes.
It is possible, Miller and Rice argue, to make a more general
proposition regarding the generation of sentience in a manner that
does not inhibit technological change. Task and sentient boundaries
need not be coincident in order to satisfy either organisational or
human needs; the alternative which they prescribe is the "project
type organisation":
"The essential feature of a project type of organisation
is that the group brought together to perform a particular
task has to be disbanded as soon as the task is
completed. This group has no further raison d'etre
in terms of task performance." (Miller and Rice, 19&7,
p.129.)
A number of examples of project type organisation are given from the
construction industry, research organisations, and air transport, and
the objective of Miller and Rice is to present the project type
organisation as generally applicable to any type of enterprise and
to all manner of tasks. Thus:
".... a project type organisation which is appropriate
and necessary for temporary and transitional activity
systems, also provides the best basis for a general
organisational theory." (Miller and Rice, 1967, p.251.)
If the task group is constantly broken up and its members redistributed
in other similar task groups, sentience (i.e. commitment to the
enterprise) must be generated in some other way. The appropriate
sentient group for an aircrew, as discussed above, is the whole pool of
flying crew. Research organisations similarly tend to form groups of
scientific staff suitable to deal with the problems in hand. As
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research questions are answered, these groups are dispersed and
different groups are put together as novel problems come up. For
any enterprise faced with technological change, Miller and Rice
advocate this as the most appropriate form of organisation. This
prescription is not restricted to white-collar staffs : Miller and
Rice regard the project type organisation as equally appropriate
for manual workers. The "pool", or "task-related sentient group"
to which they belong must still possess a professional or quasi-
professional basis:
"We envisage, for instance, a much greater use of the
equivalent of the 'scientific' or 'professional' base,
not only for specialists, but also for production
workers who may have to return at frequent intervals
to base for retraining in new skills before being
deployed in a new task organisation." (Miller and
Rice, 1967, p.2U6.)
While it is the contention of Miller and Rice that this
prescription is universally applicable, there is an exception in
one type of situation, and this is dependent upon the properties of
the environment of a particular enterprise. The property of an
enterprise's environment of overriding importance, as far as
Miller and Rice are concerned, is technological change. The
contrived coincidence of task and sentient boundaries is undesirable
in enterprises which face such change, but this form of organisation
may be appropriate in "relatively stable technologies" (Miller and
Rice, 1967, p.257-), as a means of promoting sentience. Under these
conditions, autonomous primary work groups (in which task and sentient
boundaries coincide naturally) will be effective where:
1. the group is engaged on a "whole" task;
2. the group is able to regulate its own activities;
3. the group is of a size capable of self regulation and
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capable of providing satisfactory personal relationships;
h. the required range of skills is not as great as to induce
internal differentiation in the group (and status
differences do not inhibit internal mobility);
5. the group is not unique and disaffected members can
move to alternative groups. (See Miller and Rice, 1967,
p.256.)
This brings us logically to the next section which deals with the
development of the concept of the autonomous group from the work of
the Tavistock researchers (including Rice) starting in the early 1950's.
Postscript on project type organisation:
A number of years ago, Plessey Radar Ltd. (part of Plessey
Electronics) set up what they called "key task teams" in the display
and data division. Each task team has a manager who draws up a
"tender" for each task to be undertaken. The successful manager
is then given the necessary finance, and proceeds to recruit his
team members from a labour pool provided by the various functional
departments. The teams are broken up and members return to their
respective departments once the job is finished. This particular
project type organisation produced cost savings of up to 20 per cent,
and a reduction in labour turnover from lH to b per cent in 2\ years.
(Oates, 1970.)
Autonomous Group Working
The socio-technical system theory of organisation outlined above
was developed initially through two major studies carried out by
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workers from the Tavistock Institute; these studies were carried out,
respectively, in the coal mines of Durham (Trist and Bamforth, 1951;
Trist, Higgin, Murray and Pollock, 1963; Herbst, 1962), and in a
textile mill in northwest India (Rice, 1953, 1958, 1963.)
The North West Durham Coal Mines
Deciding upon the title for the main report of these studies
(Trist et al, 1963), may have given the authors some difficulty. The
full title of the book is:
"Organizational Choice; capabilities of groups at
the coal face under changing technologies; the loss,
rediscovery and transformation of a work tradition."
The book does indeed deal with a number of issues, and the brief
summary given here gives little indication of the wealth of detail
given in the original. The main argument of the book, however, is
that the form of work organisation introduced when mechanical coal-
getting methods replaced traditional ways of working was not completely
determined by the new technology. Other forms of work organisation
could operate the new technology, and the enterprise, thus has
"organisational choice "•
Britain's coal mining industry was nationalised by the Labour
Government in 1946. The anticipated improvements in productivity and
management-worker relations did not materialise, and labour turnover
and the incidence of stress illnesses amongst face workers remained
high. Trist and Bamforth (1951) refer to medical investigators who
noted "the epidemic incidence of psychosomatic disorders among miners
working under mechanised conditions ...." (p.5.) Trist and Bamforth
attributed these problems to the organisation of work associated with
the partially mechanised longwall method of getting (i.e. obtaining)
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coal. In order to investigate this hypothesis, an alternative form
of work organisation, which had developed spontaneously in some pits,
was studied. The research thus compared the operations of two kinds
of work organisation, controlling as far as underground conditions
would permit for neighbourhood equipment used and "type of men ".
(Trist et al, 1963, p.xi.)
The first published report of this study (Trist and Bamforth,
1951)5 had described the dysfunctional social and psychological
characteristics of the "conventional longwall" method of coal-getting.
This system had been gradually replacing traditional "hand-got"
methods since around the turn of the century. The fieldwork for the
1951 report was greatly reduced through the assistance of Bamforth
who had been a miner himself for 18 years. Although the problems
of the new system had been identified, the researchers were not yet
prepared to offer solutions. The main report of the study covers
the period January 1955 to March 19585 and Trist et al were by this
time certain of what should be done to alleviate the malaise induced
by the conventional longwall method.
Continuous methods of getting coal have now been developed,
but the methods studied in the 'fifties were cyclical, the production
cycle having three stages:
(a) preparation, in which the coal is either cut by hand,
(previously with a hand pick, now with pneumatic picks),
or undercut and blown down into the space cleared;
(b) getting, in which the coal is loaded into tubs or onto a
conveyor for removal from the face to the surface;
(c) advancing, in which the roof supports, gateway haulage
roads and conveyor equipment are moved forward.
176.
Mechanisation had gradually replaced "single place" working where one
or at most two miners worked with picks at faces ("places") six to
eleven yards long. These men worked in self-selecting groups
("marrow" groups) which shared a common paynote and worked the same
place on the same or different shifts. Once cut, the coal was
shovelled hy hand into 1§ ton tubs and removed on rail. Each
miner performed a "composite work role", i.e. he was capable
of carrying out all the necessary face tasks: "He is a 'complete
miner' - the collier - who supervises himself and is the person
directly responsible for production." (Trist et al, 1963, p.33.)
The traditional system, organised around the composite
autonomous miner, had several advantages. The production tempo
was slow but it was maintained throughout and across shifts. This
avoided periodic overloading of winding capacity and ensured the
constant occupation of services (such as haulage and flow of
supplies). Very little organisation was required to maintain
production because the seam as a whole became virtually self-regulating.
Management was thus rudimentary, and the pit deputy's main
responsibilities concerned the application of safety regulations,
maintenance of supplies to the workmen, and shotfiring when required.
The length of face that could be worked at any one time was
greatly increased by the use of belt conveyors. In North West Durham
pits, straight "longwall" faces were generally 80 to 100 yards long
(hence the name). The major economic advantage of the face conveyor
is that the amount of stonework involved (in advancing the gateways)
in relation to the extraction area is significantly reduced. The
coal/stone ratio becomes more crucial to the economic viability of a
pit with thinner seams. The extension in the length of the coal face
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created a novel organisation of work at the face. The first longwalls
were simply extensions of single place working, preparation and
getting being performed together for the first two shifts and advancing
in the third. These were referred to as "hewing longwalls". The
cycle was separated into its three discrete stages with the intro¬
duction of the electrical coal cutter. The "cutting longwall" was
the most widespread longwall technology in Britain at the time of
the Tavistock study. The three stages - preparation, getting
and advancing - were each performed by a separate task group each
working on a separate shift. The cyclical nature of the process
was now dominant with coal being removed on only one of the three
shifts. Each shift now had to complete its stage of the process
before the next shift could begin work. Balancing the work of the
three shifts now became a major problem.
The most significant change to the organisation of facework
introduced with the longwall method was the abolition of the composite
autonomous workman. Trist et al (1963) compare this conventional
longwall method with the mass production methods of industry in
general (p.xii). It involved maximum job breakdown and work role
specialisation. Workers were allocated to one task on one shift
with no opportunity for rotation and thus no means of enhancing
their skills. The marrow relationship was continued to some extent
in the new "single task" groups which now covered only one stage of
the cycle. Lacking those two characteristics - the composite workman
and the marrow group - the new work organisation was inappropriate
for the underground situation. The miner has two types of task to
contend with simultaneously; the activities of the production cycle,
and the "background" task of coping with interference from underground
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working conditions. The production skills, if physically demanding,
are not complex and may all be learned by one person within a
comparatively short period. Skill in dealing with the exigencies
of work underground is of a higher order and is only developed by
experience over a number of years. The underground work system
should ideally ensure that the relevant experience is obtained in
order to develop the faceworker's capabilities to the fullest extent.
The conventional longwall system, Trist et al (1963) argue, restricts
the faceworker in this respect.
The nature of the task breakdown and resulting payment systems
in the conventional longwall system created status differences absent
in traditional marrow groups. Cuttermen, who work the entire length
of a face using a large and powerful piece of machinery, formed a
"face aristocracy". The fillers, working on their own shovelling
coal in a confined space, had the lowest status. The pay of each
task group was now calculated on a different basis and each group
conducted its own negotiations with management. The goal of cycle
performance was displaced by the primary concern of each task group
to improve its own relative position.
Unlike the traditional method, the conventional longwall system
was not self-regulating but thrust the responsibility for cycle
co-ordination into the hands of management. Because self-regulation
was now structurally impossible, management had to rely on price
negotiation to control the cycle. This became a key characteristic
of the conventional longwall method, and "management through the wages
system" developed into a highly complex bargaining process. Hot only
main tasks but sub-tasks and ancillary tasks became the subject of
separate agreements. No common denominator could be used to establish
179-
rates for the different task groups and several criteria had to he
used (e.g. tonnage, yardage, cubic measure, number of operations
completed). Task groups would typically seek special payment for
work not carried out by groups preceding them in the cycle. So each
shift had a vested interest in the previous shift not completing its
task. The negotiating procedures consumed vast amounts of otherwise
productive time and energy.
Some pits, however, had developed a form of "shortwall" work
organisation with characteristics approximating more closely to those
of the single place tradition. These "composite shortwalls" were
worked by multi-skilled groups, each on a common paynote, who were
responsible for the whole coal getting cycle on any one shift. In
one of the Durham pits, roof conditions had necessitated the return to
shortwalls as long faces had become impossible to support. Increasing
costs eventually forced the management to consider a return to longwall
working. The men, however, resisted this suggestion partly on
grounds of safety, but also because they did not wish to give up
the "composite" form of work organisation they had developed and
return to a system which tied them to particular tasks and shifts,
i.e. the conventional longwall. Instead, an agreement was
negotiated which attempted to preserve the social and psychological
advantages of composite groups while solving the economic problems
which necessitated working longer faces. Trist et al (1963) refer
to this as the "Manley innovation" (p.73.) and the result was self-
selected cycle groups of Ul men who allocated themselves to tasks
and to shifts and who received payment on a common note. (This pay¬
ment system removed the need for continual rate negotiations.) This
"Manley innovation" is more commonly referred to as the composite
longwall method.
The new composite longwall system had four main
characteristics:
1. Task continuity was maintained. Each shift took up the
cycle at the point at which it was left by the preceding
shift. When their main task was complete, they auto¬
matically went on to the next stage of the cycle. This
feature was vital to the operation of the composite work
method.
2. The system required multi-skilled miners. Each man
did not have to possess all the necessary skills as
long as the group as a whole was able to deploy the
resources required on each shift. Groups were, therefore,
composite in terms of the range of skills contained within
the group, and autonomous in operating their own task
and shift rotation.
3. Work groups were self-selecting and resembled the
traditional marrow groups.
k. The groups were each paid on a common paynote since all
members were regarded as making equivalent contributions.
These "Manley" groups were essentially leaderless. Their
"team captains" acted as representatives, not as executives. The
workers themselves arranged task and shift rotation which allowed
them to maintain their skills and gave them constant reminder of the
conditions under which other shifts had to work, and of the
consequences of sub-standard work. Herbst (1962) provides a graphic
description of the typical face conditions under composite working:
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"The astonishing change in the physical appearance of
the work-place, which would be the first thing to impress
itself on a visitor, has come to be recognised as almost
a hallmark of a composite work group. (....) Although
the men were not responsible for equipment in the gates,
they would use their lunch break to check and, if
necessary, do repairs to the mothergate belt which leads
to the face, anticipating and preventing possible
disturbance of their work. No man was ever out of a job.
If he finished hewing or pulling before others he would
join and help them, or go on to some other job which
was to follow. If work was stopped owing to breakdowns
in the transport system on which the group was
dependent for its supply of tubs, the men would go on
to do maintenance work." (Herbst 1962, p-6.)
Although the task and shift rotation systems diverged, as they
developed, from the original union-management agreement, management
never considered it necessary to investigate the changes which took
place, or to put a stop to them. These systems continued to operate
to the mutual satisfaction of both parties.
Figures 2.7 and 2.8 illustrate briefly the comparison between
a composite and a conventional longwall in terms of their respective
effects on faceworker behaviour and production.
The effect of the composite longwall method on management was
also marked. Trist et al (1963) state that "There was no greater
constrast between the conventional and composite faces than in their
management." (p.128.) The composite organisation, like the
traditional single place working, was self-regulating and the deputies
were freed from their responsibility under the conventional system
of "....'propping up' a cycle always to some extent falling down on
itself...." (p.129.) Management and workers in the composite system
were not involved in the interminable wage rate negotiations of the
conventional system, as mentioned above.
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the study (regarding composite work organisation) was:
".... the ability of quite large primary work groups
of i+0-50 members to act as self-regulating, self-
developing social organisms able to maintain themselves
in a steady state of high productivity throughout the
entire period of their 'missions'." (Trist et al, 1963,
p.xiii.)
The "mission" in this case is the management of the three shift work
cycle, and is another term for "primary task".
The central thesis of the Durham coal mines . research is that
the work organisation originally associated with longwall technology
was not inevitable. That is, "organisational choice" exists
because the social system is not wholly determined by the technical
system. The conclusions of this work have not passed without
criticism, which will be mentioned in a later section; they gave
strong support, however, to the main argument of job design theorists
in general, that job content is not wholly dictated by technology.
The Ahmedabad Textile Mills, India
The work in Durham ran almost concurrently with the mutually
supportive work of A.K. Rice (also from the Tavistock Institute)
at a textile mill in north west India, at Ahmedabad. The problems
facing these textile manufacturers and the coal mines and the
solutions that were developed, show a striking similarity.
The Chairman of the Ahmedabad Manufacturing and Calico
Printing Company Limited (Calico Mills for short) visited the
Tavistock Institute in 1952. As a result, Rice (accompanied on
his second visit by G.M. Stalker) went to India in 1953 to act as
a consultant to the company on a broad range of management problems.
The problems created by increasing mechanisation in an agricultural/
rural economy appeared to be the most pressing. As in British
coal mining, mechanisation of textile manufacturing had destroyed
the traditional craft of the weaver by introducing mass production
methods.
By March 1953, the shed at the Mill which Rice was to study
(the experimental shed) contained 22b automatic looms for the
manufacture of a range of cloths. The work was organised on
standard British and American lines with different workers
performing discrete operations. While the working conditions
were considered to be very good, productivity was much lower than
had been expected. The 29 workers who manned the looms in the shed
were allocated to tasks in the following manner:
8 weavers, who operated the machines, investigated stoppages, mended
broken warp threads and fixed minor entanglements;
3 smash-hands, ("weavers in training") who dealt with major
breakdowns and entanglements;
5 battery fillers, who maintained the supply of fresh bobbins;
2 gaters, who replaced completed "beams" of cloth with new warps;
2 cloth carriers, who cut and removed the finished cloth;
2 jobbers, plus 2 assistant jobbers, who were responsible for
general loom maintenance and adjustment;
1 oiler, who serviced the looms with an oil can;
1 feeler-motion fitter, who serviced the device that ejected
empty bobbins;
1 humidification fitter, who maintained the humidifier plant;
1 bobbin-carrier, who removed empty bobbins and returned them
to the spinning department;
1 sweeper, who removed dust and fluff from the shed.
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This extreme task breakdown presented a number of problems. The
production process was continuous (rather than cyclic, as coal
getting was) and the various tasks were interdependent. The roles
that had been allocated, however, did not create any stable internal
work groups but formed instead an aggregate of individuals who
operated virtually independently of each other. There was confusion
concerning status and lines of authority; difficulties arose, for
example, when smash-hands were required by more than one weaver at
the same time. This confusion was compounded by the variability
in allocations of roles to the looms. On average, the following
assistance was available to each weaver:
J of a jobber pair,
1 of a battery filler,
g of a smash-hand,
and so on. Rice concluded:
"The overall picture is of a confused pattern of
relationships among an aggregate of individuals for
whom no stable internal group structure could be
discerned." (Rice, 1958, p.57-)
The only way in which groups could be given "whole" tasks was
if they could carry out all the weaving, gating and maintenance
activities. The possibility of allocating a group of workers to
a group of looms was thus considered. The optimum size of these
groups would differ depending upon the type of cloth being made as
this put different demands on the machinery. For a block of 6k
looms, optimum group size was calculated to be between 6 and 8
workers (8 for coarse cloth, 6 for fine). The internal work group
structure was felt to have three "natural" grades : a group leader,
a fully experienced weaver or gater, and those on less skilled jobs
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(battery filling, sweeping, oiling, carrying). This structure
was to allow for task rotation, and all members were now to be paid
on a piece rate basis.
The original plan was to set up an experiment with one group
of workers on one group of 6h looms on one shift. A number of
discussions with Shift Supervisors and workers were planned as a
necessary introduction to the changes. To begin this programme,
the Works Manager started discussion of the proposals with the
Supervisors one evening. The following morning, quite unexpectedly,
the workers had spontaneously organised two self-selected experimental
groups on the first shift. The following day, another two similar
groups were organised by the other shift working the same two
blocks of looms. Each of these groups comprised seven workers,
four in a weaving sub-group and three in a gating and maintenance
sub-group. These groups claimed to be able to cope with all
ancillary services. The management felt that they had lost control
of the situation, but despite their misgivings they decided to allow
the groups to continue to function.
The basic experimental period lasted for 59 working days,
from 30 March to 7 June 1953- During the first few days, weavers
could apparently be seen running to their looms, and gaters trotted
around the shed carrying beams weighing over 200 lbs on their
shoulders. With an outside temperature of over 100 degrees
fahrenheit, and an artificially maintained plant humidity of 85
per cent, this pace was clearly too fast to endure. There was an
immediate increase in efficiency with the experimental groups,
but the percentage of damage increased and loom maintenance was
neglected. Performance was quickly restored to above normal levels
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after the Top Supervisor had taken charge of one group for three days
to investigate the problems. Once the experiment was running
satisfactorily, discussion began over the possibility of keeping the
looms running during meal breaks. The looms were soon left running,
over lunch, until a yarn broke stopping a machine automatically.
After 37 days, the requests of the workers in the rest of the
shed to reorganise themselves in experimental-type groups were
granted. The overall results of the reorganisation indicated two
major improvements.
(a) Substantial increases in efficiency were achieved. Efficiency
was defined as the number of "picks" or weft threads inserted
in any shift as a percentage of the number of picks that
would have been inserted under continuous running of the
looms; and
(b) Decreases in damage also occurred. Damage was defined as
the percentage of cloth of sub-standard quality.
Language difficulties and the unprecedented speed with which the
reorganisation was implemented prevented Rice from asking the workers
why they had spontaneously accepted the new work organisation. There
had been no overt complaints about the conventional system, and Rice
concludes that:
"It seems reasonable to infer that their acceptance of
'a group of workers for a group of looms' was the
result of an intuitive recognition that it provided a
means of satisfying needs of which they had been, and
probably still were, largely unaware." (Rice, 1958,
p.8l.)
The characteristics and advantages of autonomous work groups
have been investigated further by Trist, Rice and a number of other
researchers. These will be examined in detail following a brief
introduction to the work of Louis E. Davis. The claim was made above
that socio-technical systems theory is a British product. Davis,
now Professor of Organisational Sciences, Graduate School of
Management, University of California at Los Angeles, has made a
prodigious contribution to the field of job design, and his work
has been influenced greatly by that of the Tavistock Institute.
He has more recently worked with the Tavistock Institute on various
projects and may now be regarded as a "member" of that "school".
His earlier work, however, was not based on systems theory although
some of his ideas developed along similar lines. Davis' work
up to 1966 is another section of the job design literature which
(like part of the work of Miller and Rice) does not fit
comfortably into a chronological exposition. In 1966, Davis (1966)
published a review article summarising some of his own research and
that of Trist et al (1963) and Rice (1958, 1963), concluding that
the combined results of these studies supported the Tavistock model
of "responsible autonomous job behavior". This digression into
Davis' previous work is but a short one, and his subsequent
contributions are not again separated from the main body of the text.
Louis E. Davis
Davis' initial approach to job design was a job restructuring
one, what he called a "job-centred" approach (Davis, 1957a, p.306).
His concern was with the specification of the content of individual
jobs:
".... the job design process can be divided into three
activities: (a) the specification of the content of
individual tasks, (b) the specification of the method
of performing each task, and (c) the combination of
individual tasks into specific jobs." (Davis, Canter
and Hoffman, 1955, P-65 in Davis and Taylor 1972; and
Davis 1957b, p.171 in Yukl and Wexley, 1971-)
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A second feature of Davis' approach has been his objective of formu¬
lating a set of systematic guiding principles for those who have
to design jobs. The main criterion for the formulation of these
principles is the total economic cost measure which takes into
consideration ".... relevant long-term changes in the form of
money, time, growth and psychological, social and cultural stress
costs." (Davis a.nd Canter, 1956, p.281; Davis, 1957a, p.307.)
Job design principles would thus be directed at minimising total
economic cost, and not just at minimising immediate or direct costs.
The concept is similar to that of "joint optimisation" of the social
and technological systems, but Davis recognised the problems involved
in making his total economic cost measure operational.
Davis' growing affinity with the socio-technical systems
approach is illustrated in his definitions of the concept of job
design; thus in a 1957 paper he gives the following definition:
"Job design may be conceived as the organisation of
the content of a job to satisfy the technical-organisational
requirements of the work to be accomplished and the
human requirements of the person performing the work."
(Davis, 1957a, p.305.)
Here again he comes close to expressing the concept of joint
optimisation; but although job design is seen as taking place within
a "three-dimensional framework of organisational, technical and
personal factors" (Davis, 1957a, p.306.), the actual technique
adopted is a job-centred or job restructuring one.
Davis drew up a research programme to discover the set of
guiding principles for job designers. This was to consist of an
impressive multivariate analysis, through controlled experiment,
investigating the relationships between job content factors and
productivity, quality, costs, and job satisfaction. The principles
thus deduced could then be used to design job content and to predict
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performance:
"The immediate steps to be undertaken in a study of
job design are those concerned with the identification
of variables and their classification into criterion,
dependent and independent variables; with the
development of hypotheses; and with the identification
of the effect of job designs on productivity, costs,
human resource use, etc." (Davis 1957 a, p. 308.)
Amongst the first steps actually undertaken was a study conducted
by one of Davis' students which he cites as "one of the first controlled
experiments on job design." (Davis, 1957b, p.17^. in Yukl and
Wexley, 1971.) This was essentially a job enlargement project
which entailed changing the line assembly of a hospital appliance
to an individual assembly (see p.57 above). The "group job
design" which was one phase of this experiment, and which was
unsuccessful, is misleadingly named; the only change made to the
assembly line was to eliminate conveyor pacing and to allow the
female assemblers to work at their own speed.
An example of vertical job enlargement is described in Davis
and Werling (i960), another attempt to correlate job factors and
performance. The authors concluded that:
"Job enlargement that increases skills of jobs, adds
control over work content, rate and quality, adds
completion activities, and permits the development
of wide job knowledge seems to yield reductions in
operating costs, and increased quality and quantity
of output." (Davis and Werling, i960, p.130.)
These conclusions are more in line with those of Herzberg and Lawler
than with Trist and Rice.
Davis also studied supervisory job enlargement (Davis and
Valfer, 1965 and 1966). These attempts to study "job design
variables of first-line supervisory positions" (Davis and Valfer,
1965, p.171) illustrate the confusion created by trying to redesign
jobs at one hierarchical level in isolation from related jobs on
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adjacent levels. The supervisory job design prescriptions appear
to conflict with the conclusions of Davis' other 1966 paper which
supports the socio-technical systems theory model of "responsible
autonomy"; groups of workers (e.g. miners and weavers) take
collective responsibility for the activities which they carry out,
operating without supervision.
Davis' active collaboration with the Tavistock Institute
began in 1966: see Emery (1966), and Davis and Engelstad (1966).
From this point on he will be treated as belonging to that school
of thought - a fully fledged socio-technical systems theorist.
Properties and Advantages of Autonomous Groups
Rice (drawing again from the work of Bion) made two fundamental
assumptions about individual behaviour at work:
(1) "The performance of the primary task is supported by
powerful social and psychological forces which ensure
that a considerable capacity for cooperation is evoked
among the members of the organisation created to perform
it." and
(2) ".... the effective performance of a primary task can
provide an important source of satisfaction for those
engaged upon it."
(Rice, 1958, p.33.)
The problem lies in realising this latent capacity for co-operation.
If work is to have this effect, Rice argued, it must be meaningful,
i.e. it must be a task which those who carry it out can comprehend
and to which they can contribute. It must be a task for which they
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can take responsibility, and contributions must be necessary
and valued. Very difficult and very easy tasks evoke anxiety
and stress either through poor performance or wastage of talent.
Following Argyris, Rice (1963, p.252) claims that tasks without
responsibility force individuals into dependent child-like roles,
frustrating those with aspirations to maturity.
Rice postulated that satisfaction from primary task performance
would result only if:
(a) tasks are organised such that the individual has -
(i) a "whole" task to perform;
(ii) control over his activities; and
(iii) satisfactory relationships with those perfoming
related tasks;
and also if
(b) work groups are organised according to the following
principles -
(i) groups should ideally have from six to twelve
members, the optimum being eight;
(ii) the range of skills required should be such that
group members can comprehend all of them;
(iii) prestige and status differentials should be small; and
(iv) groups should not be unique and disaffected members
should be able to transfer to similar groups.
(See Rice, 1958, pp.3^-35 and 3T~39«)
(Rice, 1958, in fact argues that skill levels should be hierarchically
structured, but providing opportunities for change in status and
rotation between comparable skills.)
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The original tasks in the Calico Mills loom shed did not
meet these criteria, hut Rice argues that the reorganisation of
tasks in the shed fulfilled these requirements. As noted above,
Rice took the workers' spontaneous acceptance of and subsequent
satisfaction with the new work organisation as "proof" of the
validity of these initial assumptions. The characteristics of
the groups operating the composite longwall method of coal getting
were similar to those of the reorganised weaving groups. The main
difference was probably group size; the weaving groups had seven
members, but Trist et al (1963) described self-regulating
composite groups with over 40 members. These comparatively large
groups of multi-skilled face workers ensured continuity of the coal
getting cycle without supervision. The group determined the
deployment of its members and was paid on a common paynote.
(The relative wage differential within the experimental groups
at Calico Mills was 3.8; using the new entrant rate as the base,
the relative differential was 6.1: Rice, 1958, p.69.)
A central argument of the work organisation approach to job
design, therefore, is that group work is more likely to provide
meaningful work, to develop responsibility and to satisfy human
needs in general than is work which is allocated to separately
supervised individuals. Emery (1959) summarises this argument thus:
"if the individual's tasks are genuinely interdependent
with the group task, then it is possible for the
individual to be meaningfully related to his personal
activity through his group task. A group task with
its greater size and complexity is more likely to
provide structural conditions conducive to goal setting
and striving. If it has a measure of autonomy and a
wide sharing of the skills needed for its task, a group
is also able to provide a degree of continuity in
performance that is unlikely to be achieved by
individuals under the control of a supervisor."
(Emery, 1959, p.l85 in Davis and Taylor, 1972.)
In what appears to have been a collective effort, various
Tavistock researchers (other than Miller and Rice) have formulated
a set of task and work group organisation hypotheses. These are
a more detailed extension of the principles for task and group
organisation which Rice (1958) outlined. The hypotheses arise,
first, from consideration of the types of human needs relevant to
behaviour at work,such as:
(a) the need for affiliation and supportive social contact;
(b) the need for achieving and maintaining a favourable
self-concept;
(c) the need for influence and control over one's environment;
(d) the need for satisfying curiosity;
(e) the need for social and economic security.
(van Beinum, 1966, p.62.)
Miller and Rice deal only with the affiliation and security needs.
Given these needs, the major psychological requirements
pertaining to job content, therefore, are -
1. the need for job content to be reasonably demanding (other
than in merely physical terms) and to provide variety
(other than mere novelty);
2. the need for the job to provide continuous learning for the
worker;
3. the need to give the individual a discrete area of decision
making;
U. the need for social support and recognition in the work;
5. the need to relate task and product to social life;
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6. the need to believe in the job as leading to a desirable
future.
(Emery, Thorsrud and Lange, 1965, p.5; van Beinum, 1966, p.63;
Engelstad, 1969, p.353 in Davis and Taylor, 1972; Emery and
Thorsrud, 1969, p.105; Trist, 197*+, p.*+5.)
It is from these basic considerations that Emery (1963)
drew up■a list of thirteen hypotheses about the ways in which
tasks may be more effectively put together to make jobs."
(reprinted in Emery, Thorsrud and Lange, 1965, PP-5~9; van Beinum,
1966, pp.63-67; Hill, 1971, Appendix 2, pp.208-210; Emery and
Thorsrud, 1969, Appendix V, pp.103-105; Trist, 1977, p.75.) Seven
of these hypotheses concern individual task content, four are
concerned with group organisation, and the two final items appear
to have been added in 1969 and concern worker participation and
promotion.
At the individual level, therefore, tasks should provide:
1. optimum variety,
2. a meaningful pattern (i.e. a single, overall or "whole"
task),
3. optimum work cycle length,
7. scope for setting output and quality standards, with
feedback of results,
5. inclusion of preparation and auxiliary tasks,
6. for the use of valued skill, knowledge and effort, and
7. some perceivable contribution to the utility of the final product.
And at the group level, organisation should provide :
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for job rotation or physical proximity:
8. where tasks are interdependent, or
9. where individual jobs are stressful, or
10. where individual jobs do not make perceivable contributions
to the utility of the end product;
and where jobs are interdependent they should, when grouped together:
11. (a) approximate an overall task which contributes
to the utility of the end product,
(b) have scope for setting standards and receive feedback
of results, and
(c) have some control over the boundary tasks.
In general the work organisation should also provide:
12. channels of communication to allow worker requirements to
be incorporated in the design of new jobs, and
13. channels of promotion to foreman rank.
(Briery, 1963; Hill, 1971.)
Job characteristics thought to be desirable by the early British
industrial psychologists such as Wyatt, Fraser and Stock, and by more
recent American workers such as Herzberg and Lawler, may all be found
in the above list. Creating work with these characteristics through
the formation of responsible autonomous groups is, at least in theory,
unique to the socio-technical systems approach. Reviewing the work
of Trist and Rice along with some of his own research, Davis (1966)
concluded that job characteristics which lead to "learnings and
behaviors that seemed to provide the sought for organisation and job





(See also Davis, 1971c, p.^25 in Davis and Taylor, 1972.)
Davis defines responsible behaviour as the individual's or group's
acceptance of responsibility for:
1. the activities of the production cycle,
2. output rate,
3. quality of output,
U. quantity of output,
and the individual's or group's recognition of interdependence with
others for effective performance of the production cycle.
Autonomous behaviour is defined as involving:
1. self-regulation of work content,
2. self-evaluation of performance,
3. self-adjustment to contingencies, and
U. participation in goal or objective setting.
(Davis, 1966 , p. 1+2; Davis 1971a, p.170 in Davis and Taylor, 1972.)
If it is to incorporate adaptability, job content should be
such that "the individual can learn from what is going on around him,
can grow, can develop, can adjust." (Davis, 1971c, p.^26 in Davis
and Taylor, 1972.) Davis gives two reasons why jobs should have an
adequate level of variety - the need to avoid creating a "deprived
environment" with routine, repetitious tasks, and the need to ensure
that adaptability is feasible. For this second reason, Davis cites
Ashby's "law of requisite variety" which states that control is only
effective where the controller (in this case the individual worker
or the group) must be capable of matching the variety of behaviour
which the system (in this case the work) is capable of producing
with an equally varied set of responses. The fourth category which
Davis mentions, participation in decisions affecting an individual's
work, is important, he argues, for learning and growth and hence
for adaptability.
Davis' (1966 ) four categories of job characteristics cover
virtually all of Emery's thirteen hypotheses and may be regarded as
a more parsimonious expression of the same ideas.
The contention of Miller and Rice (1967) that the advantages
of autonomous groups are limited by the rate of technological change
has been discussed above. Other theorists have noted further
constraints. Emery and Trist (i960) for example empha.sise that
maximum work group autonomy is not appropriate in all productive
settings due to the requirements of the technology in use (p.288).
Similarly, Herbst (1962) argues that the findings of Trist's coal¬
mining studies could not be extrapolated to other industries unless
certain conditions prevail, i.e. autonomous work groups would only
be effective where:
1. the work itself is autonomous, that is, it encompasses
an independent and self-completing whole;
2. physical task boundaries are clearly definable;
3. the group members are capable of exercising control and
responsibility; and
U. control is linked to variables that are observable and
measurable (such as output and quality) rather than to those
that are difficult to observe and supervise (such as activity
and interaction patterns).
From his research in a small oil refinery in South California,
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Susman (1970a), claims that the motives behind the formation of an
autonomous group may affect performance. He distinguishes between
"democratic work groups", which are "organised on the basis of
democratic principles" and are the consequence of a democratic
ideology, and "independent work groups", which have been set up for
economic reasons and are the consequence of an economic decision by
management. The results of either of these types of group can not,
therefore, be applied to the other:
"The creation of democratic work groups is motivated by
concerns for reducing worker alienation and apathy by
allowing greater worker participation in the design of
jobs. Awareness by members of democratic work groups
that management was guided by a democratic ethic in
permitting greater autonomy might create an atmosphere
of high morale and cooperation which might not be
found in independent groups, where autonomy is
permitted for economic reasons." (Susman, 1970a,
p.173.)
Autonomous group applications examined below do not fall neatly
into Susman's two categories, having been based on both political
and economic reasoning. Whatever the opinions of the researchers and
consultants advocating these projects, however, final decisions
concerning implementation which are left to management are generally
based primarily on economic reasons.
Gulowsen (1971) seems to have been the only researcher to
consider autonomy as a variable. He examined the functioning of
eight autonomous groups comparing areas in which they did have
autonomy, and those in which they did not. The criteria of
autonomy (which Gulowsen formulated independently of the case study
material) appeared to be arranged in the form of a Guttman scale;
they were ordered as follows:
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production method (of individual members)
Gulowsen argued that in order to reach a particular level on the
scale, a group must satisfy all the criteria that precede that level
on the scale of autonomy. In the groups that Gulowsen studied he
found for example that if a particular group had influence on internal
task distribution (criteron 7) it also had influence on criteria. 8
to 10. Gulowsen's conclusion is that autonomy is a one dimensional
property derived from two underlying variables - time span of
decision and the system level on which decisions have an impact.
The groups in Gulowsen's study having the most autonomy were groups
of loggers and miners, who tend to work on time bounded contracts
lasting for up to three months. During this period there tends to
be no management interference as long as production is satisfactory.
Gulowsen suggests that the term "autonomous group" be used to describe
groups which negotiate and operate on the basis of such time
bounded contracts, and that other types of groups (where appropriate)














Davis and Taylor, 1972.)
Friedmann (1955) and Blauner (196b) had, amongst others,
considered the effects of automation on job content. A number of
writers have examined this topic from a socio-technical system point
of view, and some difference of opinion now exists on the matter.
There are those who, with Blauner, believe that everything undesirabl
in productive work will be removed with automation. Others advocate
a more cautious, albeit pessimistic, view of its consequences.
A comparison of attitudes and jobs of workers in a conventional
(in 195*0 electricity generating plant and in a new highly automated
plant led Mann and Hoffman (i960) to the conclusion that automation
creates jobs which utilise employees' skills and abilities more
effectively, and provide greater variety and opportunities for
learning. Workers in the new plant ("Advance") reported higher
levels of job satisfaction than those in the older plant ("Stand")
and Mann and Hoffman claim that this was due to the combined effects
of job enlargement and job rotation made possible by the technology
of the new plant. Operators in the new plant were required to
perform boiler, turbine and electrical switching operations which
had previously been separate jobs.
Mann and Williams (1958, pp.83 to 90 in Davis and Taylor, 1972)
arrived at similar conclusions about white collar work in their study
of a change-over to electronic data processing (EDP). While jobs
were generally not upgraded as a result, introduction of the EDP
facilities eliminated routine and menial clerical jobs, creating new
jobs which required new skills. These changes were accompanied,
however, by feelings of loss of autonomy by both workers and
supervisors as variations in work rate and tolerance of errors were
reduced.
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In a comparison (similar to that studied by Mann and Hoffman)
between an original and later automated factory power plant, Marek
(1962) attempted to show how with most of the manual tasks in the
plant automated, the operators became "auxiliary controllers" with
a high degree of responsibility for the production process. This
involved greater use of the operators' perceptual and conceptual
skills, and their ability to take the appropriate "feedback action"
to rectify the process when necessary. In terms of ability to
control the production process, Marek describes the work of the
"auxiliary controller" as similar to that of the traditional crafts¬
man. (Marek, 1962, p.62.) Williamson (1973) similarly argues that
jobs in process industries (which represent "the summit of man's
achievement in manufacturing") demand high skill and "represent the
elite of manufacturing industry". (Williamson, 1973, p.30.)
Process manufacturing is thus described as a model for other
industries to emulate with respect to the nature of the work provided.
Davis argues that as automation takes over the routine
"programmable" tasks, human intervention is required to deal with
"unprogrammable" contingencies; workers in these conditions must,
therefore, possess the requisite range of skills and abilities, be
able to cope with unpredictable events, to work unsupervised, and
to act on personal initiative. Automated industries, therefore,
create jobs which require self-control and self-regulation. (Davis,
1971c, p.i+20 in Davis and Taylor, 1972; Davis, 1971a, p.l62 in
Davis and Taylor, 1972.) Davis finds this situation to be an
extremely convenient one as technological and social forces appear
to be working towards the same end:
".... for 'job characteristics that develop commitment' and
thus promote the economic goals of the highly automated
organisation are exactly those that are beginning to
emerge as demands for 'meaningfulness' from the social
environment - participation and control, personal
freedom and initiative." (Davis, 1971c, p. ^21 in
Davis and Taylor, 1972.)
As a final example of this argument, Taylor's (1971a) longitudinal
study of over 3000 respondents in two different organisations (an
oil refinery and an insurance company) tries to show that
"sophisticated technology" is more conducive to the formation of
autonomous groups, and to participative management:
"it would seem that automation does in fact provide the
potential or opportunity for enhanced worker discretion,
responsibility, intra-work-group autonomy, inter¬
dependence and cooperation in both blue- and white-
collar organisations. In fact, what seems to be
happening is that lowest level jobs are becoming
more like traditional supervisory roles." (Taylor,
1971a, p.7; Taylor, 1971b, p.393 in Davis and Taylor, 1972.)
These researchers have tended to generalise about the effects of
automation on job content from single case studies (Taylor being one
exception). But Emery (1959), noting that automation changes task
requirements from the use of gross motor skills to perceptual and
conceptual skills, argues that other characteristics of the work
depend upon the type of automation introduced. Thus where physical
effort is still required to complete the work of the machinery, the
worker is likely to experience a considerable increase in job
pressure and probably also in physical fatigue. Where physical
labour is eliminated but self-correcting controls have not been
incorporated in the machinery the pressure upon the worker to
maintain surveillance is increased. Frequently there is no direct
relationship between speed of production and job pressure; the
operator has to be on the constant look-out for deviations from
process norms. Emery concludes, therefore, that "....technological
205.
changes towards greater automaticity promise no automatic solutions
of the human problems of industry." (Emery, 1959, p.196 in Davis
and Taylor, 1972.)
Cooper (1972) also suggests that the "utopian" work conditions
described by, for example, Mann and Hoffman, Marek, Davis, Taylor
and Williamson, may be characteristic of fluid processing technology
alone, e.g. in petroleum refining or chemicals manufacture (and
possibly in electricity generating). Cooper notes the "trend of
automation to assimilate the information - processing functions
characteristic of skilled work." (1972, p.15^.) This development
will tend to eliminate skilled work leaving operators on lower skill
levels requiring fewer perceptual and conceptual abilities (under¬
standing and synthesising skills). The combination of operating
and maintenance tasks into single jobs, Cooper suggests, is one means
of providing job enlargement; but automation will not automatically
create this opportunity without planned intervention.
Thus it would seem that claims for the benefits of automation in
ameliorating the alienating characteristics of production work should
be treated with scepticism. The outcome of technological change in
the direction of process manufacturing methods is equivocal and it
is not possible to generalise about the effects of automation on
job design. This is an area of continuing interest to socio-technical
system theorists for obvious reasons, and this review has touched
upon only a section of the literature on automation and its
implications. The main concern here has been to illustrate the
relationship between automation and desirable job characteristics
(including autonomous group formation) and, it is hoped, to show that
there is no simple relationship. The next section deals with a
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further source of misunderstanding concerning autonomous group
working, and this has arisen over the introduction of "group
technology" which has no relationship with socio-technical systems
theory whatsoever, and has only an indirect relationship with
autonomous group working.
Group Technology and Autonomous Group Working
A number of writers in this area have equated "group technology"
(or "cellular manufacture") with autonomous group working; this is
a major source of confusion which should be resolved before this
review continues. Edwards and Schmitt (1973), for example, advocate
the "cell system" of work organisation, using groups of six to eight
workers who control to a certain extent the work which they are doing.
Williamson (1973) argues that in batch manufacture the cellular
system has the following advantages:
1. increased flexibility of production;
2. reduced set-up times;
3. increased ratio of processing time to total throughput time;
U. reduced overall manufacturing time;
5. reduction in quantities of work in progress;
6. improved communications;
7. faster reaction to errors;
8. improved task identity; and
9. fostering of "skill, team spirit and pride in achievement."
(Williamson, 1973.)
The "cell system" was first described by S.P. Mitrofanov(l955,
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translated from the Russian in 1966). He was concerned with the
technical rather than with the behavioural advantages of organising
batch production around groups of components which undergo similar
production processes:
"The problem here is to create a method of technological
process development, equipment planning and efficient
setting of the machine tool, so as to ensure the most
profitable technological planning of production in the
shortest time." (Mitrofanov,l966, p.15.)
The solution to this problem, through group technology, is summarised
thus:
"The group processing method is based on the classification
and isolation of such part groups which, in processing,
require identical equipment, common tooling and similar
set up of the machine tool." (Mitrofanov,1966, p.l6.)
The "group" in "group technology", therefore, is a group of
components with common production requirements, not a group of
workers who operate in comparative autonomy. Now in setting up
"manufacturing cells", i.e. groups of machinery which will produce
exclusively one type of component, it is possible to have this
machinery operated by a composite, internally led group of workers.
Such cells, according to Williamson, become:
".... pockets of self-contained responsibility in which
man's skill, intelligence and enthusiasm are harnessed
in somewhat specialised working groups." (Williamson,
1973, p.33.)
The point, however, is that group technology does not in itself
imply or necessitate the creation of autonomous groups of workers.
It is a technically advantageous way of organising batch manufacture
which appears to afford opportunity for the establishment of
autonomous group working in the manufacturing cells created.
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Socio-Technical System Analysis and Design
Socio-technical system theorists have formulated a 9~step
"method of socio-technical analysis" for the redesign of production
tasks, and a 7~step "method of role analysis" for use in service
or advisory departments.
The Tavistock Institute formed a study group (comprising Emery,
van Beinum, Davis, Herbst and Engelstad) to examine possible frame¬
works of analysis to help system designers with job structuring or
work organisation. The study group reported in 1966. Their
initial conclusions, based on a number of work organisation
applications, were that:
1. general principles for designing jobs and work organisations
could be formulated;
2. a given technology could be analysed to determine means
of jointly optimising the social and technical systems;
3. experience with one technology could not be directly
transferred to another; and
it. diffusion of the findings and further application would be
inhibited by inadequate conceptualisation.
The analysis and classification of "unit operations" was first
considered to be a possible solution (Emery, 1966). Unit operations
are:
"....process-oriented functional elements reflecting
processing requirements for transforming materials or
information into products or services. They describe
the processing stages to be completed, i.e. work to
be done, by men and machines." (Davis and Engelstad,
1966, p.U.)
In the terminology of Miller and Rice (1967) these are "operating
systems".
The unit operation approach, however, required extension to
take account of environmental and human factors relevant to the
socio-technical unit under analysis. One of the fundamental
parameters of production system design for the socio-technical
theorist is the ability to adjust to environmental changes. In
his discussion of the value of self-maintaining autonomous groups,
Herbst (1966) argues that a design that specifies every variable of
the system removes that system's self-regulating properties. He
advocates instead "critical specification design" in which only
a minimal set of variables is specified, others being regarded
as "free variables". In other words if a system ( work group )
is to behave in a self-regulating manner, its functioning must not
be so constrained that change is difficult or impossible. Herbst's
concept of critical specification design is an attempt to identify
"the minimal set of conditions required to create viable self-
maintaining and self-adjusting production units." (Herbst, 1966,
p.9.) The composite, internally led autonomous group, claims
Herbst, provides the optimum solution. It was from these
considerations that the 9~step method of socio-technical analysis
was derived. It was developed in the course of the company
development programme at Shell UK, and in particular through the
design of a new oil refinery at Teesport. A full description of
that development programme is to be found in Hill (1971) who also
gives the 9~step analysis (in Appendix 5, pp.230 to 2^3) which
will be briefly described here:
Step 1 : Initial Scanning.
The main characteristics of the production system and its
environment are identified and the main problems are determined.
This step of the analysis covers layout, organisation structure,
system inputs and outputs, the transformation process, the main
variances and their sources, the relationship between the production
system and the department in which it exists, and production and
social objectives.
Step 2 : Identification of Unit Operations.
The main stages or transformations in the production process are
identified. The purpose of each unit operation is described in
terms of its inputs, transformations and outputs.
Step 3 : Identification of Key Process Variances and their
Interrelationship.
Variances are defined as deviations from standard or specification.
At this stage, the analysis is concerned only with variances arising
from raw material or from the nature of the process itself; break¬
downs, plant faults and "human factors" are not considered at this
stage. Not all variances are taken into account, only those which
impinge significantly upon system performance:
".... it has been found that in any production system
there are a large number of variances that have either
no effect or a comparatively minor effect on the ability
of the production system to pursue its objectives."
(Hill, 1971 * p.232.)
Four criteria are suggested for determining the "key" variances and
concern their effect on output quality and quantity, operating costs
and social costs (stress, effort, hazard).
Step h : Analysis of the Social System.
The major groupings (informal and formal) in the social system and
their interrelationships are identified. The object here is
to show the extent to which the key variances are at present
controlled by the social system...." (Hill, 1971, p.233.) It is
suggested that a "Table of Variance Control" be drawn up; this
Table lists each key variance identified and records:
1. where in the process it occurs;
2. where it is observed;
3. where it is controlled;
U. by whom it is controlled;
5. what tasks are necessary to control it;
6. the information necessary, and its source, that enables these
control activities to be carried out.
A final column on the Table of Variance Control is reserved for
"Hypotheses for Job Design". This is to be used for recording
suggestions generated during the completion of the Table.
This step also incorporates an analysis of (a) ancillary
activities, (b) layout and dispersion of workers in space and
time, (c) workers' knowledge of each others' roles, (d) the
payment system, and (e) areas of frequent mal-operation.
Step 5 : Men's Perceptions of their Roles.
(There was apparently no female labour in the refinery at Teesport.)
This step is linked with Step k and continues the analysis of the
social system. The psychological requirements of the workers are
determined by interview, and further job design proposals are
developed.
This step completes the analysis of the production system itself,
and it is to be expected that a number of job design proposals will
have emerged.
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Step 6 : Maintenance System.
The impact of "external" systems upon the production system is
now examined. This may affect the redesign proposals and/or
produce further ones. Variance due to maintenance (arising
in the production system) is identified and present and potential
methods of control are examined.
Step T : Supply and User Systems.
The emphasis here is again on how supply and user systems affect
the production system. Variance arising in the supply and user
systems is examined along with means of controlling it.
Step 8 : Environment and Development Plans.
This Step concerns identification of forces operating in the wider
environment which impinge upon the production system's ability to
achieve objectives, or which are likely to lead to a change in
objectives in the forseeable future. Any development plans
affecting the social or technical systems will be scrutinised,
including any general policies and practices relating to the
production system which have not yet been taken into account.
Step 9 '• Proposals for Change.
At this point an "action programme" is drawn up incorporating all
the hypotheses and proposals developed during the analysis. With
this, the analysis is complete and the next stage is implementation.
A "method of role analysis", similar to that for production
tasks, was also developed ".... as an alternative method of
analysis for departments where no continuous process exists, such
as service or advisory departments." (Hill, 1971, p.2UU.)
This process has only seven steps and these are:
1. General scanning;
2. The objectives of the system;
3. Analysis of roles in the system;
Measurement of roles against psychological requirements;
5. Grouping of roles;
6. Development of change proposals;
7. Management by objectives.
This procedure is clearly similar to that used to analyse production
tasks. The seventh step - management by objectives - is
necessitated by the difficulties in establishing performance measures
for this type of task, and providing adequate feedback of results.
A summary of the 9~step analytical model is given by Trist
(197^, p.i+6.), and Taylor (1975) has produced a simplified version
using the following five steps:
1. Scanning;
2. Technical analysis; identification of -
(a) unit operations, and (b) key variances;
3. Table of variance control;
b. Social system analysis: the internal role network, gross
boundary role network, and individual role analysis are
examined;
5. The socio-technical design.
(Taylor, 1975-)
Autonomous Group Working : Applications
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Here it is necessary to divide the relevant literature
geographically since the theory with which we are dealing has been
applied extensively in Europe and particularly in Scandinavia.
The repetition involved in describing all or most of these studies
will be avoided by describing in detail one study carried out in
Norway and one from Sweden. These are chosen as illustrative of
work organisation projects where autonomous groups have been
established.
Norway
By the end of the 1950's no further opportunities had arisen
for the Tavistock Institute to conduct field experiments in Britain.
Socio-technical system studies, however, were given a "new dimension"
with the Institute's involvement in the Norwegian Industrial Democracy
Project. (Trist, 1971, p.86.) A Joint Committee of the Norwegian
TUC (the L0) and the Norwegian Employers' Federation (NAF) had been
formed to study the question of industrial democracy. In the winter
of 1962-63 that Committee invited a combined research team from the
Institute for Industrial Social Research in Trondheim (Norway) and the
Tavistock Institute to undertake a study of the experience of
Norwegian industry with employee representation on company boards.
This part of the Project was termed "Phase A" and its conclusions were
first published in Norway in 1964, and in English in 1969 (Emery and
Thorsrud, 1969).
Only a few Norwegian companies had appointed employee directors.
Twelve such employee representatives from five large Norwegian
215.
manufacturing firms were interviewed and it was found that
(a) communications between representatives and their electors were
poor, and (b) the representatives often found themselves adopting
the view of the Board as a whole on certain matters. (Thorsrud
and Emery, 1966.) Contrary to the original objectives of these
schemes they had produced no increase in participation by shopfloor
workers in company affairs, no increase in productivity, and no
decrease in worker alienation:
"The majority of employees were not involved or committed
to the representative activities. Those who were
committed would soon change from being representatives of
employees and become ordinary board members. In cases
where this was not so, the board seemed not to fill
its primary function." (Thorsrud, 1968, p.121.)
Due to the apparent lack of success of employee board
representatives, attention was switched to "The other aspect of
industrial democracy - the democratisation of relations on the
job . . . ." (Thorsrud, 1968, p.123.) This was to be termed
"Phase B" of the Project. The two tasks requiring immediate
attention were first, to initiate experiments in work organisation
(i.e. to implement the principles outlined above) and second, to
establish a network for the diffusion of the results of these
experiments. The latter proved to be the more difficult task;
the problems of the diffusion process are described in Thorsrud (197^)*
Two industries were selected for initial experimentation - the
metal working and pulp and paper industries - because of their
importance to the Norwegian economy. One of the most important
selection criteria for plants considering starting an experiment was
a good labour relations record. One problem common to all the sites
eventually chosen was the attitude of management towards the proposed
changes. They were conscious of the irreversible nature of the
steps which they were about to take and the progressive erosion
oftheir prerogatives which this involved. Each stage of the
experiments had, therefore, to be designed such that management,
and workers, did not feel that they had become over-committed.
They were asked to make a series of small, step-wise commitments
rather than one comprehensive transition.
The four plants selected for the initial experiments were:
1. Christiana Spigerverk, a wire drawing mill in Oslo;
2. Hunsfos, a pulp and paper mill in South Norway;
3. Nob^, an electric panel manufacturer in Trondheim; and
H. Norsk Hydro, a chemicals and fertilizer manufacturer.
We shall examine here the first of those experiments which was
selected on the grounds that if improvements could be made here they
could be made anywhere (Trist, 197^, p.^3). As explained below,
this experiment was so successful that it had to be discontinued.
The main report of this experiment is in Emery, Thorsrud and Lange
(1965).
The site chosen for the first experiment was the rather
dilapidated wire drawing mill belonging to Christiana Spigerverk,
a large metal manufacturing company. This section processed thick
wire which was run at high speed through a series of dies to reduce
its diameter, producing coils of thinner wire. The job of the wire
drawer consisted of long periods of inactivity interrupted by
unpredictable breaks in the wire. When these breakages occurred,
the operators were required to work at speed to correct the fault
and get the machine running again. The operators worked independently
- one man, one machine - and did not assist one another when they
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had nothing to do at their own machines. Apart from repairing
breakages, the work was routine; batches of wire for reduction
had to be welded together, and finished wire had to be removed from
the machine.
The wire drawers found their work boring. It lacked variety
and was generally unattractive. The constant threat of breakage,
however, generated an undesirable tension. The job seemed to have
one positive aspect - some workers enjoyed being "master of their
own bench." (Emery, Thorsrud and Lange, 19&5, p.l6).
The workers' overall attitude to their job was,therefore, ambivalent:
"It would seem, on balance, that while some individuals
may have found a positive value in the lack of interaction
on the job, the majority regret it but put up with it
because they do not in any case expect to find easily
other industrial jobs that are, all told, much better."
(Emery, Thorsrud and Lange, 19^5, p.17.)
Some had found a source of satisfaction in the job, others passively
tolerated it.
The first attempt to improve the job through autonomous group
working met with considerable resistance and the conditions specified
for the experiment were not fully met. The basis of the change was
the allocation of a group of workers to a group of machines (rather
like Rice's textile workers, although the initial conditions were
different). The basic experimental conditions were to have been:
1. seven benches run by six men;
2. a guaranteed minimum wage 1 per cent above average, and
an incentive payment for production above average (these
averages were both calculated over the four weeks preceding
the start of the experiment);
3. the experimental group would consist of volunteers approached
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through the shop stewards;
U. work would "be shared by the group;
5. the basic layout would not be changed (although this would
have been desirable);
6. the group would be allocated a full time maintenance man;
7. trainees would only be attached to the group later;
8. production and earnings would be calculated daily and
displayed on a chart in the work area.
These conditions were only partially achieved. The "rule" of
"one man, one machine" proved impossible to break and argument
broke out over the payment system. Voluntary participation and
co-operation could not be obtained and the shop stewards had some
difficulty in "persuading" the workers to "volunteer". The operators
who took part in this phase of the experiment did not regard them¬
selves as volunteers, and one man claimed to have been forced to
take part. The operators displayed a marked preference for the
traditional work system and work sharing in the group was restricted
to rotation and some mutual help with breakages.
The researchers attributed this lack of success to the
characteristics of these particular operators:
"The high turnover of trainees and new workers (six out
of ten quit within the first eighteen months of employment)
suggests that not only had most of these men become
habituated to this work, but they had been selected out
by the system as the ones least put off by the isolation
of the job and its peculiar rhythm of indolence and
exasperating wire trouble." (Emery, Thorsrud and Lange,
1965, p.26.)
A second experimental group was, however, set up with genuine
volunteers and a renegotiated incentive scheme. This group was
one man short, due to illness, but the group agreed to operate the
extra machine anyway. This stage lasted only two weeks, but a much
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closer approximation to the ideal experimental conditions was
achieved, this time with four men operating five machines.
Productivity increased, although it did not reach the level which
would normally have been attained with the extra man. The operators
were content with the new work arrangements but there was some
dissatisfaction with payment. If the men had been given fair
payment for the production achieved through group working they would
have been among the highest paid men in the plant. The other highly
paid workers would then have requested regrading (upwards), but as
the plant as a whole was not producing more this would not have been
possible. This would also have violated nationally agreed rates.
This experiment had to be discontinued, therefore, because the
problems created by improved productivity had not been fully
anticipated. This did not inhibit other autonomous group working
experiments at Christiana Spigerverk, some of which are outlined by
Gulowsen (1971)- The other experiments went ahead as planned;
the Hunsfos experiment is reported in Engelstad (1969), the Nob0
experiment is reported in Thorsrud (1968), and the experiment at
Norsk Hydro is reported in Gulowsen (1969, 1973). Brief accounts
of these are also given by Thorsrud (1968), Trist (197*0 and
Jenkins (197*0-
Researchers in the natural sciences may be heard to claim that
there is no such thing as a failed experiment - it can always be
used as a bad example. The experience at Christiana Spigerverk
is a good example of what may go wrong with a work organisation
project when an inappropriate group of workers is selected for the
experiment, and when insufficient attention is given beforehand to
the consequences of the experiment fulfilling its objectives.
The comparative success of these experiments has been widely
publicised in Scandinavia and this has marked the third phase of
the Project - the diffusion process. The Joint Committee which
sponsored the Project has been transformed into a National
Participation Council, and a Norwegian Parliamentary Commission
on Industrial Democracy was established (see Trist, 1971). A
number of limited experiments began in the 1970's and more
recent applications have occurred in the Norwegian shipping industry
concerning the organisation of work on bulk carriers (Thorsrud,
197^) • The Norwegian experiments, however, appear to have been
more influential in Sweden than in Norway.
Sweden
Emulating their Norwegian counterparts, the Swedish Employers'
Confederation (SAF), the white-collar central union organisation
(TCO) and the central labour confederation (L0) established a
"Development Council for Co-operation Questions" in 1966. The
Council's objective was to carry out experiments of various kinds
similar to those conducted in Norway. Their major impetus in
fact seems to have been generated by the published results of the
Norwegian experiments. (See, for example, Jenkins, 197^-, p.26l.)
Barritt (1975) assesses an SAF report on some 500 Swedish
experiments in job design; Valery (1975) estimates that over 1000
such experiments have been started, noting that many have failed and
that many have been used for publicity purposes. Despite this
apparent breadth of experience, Valery suggests that in Sweden the
work organisation "movement" as such rests on the experience of only
three companies - Atlas Copco, Volvo and Saab-Scania. (Osbaldeston
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and Hepworth, 1975, p.17, make the same point.) The experiments which
these companies have set up have become major "management tourist"
attractions. Similar but less well publicised projects have been
successfully implemented in The Grangesberg Company (a large steel,
mining and shipping concern) and in Orrefors Glass Works. Of the
three best known case studies, Volvo has received by far the most
publicity (at least in publications in English). Very little
information, however, is available about the Atlas Copco experiment
(see Jenkins, 197^, and Valery, 197U). The Saab-Scania experiment
will be used here, therefore, to illustrate the work organisation
approach in Sweden.
The Saab-Scania Group's experiments in work organisation began
in 1970; 1+0 production operators in the chassis shop of a new truck
factory were divided into small composite production groups (Norstedt
and Aguren, 1973). Group members rotated themselves between
different tasks, and also carried out maintenance and quality control
functions. In order to involve operators in the development and
improvement of work methods and conditions, "development groups" were
also established. Each group includes a supervisor, a work study man
and a number of operators. These groups meet monthly and issue a
report on decisions made stating who is to be responsible for any
action to be taken. The objectives of this experiment included
reductions in labour turnover and absenteeism and increased
productivity. The experiment was considered a success for a number
of reasons, e.g.:
1. this method of working spread to the rest of the chassis
works (employing about 600 manual workers);
2. productivity increased;
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3. unplanned stoppages were reduced significantly;
U. costs were reduced to 5 per cent below budgets;
5- product quality improved;
6. over U years, labour turnover in the chassis shop was
reduced from JO per cent to 20 per cent;
7. absenteeism remained unaffected;
8. communication and co-operation between management and workers
improved through the "development groups".
The Saab-Scania Group's better known experiment took place in
their new engine factory at SBdertElje (which began production in
1972). From the results of their earlier experience, the company
decided to design the work organisation of the new factory from scratch
and to design the factory layout accordingly. The final layout consis¬
ted of an oblong conveyor loop which transported the engine blocks to
seven assembly groups each with three people. There is also an island
of potted plants enclosing a cafe alongside the assembly line, where
workers have the use of a telephone. (Thomas, 197^-) Each group
has its own u-shaped guide track in the floor to the side of the main
loop; engine blocks are removed from the main track,completely
assembled by the group, then returned to the main track. The engine
blocks arrive with their cylinder heads already fitted and these
groups are concerned with the final fitting of carburettors,
distributors, spark plugs, camshaft, chains, etc. There are seven
groups altogether (one is a training group) made up from 36 workers
most of whom are female. Each group thus assembles a complete
engine from start to finish, deciding amongst themselves how the work
is to be distributed within the group. Each group has its own
guide-track which is not mechanically driven and the overall work
cycle for the group can he 30 minutes, compared with the 1.8 minute
cycle time of individual jobs on the conventional assembly line.
At the time of their writing, Norstedt and Aguren (1973) claimed that
evaluation of the experiment was not possible, but Lindestad and
Norstedt list some of the expected advantages and disadvantages.
advantages:
1. production is more insensitive to disruption;
2. group working is stimulating, provides opportunities for
individuals, to expand their skills, and work can be adapted
to suit individual competence;
3. fluctuations in production volume do not require extensive
and costly line rebalancing measures, and changes in
capacity can be achieved by varying the number of group
members (up to 6) or by increasing the number of groups;
U. since work content can be adapted to each individual,
this will provide better recruitment opportunities.
disadvantages:
1. the new layout takes up more floor space and ties up
more material than the conventional assembly line;
2. investment costs are therefore higher;
3. work efficiency is reduced because of the reduction
in degree of specialisation.
(See Lindestad and Norstedt, 1973, p.21.)
Writing a year later, Valery (197^) claimed that the biggest
saving from this experiment had been due to reduced labour turnover;
Saab-Scania are saving an estimated 65,000 Swedish Kroner (Sk) per
annum on recruitment and training costs. Reductions in absenteeism
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are saving the company an additional 5,000 Sk per annum. Valery also
reports that the factory achieved a lower reject rate, easier production
balancing, lower cost of assembly tools and a reduction in the number
of instructors and relief workers required. Reminiscent of Herbst's
description of the coal face worked by an autonomous group, Thomas
(1974) remarks on the quiet and cleanliness of the S8dertHlje factory
and its relaxed and unhurried atmosphere.
Additional information concerning this particular experiment can
be found in Wild (1975), Jenkins (1974) and Ruehl (1974). Wild (1975)
cites a number of references describing Volvo's experiments in re¬
designing car assembly; amongst the more easily obtainable are
Jenkins (1974), Foy (1974), Ruehl (1974) and Valery (1974).
Europe
Experience of work organisation in other European countries
again seems to be restricted to a few well known companies whose
efforts in this area have not suffered from lack of publicity.
Agersnap et al (1974) report on a number of projects undertaken in
three companies in Denmark (Hj4jbjerg Machine Factory, Philips Radio
and N.Foss Electric). Philips is actually based in Holland and the
work organisation projects in its Dutch factories are well known
(Philips Report, 1969). This company has investigated a number of
trials of job rotation, enlargement and enrichment, and autonomous
group working. Successful projects in the Swiss machinery and
metal processing industry have also been reported (European Foundation
for Management Development Fourth Annual Conference, 1975)- Amongst
European car makers, Fiat of Italy has also implemented successful
experiments in work organisation (Ruehl, 1974). The studies
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mentioned so far have dealt exclusively with Hue-collar work
organisation. Osbaldeston and Hepworth (1975) managed to locate
only 25 white-collar experiments in the course of a year's research
throughout Europe (including Britain). Nine of these were in
Scandinavia. Wilkinson (1971) provides a sketchy survey of European
"experiments in motivation" up to his date of writing.
America
A number of "group working" experiments in job design have been
undertaken - see Kuriloff (1963), Sorcher and Meyer (1968), Gooding
(1970), Weed (1971), Huse and Beer (1971) and Sirota and Wolfson (1972b).
Some of these references may be familiar - they were mentioned in
the earlier section on job enrichment. These experiments were not,
therefore, motivated by socio-technical system theory. One American
study which does have this theoretical background is that reported by
Walton (1972) who describes the establishment of autonomous processing
and packaging teams in the new plant of a large pet-food manufacturer.
American management has concentrated on job restructuring techniques
and on job enrichment in particular.
Britain
The major direct contribution of the Tavistock Institute to this
area in Britain in recent years has been their participation in the
company development programme of Shell UK Ltd. Low productivity and
high labour costs, attributed to negative employee attitudes to the
company, and the existence of a multitude of restrictive practices,
led to the formulation of two solutions:
(a) to adopt a participative style of management to improve morale,
and
(b) to begin comprehensive productivity bargaining to eliminate
or reduce restrictive practices.
The Tavistock Institute (and Emery in particular) was involved in
drawing up a statement of the company's philosophy and objectives,
for disseminating this to all members of the company, and in the
direct application of this statement in the design of a new refinery
at Teesport (Hill, 1971; Taylor, 1972).
Other British group working experiments have included:
1. establishment of groups of ^ to 5 workers making complete
products in a domestic appliance factory in Hamilton,
Scotland (Leigh, 1969);
2. establishment of teams of 7 to 8 workers making television
sets at the Pye factory in Lowestoft (Manufacturing
Management, 1972);
3. establishment of groups of up to 25 workers making
complete sub-assemblies or main assemblies in a Hoover
factory (Dyson, 1973).
More recently, the Industrial Training Research Unit at Cambridge
have been introducing autonomous work groups in the clothing industry
at Ladybird (Northern Ireland) Ltd., in Belfast (Waldman
and Larkcom, 197*0, and
at Emcar in East Anglia (Pearcey, 1976).
The socio-technical systems approach to job design has had a
far greater impact on Scandinavian industry than it has had in its
country of origin. Two sets of cultural factors pertaining to
Scandinavia, and to Sweden in particular, appear to have contributed
to this - a highly formal, centralised industrial relations system,
and the Scandinavian industrial environment (or "climate") as a whole
Scandinavian industrial relations systems are dominated by powerful,
formal centralised bodies representing employers and unions.
Procedural agreements are established at national level. Unlike
Britain, the unions are organised on an industrial basis as opposed
to an occupational basis and there is a relative absence of
demarcation problems. The stability of the balance of power between
the two sides has also assisted co-operation between them. These
countries have generally higher standards of living, education and
welfare state benefits. Labour shortages make techniques like
job design attractive to management as a means of attracting and
retaining labour. And increased job security also reduces resistanc
to this type of change.
There are indications that this lack of application of work
organisation in Britain is a trend which is being reversed. Mention
has been made of the Tavistock Institute's involvement with Shell,
and the work of the Industrial Training Research Unit in the British
clothing industry. The Work Research Unit of the Department of
Employment is now charged with promoting research into and advising
on the application of job design techniques in general, including the
job restructuring approaches discussed above and the socio-technical
systems approach. (See Jessup, 1975•)
The Socio-Technical Systems Approach : Criticisms
From their survey of white-collar work structuring experiments
in Europe, Osbaldeston and Hepworth (1975) conclude that European
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applications have in general been more far reaching than those under¬
taken by British companies. This they attribute to the cultural
constraints on the transferability of such experience from country
to country, and to the disinterest of British trade unions. They
also found that, compared with American studies in job enrichment
such as that of Ford (1969) there has been very little true
"experimentation" in Europe:
".... instead of rigorous experimentation, there is often
found a continuing change process, whereby an organisation
constantly adjusts and adapts itself to its environment,
both external, in the shape of changing legislation,
market forces and social values, and internal, in the
shape of changing expectations of a more educated work
force, pressures from trade unions, and the introduction
of new technologies." (Osbaldeston and Hepworth, 1975, p-1-)
Job restructuring, on the other hand, is generally regarded as a
single time-bounded intervention.
The Tavistock workers have been criticised for producing
ostensibly academic books and papers based on data gathered in the
course of consultancy work. Following such criticism, for not
making his working methods explicit in his 1958 book, Rice included
extensive appendix material in his later book (1963) giving examples
of his original working notes as they were presented to the Mill
management at the time. A similar degree of openness regarding the
source of data is also to be found in the case studies of Miller and
Rice (1967). Rose (1975) is perhaps unduly critical in suggesting
that the concepts of socio-technical system and organisational choice
".... can be interpreted as an attack on the trained
incapacities of production engineers and as an advertise¬
ment for social scientific industrial consultants."
(Rose, 1975, p.213.)
Rose further suggests, however, that the concept of organisational
choice is not accurate: the argument of Trist et al (1963) was that
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management is not wholly constrained by the technology of a production
process in organising those who will operate it; i.e. with a given
technology there are alternative forms of organising the work. But
the alternatives that Trist et al advocate are also more effective
ways of working. So the "choice" that management is faced with
is not merely between two or more organisational forms but between
inefficient and more efficient forms. Rose argues that this is not
really a choice at all.
The scepticism of British trade unionism towards job design
and autonomous group working has been mentioned above. The Head
of Research of the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers, Tony
Banks (197*0 expresses this attitude clearly. He is critical of
the management bias in the job design literature. Although increased
satisfaction is stressed as an advantage, group working is invariably
introduced to solve serious management problems. Banks also points
out that "group working" is frequently no more than job rotation and
that "autonomy" can vary widely in meaning (see Gulowsen, 1971,
referred to above). Banks criticises the way in which group working
projects can, as in Scandinavia, be used as publicity vehicles and
become "tourist attractions". In one of his more sarcastic passages
Banks claims that:
"Another similarity in most of the group working schemes has
been the predominance of unskilled and semi-skilled female
employees. Perhaps group working initially appeals to
the highly developed group instincts of the average female'.
In conjunction with this it is interesting to note the
number of occasions group working commenced with a re-
decoration of the work area based on the suggestion of
the employees involved in the experiment." (Banks, 197*+,
p.11.)
Banks discusses four more serious disadvantages of group working:
1. That the delegation of responsibility down the hierarchy
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may increase stress and work load.
2. That the creation of groups with added responsibility may
induce friction between groups and individuals and "undermine
workshop comradeship and unity".
3. That group working reduces the number of supervisory jobs
(and thus reduces labour costs - a managerial advantage).
b. That promotion opportunities for shopfloor workers are reduced.
With the exception of the second, these criticisms could also apply
to job restructuring techniques. With either approach, these
criticisms do not necessarily apply as the circumstances of each job
design project vary. In one of Ford's (1969) job enrichment experiments,
for example, the number of promotions out of the "experimental" group
were much higher than those from the "control" group. Bank's
criticisms are generalisations which will not apply in every case.
The outcome of the experiment at Christiana Spigerverk in Norway lends
weight to Bank's second criticism. The wage differential which the
experimental group established created dissatisfaction amongst other
groups of workers in the factory. Herzberg's (197*0 argument
against "social job design approaches" is based upon his concept of
the "tyranny of the group". Precisely what Herzberg means by this
is not clear, but he seems to imply that the development of the
individual may become submerged in the requirements of the group as
a whole. The majority of the authors cited in this section on work
organisation on the other hand would claim first, that autonomous
group working is a more powerful technique than individual job
restructuring in providing for human needs, and second that group
working is intrinsically flexible and thus more able to cater for
individual differences in ability and need.
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It is not possible to end this section without mention of David
Silverman's (1970) celebrated critique of socio-technical system
theory. Silverman is a sociologist and his book," The Theory of
Organisations : A Sociological Framework" is concerned with the subject
matter of sociology as a whole and with how sociologists should go
about their business. Here we shall concentrate on his view of socio-
technical systems theory as a means of examining behaviour in
organisations. Silverman argues that by concentrating upon technology
and social factors, the socio-technical systems approach diverts
attention from the wider social influences on worker behaviour; by
concentrating on "objective" organisational properties, individuals'
subjective definitions of their environment are ignored. The
sociologist studying organisational behaviour (and other forms of
social behaviour), Silverman argues, should take account of these
factors which the socio-technical systems approach obscures. An
additional difficulty with socio-technical systems theory lies in
what Silverman terms reification, that is ascribing organisations
with biological needs for survival, stability and growth.
Organisations cannot have such needs, and cannot act independently of
their members. The usefulness of the theory claims Silverman
"depends on how far one is prepared to concede that social institutions
are similar to biological organisms and that their functioning is
best understood in terms of a series of adaptations to an often
hostile environment." (Silverman, 1970, p.119.)
Silverman argues that the socio-technical systems approach has
four "serious limitations" which are:
1. The confusion between "Is" and "Ought" propositions.
Are technology, market forces and human needs to be regarded
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as variables which actually shape or determine organisation
structure, or are they important variables requiring study
and which must be considered when attempting to undertake
organisational change? It is one thing to argue that these
variables ought to be important in determining organisation
structure, but it does not then follow that these variables
indeed are determinants of organisation structure.
2. The role of the consultant in prescribing for organisational
problems.
Silverman raises the familiar criticism of "the dual role
of many socio-technicists as academic analysts and as
consultants to business organisations". (Silverman, 1970,
p.121.) His main concern here is with the lack of a
sociological perspective in much of the socio-technical
literature, and he speculates on the influence which the
consultancy role may have on orientations to the questions
of constructing efficient organisations. The consultant,
argues Silverman, "is likely to be immediately concerned
with social rather than sociological problems" and "theories
and empirical materials which do not have a direct bearing
on the task at hand may not be taken up". (Silverman, 1970,
pp.121-122.) Theories generated apply to commercial
organisations and are difficult to apply to other types of
organisation, and the problem solving bias of the consultant
leads to an eclectic use of perspectives and techniques.
From the sociologists point of view, this is unsatisfactory.
3. The nature of members' attachments to organisations.
Silverman argues that:
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"The weakest part of the Socio-Technical Systems approach
is the regular failure of its proponents to discuss
adequately the sources of the orientations of members of
organisations." (Silverman, 1970, p.123.)
Miller and Rice (1967) concentrate on affiliation and
security needs of an organisation's members and discuss
sentient groupings which satisfy these needs as producing
loyalty and commitment from their members. Silverman
points out that there are a number of types of involvement
in organisations and that the socio-technical systems
view is confused and restricted.
b. The nature of the environment of an organisation.
Again Silverman argues that the socio-technical systems approach
is restricted in that the organisation's environment is analysed
in purely economic terms, as a series of market pressures
affecting organisation structure. Members' orientations
to the organisation, argues Silverman, are determined by
their perceptions of the organisation and these are influenced
by their extra-organisational experiences. The environment
of an organisation, therefore, affects its internal functioning
through more than economic pressures.
Silverman does not, of course, examine socio-technical systems
theory as an approach to job design. Some of his remarks will be
taken up in the Conclusions at the end of this Chapter where the
disadvantages of this approach to job design will be examined in
more detail.
In addition to these criticisms of work organisation and socio-
technical systems theory, several points may be made in summary of
this approach as a whole.
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1. The work organisation approach to job design incorporates
an explicit model of the organisational framework which is
to be changed - it adopts a model of organisation structure
and functioning. Herzberg's contribution to the theory of
job design was discussed above in terms of the components
which his theory included. The work organisation approach,
therefore, has all the basic components of Herzberg's
theory plus a model of organisation structure and functioning.
That this model should be a socio-technical systems one has
been severely criticised, for example by Silverman; but
as with Herzberg, it is perhaps more important that such a
component is considered necessary at all than whether or
not the design of the component is appropriate.
2. Job restructuring approaches to job design have not incorporated
explicit models of organisation structure and functioning.
It has, therefore, been difficult to predict in advance the
effect on supervisory jobs of job restructuring at operator
level. (Lawler, Hackman and Kaufman, 1973 is a good example.)
In using the primary work group, or the operating system, as
the basic unit of analysis, the work organisation approach
has similar difficulties in predicting the impact of changes
on higher level jobs and on jobs in adjacent groups or
operating systems. It is difficult, for example, to discover
what effect (if there was any) composite group working in coal
mining had on the tasks of other underground workers involved
on auxiliary tasks. (Trist et al, 1963.)
3. Autonomous group working seems to be a more powerful job
design technique than any of the job restructuring approaches.
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It offers more scope for introducting desirable work
characteristics than methods directed at individual jobs.
k. Applications of the project type organisation suggested by-
Miller and Rice (1967) are probably more numerous than the
incidence of reports of them in the literature would suggest.
A number of professions (including, for example, accountants
and civil engineers) often organise work teams in this way
to deal with individual contracts. No reports of manual
workers being organised like this were encountered in the
preparation of this Chapter.
The revised view of Miller and Rice concerning the
implications of the contrived coincidence of task and sentient
group boundaries has been largely ignored by other socio-
technical system theorists involved in work organisation, and
it does not seem to have influenced the establishment of
autonomous group working experiments. It has been noted above
that autonomous groups differ in the degree of autonomy they
possess (Gulowsen, 1971), and that autonomous group performance
may be affected by the motives behind the establishment of
the group (Susman, 1970a). The extent to which different
types of autonomous group inhibit or facilitate different
types or rates of change is, therefore, a possible avenue
for future research.
5. It has been argued above that socio-technical system theorists
have not dealt in a satisfactory manner with the impact of
new production technologies, and automation in particular, upon
the organisation and characteristics of work. This is an
area in which generalisation is impossible, and another possible
line for further research lies in clarifying the effects
of different types of new technologies on work at different
levels and in different operating systems in different
industries.
6. The technique (or "implementation strategy") of socio-
technical system analysis and design is certainly the most
sophisticated technique for analysing problem situations and
producing job redesign proposals. The 9~step method is used
more to stimulate "job design hypotheses" rather than to
generate these directly through the analysis itself. The
technique, although more formalised than that of Herzberg,
is still "ad hoc" in its application in a given enterprise -
the final proposals are dependent upon the ingenuity of the
job designers. It is not clear in the published case
studies how the 9~step analysis actually works in practice;
it is more of a heuristic device than a rigorous analytical
tool.




A Synthesis of Techniques : Ray Wild
The two approaches to the design of jobs have now been
described. The review has in each case followed the same basic
pattern, starting with an outline of the underlying theory and
proceeding through the type of job design advocated, the technique
of implementation, practical examples or experiments, and published
criticism. In a review of this nature, classification of the
material into sections is infrequently straightforward, ease of
exposition determining the location of some work, partially arbitrary
decisions determining the location of others. The work of Professor
Ray Wild (now Director of Graduate Studies, Administrative Staff
College, Henley, and Head of the Work Research Group there) in this
field defies classification, by any criterion, in the foregoing
review, but fortunately constitutes a convenient overview and
synthesis of some aspects of the work reviewed above which have
particular relevance for the sections which follow. Wild and his
colleagues (Colin Carnall and David Birchall in particular) carried
out an exhaustive review of published accounts of all manner of job
redesign studies involving manual workers; it is mainly this work
that will be examined here. This work was eventually published in
book form (Wild, 1975; Birchall, 1975), but many of the earlier
papers will also be cited.
The survey approach was adopted in order to identify basic
techniques, objectives, effects and scope of job design. The main
objective was to produce a model which would summarise the techniques
and objectives of job design. A total of 96 published accounts,
238.
■k
from Britain, Europe and America., were examined and the following
categorisation of types of job design change was formulated:
1. rearrangement or replacement of assembly line work.
2. workers given additional responsibility.
3. rotation of jobs.
4. responsibility for additional and different types of work.
5. control of work speed.
6. self-organisation.
This categorisation is completely independent of the theoretical
bases of the types of change implemented. It was from this
categorisation that the dichotomy between job restructuring and
work organisation was developed. Categories 3 and 6 constitute
work organisation, the rest are job restructuring. Wild's diagram
is shown on page 36 above. (See Wild, 1973; Birchall and Wild,
1973a; Wild, 197^+a; and in particular Wild, 1975, pp.^6-^7 and
Appendix A, pp.l57~179-)
The survey illustrated the variety of reasons for which job
design had been undertaken. A desire to make work more interesting
or challenging was often secondary to the solution of other pressing
problems such as labour turnover and absenteeism, quality of output
and various problems of an economic nature. In the absence of
systematic study of job design changes and effects, the work surveyed
gave the following list of benefits resulting from job design changes:
1. improved productivity




5. better absenteeism and turnover records
6. lower costs. (Wild, 1975, P»50; see also Birchall, 1975,
pp. 99-100.)
Among the more intractable problems facing job design attempts were:
(a) resistance to changes from supervisors;
(b) increases in responsibility not always followed by changes
to the payment system; and
(c) the preference of some younger workers for jobs requiring
little attention.
Forty-six group working experiments were surveyed.(Wild, 1975;
Birchall and Wild, 1973b.) Most of these - 70 per cent - involved
the establishment of autonomous groups. Birchall and Wild (1973b)
describe these as "functional" groups and distinguish them from the
establishment of "consultative" groups. The latter are groups that
have been established with a once-only or at most intermittent
responsibility. Discussing the advantages to the worker from autono¬
mous group working, Wild (1975, p.90) draws heavily on an earlier
paper by Emery (1959), and points out four such benefits in particular:
1. increased confidence through recognition of important skills;
2. development of social skills;
3. opportunity to exercise influence and assume a leadership role;
h. group support, encouragement, protection and security.
Miller and Rice (19&7) may not entirely agree, but Wild argues that:
".... the existence of functional work groups facilitates
the establishment of production targets and standards,
provides greater opportunity for work variety and facilitates
adaptation to change." (Wild, 1975, p.90.)
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In an extended analysis and discussion of the means and ends
of job design, Wild (1975) (see also Wild and Birchall, 1973;
Birchall, 1975.) suggests a novel breakdown of the job characteristics
which the survey as a whole had identified as being desirable. Some
characteristics could be described as "attributes" of jobs whereas
others could be considered as giving rise to those attributes. Work
and job "attributes" include, for example, work variety, use of
skill and ability, meaningful and worthwhile work, worker autonomy,
and so on. It is the way in which tasks, task relationships, work
methods and work organisation are designed which contributes to the
existence of these attributes. Does the worker inspect his own
materials and set up his own machine, for example; does he perform
a "whole" task; is his work mechanically paced; can he select his
own work method and does he receive regular information feedback.
These are a sample of the facilitating "means" which produce the
desirable attributes or "ends". (Wild, 1975» p.58; Wild, 1974b,
pp.32-33; Birchall, 1975, p.47.) The value of this distinction,
claims Wild, is that it:
".... helps to distinguish between those aspects of jobs
which might be manipulated and those job features which
changes might affect but which cannot be directly treated."
(Wild, 1975, p.57.)
Towards the end of the book, Wild (1975, Chapter 12) summarises
and develops his argument as follows:
First, job design can take the form of job restructuring (enlargement
or enrichment) or work organisation (job rotation or self-organisation).
Second, desirable job attributes are created by the identification
and manipulation of certain sets of job characteristics.
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Third, the creation of autonomous groups is the main form of
organisational change the nature and benefits of which are dependent
upon the degree of responsibility and autonomy given to the group.
Fourth, job design changes as a whole involve increased worker
participation in work planning and control; this is described as
"deverticalisation" of organisational hierarchies.
Fifth, Wild outlines a "development policy" for job design which
requires a third type of change, in addition to the job restructuring
and work organisation changes described. This is "organisational
design" which"is introduced in recognition of the fact that neither
workers nor production systems exist in isolation in a plant, but as
part of a larger organisation." (Wild, 1975, p.152.) Miller and
Rice certainly realise this, but those socio-technical theorists who
have concerned themselves directly with the design of jobs have
concentrated upon the individual operating system (or unit operation)
as their basic unit of analysis.
The advantage of this concept is its comprehensiveness; it
deals with the operating system and with its environment, and it
deals in particular with:
".... the provision of information systems for goal
setting, feedback and performance measurement, together
with the necessary support systems which ensure the
viability and continued existence of the unit."
Wild, 1975, p.152.)
Wild (1975) does not develop the concept of organisational design much
further in that book except to suggest that the "ideal" would be
".... the creation of small, integrated and essentially self-
contained production units." (p.153.) It is hoped that by now it
will be clear why Wild's work in this area has been left until this
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stage of the review. The relevance of this work to the thesis
advanced in Chapter 3 lies in Wild's contention that organisational
design is a component of job design.
Wild's scheme for classifying job design approaches should
require little further explanation (See Figure 2.1, p.36).
Organisational design may facilitate the establishment of autonomous
groups (or "self-organisation") or job rotation; similarly, job
rotation and self-organisation facilitate the types of work
characteristics produced by job enlargement and job enrichment.
This is why work organisation is generally regarded as a more
powerful job design technique than the job restructuring approaches.
5. RESUME MP CONCLUSIONS
This summary of the job design literature examined above has
four purposes:
1. To identify common components of job design theories.
2. To identify areas of agreement and disagreement between
job design theories.
3. To identify problems that job design theories have in common.
U. To suggest an approach to the solution of these problems.
Common Components of Job Design Theories
Job design theories can be regarded as comprising up to four
basic components. These are:
(a) A theory of human motivation that may or may not be based
on or coupled with a theory of human nature.
(b) A model of the situation towards which the theory as a whole
directs its prescriptions for change; this could be a model
the individual job, an organisational sub-system or the
organisation as a whole.
(c) A statement, based on component (a), of the types of job
characteristic that are considered to be desirable.
(d) A technique for' changing the design of jobs such that they
incorporate the characteristics considered to be desirable
while maintaining or improving the operation of the
situation that is being changed; i.e. a technique for
matching components (b) and (c).
These components are discrete in a sense but are interrelated in th
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following manner:





^ tx . . .
component (,c; : desirable job characteristics
component (b): model of change situation, and
component (c): desirable job characteristics
? .
determine
component (d) : technique for change
Figure 2.9 summarises the job design theories examined in this
Chapter and shows how each theory is made up from these four basic
components. The cells in Figure 2.9 have only been filled where the
originator or originators of a job design theory have made their
views on particular components explicit. This is not meant to imply,
for example, that researchers from the Industrial Fatigue Research
Board (IFRB) had no conception of human motivation, or that Herzberg
has no conception of the types of situation for which he advocates
change. These writers simply did not formalise and incorporate
whatever ideas they may have had concerning those components into
their theories of job design.
It may be seen from Figure 2.9 that only one job design theory
incorporates all four basic components. This is the theory of socio-
technical system design. It may also be seen that only two job design
theories have adopted an explic.it model of the situation that they
attempt to change. These are the theories of project type
organisation and socio-technical system design respectively. On
page 230, above, it was claimed that socio-technical system design is
arguably the most powerful technique available for redesigning jobs.
Figure 2.9: The basic components of .job design theories (job
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Figure 2.9 continued: The basic components of .job design theories
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This relative success may he assessed in terms of the technique's
ability to change the design of jobs in the required direction.
Socio-technical system design utilises all four basic components
indicating that it is the most rigorously developed of the job
design theories; this is perhaps the principal reason for the
comparative success of the theory.
Other job design theories have concentrated on the derivation
of desirable job characteristics from theories of human nature and
human motivation, and have directed little attention to the
problem of putting these prescriptions into practice. One
exception to this criticism is the work of Wild (1975) who bases
a comprehensive statement of desirable job characteristics (termed
"work attributes") on a review of a large number of reported job
design projects rather than on a theory of human nature or motivation.
Wild has also attempted to develop a framework for the implementation
of changes that will produce these desirable work attributes which
again is based on a review of job design projects rather than an
explicit model of the situation to be changed. In general,
however, concentration on the derivation of desirable job
characteristics is coupled with a lack of effort devoted to how
these characteristics are to be made operational.
Areas of Agreement and .Disagreement Between Job Design Theories
There are two main areas of agreement between job design
theories. First, the influence of Abraham Maslow's (19^3, 1970)
theory of a hierarchy of basic human needs dominates the theory of
human nature upon which theories of motivation and statements of
desirable job characteristics are based. Second, there is wide
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agreement over the types of job characteristic that are regarded as
desirable. Figure 2.10 summarises these characteristics and
indicates the theories that advocate their desirability. Job
characteristics that appear to be similar in intent are grouped
together in Figure 2.10; thus the claim that jobs should provide
"group affiliation" is assumed to be similar in intent to the claims
that jobs should provide "social support and recognition" and should
provide "opportunities for social interaction". There appears,
therefore, to be general agreement over the objectives of job design,
over the types of results that should be achieved.
On the other hand there appears to be little agreement upon the
technique to be used to implement desired changes. Only three of
the job design theories specify a formal method of analysing the
situation that is to be changed, and only one of these theories -
socio-technical system design - bases this analysis on a model of
the situation that is to be changed. It was argued above that
a technique for implementing job design changes should rely upon
both a statement of the results that should be achieved and a model
of the situation that is to be changed. Socio-technical system
design, therefore, is the only job design theory that meets this
criterion.
The advocated techniques for implementing job design change
are not similar. They are:
Herzberg - 10 point check list for generating ways
of implementing 7 principles of vertical
job loading.
Socio-technical - 9~step method of socio-technical system
System Design analysis for generating "job design
hypotheses".
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DESIRABLE JOB CHARACTERISTICS advocated by
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Figure 2.10: The principal "desirable .job characteristics" and the
.job design theories that advocate them.
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Organisational - Manipulation of "means-" (task relationships,
Design work organisation, etc.) to generate
desired "ends" (10 desirable work
attributes).
But these three methods rely on the abilities of the agents of
change (managers, consultants, researchers) in a particular setting
to identify possible beneficial changes. None of these methods is
grounded in a framework of job or organisational analysis that in
itself identifies possible job and organisational design changes.
There is, therefore, tacit agreement between these methodologies
in so far as they are all heuristic devices for assisting the job
designer to generate "job design hypotheses" or "vertical loading
factors" or "means" that can be manipulated.
There remains a more fundamental disagreement concerning
the components that a job design theory should incorporate. It is
difficult to argue that a rigorous job design theory can do without
one of the four basic components that are identified here, and some
of the problems that these theories meet are perhaps due to their
lack of one or more theoretical mainstays. This should be borne
in mind throughout the section which follows, dealing with the specific
problems that job design theories have to face.
Problems that Job Design Theories have in Common
There are at least five problems that job design theories appear
to have in common. These are:
(a) Limited ability to calculate the effects of particular job
design changes on other jobs and sections in an organisation.
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(b) Difficulty in making objectives,i.e. statements of desirable
job characteristics, operational.
(c) Difficulty in transferring knowledge of successful types
of change from one organisational or technological setting
to another.
(d) Difficulty in implementing job design changes that cater for
individual differences.
(e) Difficulty in calculating the durability of a given change.
These five problems will each be dealt with in turn.
(a) Limited ability to calculate the effects of particular job
design changes on other jobs and sections in an organisation:
This problem is illustrated by the difficulty that job
restructuring theories of job design have of designing jobs
on more than one level of an organisation at a time. The
job design experiment of Lawler, Hackman and Kaufman (1973)
is an excellent illustration of this (see above, p.145)"
Job design that goes beyond mere horizontal job enlargment
invariably means giving the lowest grade of worker (manual
or white-collar) tasks that have previously been performed
by supervisors. Job design implies that organisations be
"deverticalised" (Wild, 1975) by passing traditional
management functions to those performing non-managerial jobs.
Determining which managerial functions should be transferred
in this way is one of the fundamental questions of job design.
Job restructuring theories have paradox! cally attempted to
answer this question by analysing the content of the job
at which the principal change is directed; this explains
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the frequent appearance in the literature of job restructuring
of sections in papers and books headed "the changing role of
the supervisor" or "problems of supervisory resistance".
Job restructuring theories have no method, other than the
use of inspired guesswork, of calculating in advance how a
given change in job design will affect other jobs and jobs
on other hierarchical levels in the organisation. Socio-
technical system analysis attempts to circumvent this
problem by analysing managerial and non-managerial tasks
at the departmental or "operating system" level. This is
done through compiling a "table of variance control".
But how the resultant job design changes, such as the
establishment of autonomous groups, will affect other levels
of management or other operating systems, is indeterminate.
Similar criticism applies to the project type organisation
advocated by Miller and Rice (1967) and Wild's (1975)
organisational design theory.
Job design changes take place at the interface between
managerial and non-managerial jobs, and a model of how managerial
and non-managerial tasks are interrelated, and of the inter¬
relationships between managerial tasks, is a prerequisite
for calculating the ripple effects of particular job design
changes on the rest of the organisation.
(b) Difficulty in making objectives, i.e. statements of desirable
job characteristics, operational:
The meaning of, for example, the job characteristic
"responsibility" is uniquely determined by the organisational
setting to which it is applied and the way in which it is
interpreted by those responsible for the job design changes.
As Wilson (1973) concludes:
".... the efficacy of such approaches has depended
hitherto upon the expertise, integrity, and
ingenuity of a few exponents who have shown how,
within given boundary conditions, it has been
possible to increase job satisfaction, responsibility,
versatility and other desirable features of
occupational life." (.Wilson, 1973, p.3.)
The way in which the characteristic "responsibility" is made
operational is to make a worker "responsible for" something
that he or she was not "responsible for" originally, e.g.
inspection of work done. A glance at the job design projects
that report increases in responsibility for the workers
affected shows the range of interpretations that the term
has been given. "Responsibility for" something is clearly
a characteristic that can vary widely in degree; the worker
can be given "responsibility for" a number of factors that




leaving work place without permission
requisitioning own materials
hours worked
and so on. How much responsibility should job design aim to
give? How is it to be measured? How are two job design
experiments, where "responsibility for" parts of the work has
been increased, to be compared? Responsibility can vary in
different types of degree. Workers may be given one
additional "responsibility for", or they may be given six new
"responsibilities". Each responsibility, on the other hand m.
differ to the extent that supervision is maintained;
supervision may be removed entirely, it may be carried out at
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regular or random intervals. Therefore, bald statements to
the effect that job design changes have led to workers being
given increased responsibility do not mean a great deal.
The other job characteristics that are considered to be
desirable attract the same criticism; there must be an
infinity of ways, for example,in which the "variety" of a
job can be increased. The establishment of autonomous work
groups also meets this problem. The arguments of Gulowsen
(1971) and Banks (1974), concerning the differences in degrees
of autonomy between groups, have been noted above. And as
Wild (1975) suggests, the degree of autonomy or capacity for
self organisation that a group of workers possesses may
determine the extent to which other desirable job characteristics
are present.
This difficulty in making job design objectives operational
can also be seen in the results of certain job restructuring
projects that have produced autonomous group working solutions.
Paul and Robertson (1970) describe two such job enrichment
projects, and these were discussed at some length above
(see pp.114-116). A number of other job enrichment projects
that adopted group working solutions were also mentioned
(see p.116 above). Admirable though these solutions may be,
they reach beyond the limitations of the theory that inspired
them. It has also been noted that Herzberg himself never
intended job enrichment to be used in this way. Wild's
(1975) categorisation of reported job design projects also
reflects this confusion to a certain extent. He classifies
twice a project reported by Wilkinson (1970) - as a group
255.
working exercise (Wild, 1975, p.215) and as an example of
a job restructuring exercise in which "workers are given
additional responsibility" (Wild, 1975, p.l67).
These difficulties arise in part because the stated
objectives of job design theories are heuristic devices -
like the techniques used to implement them. They are not
tied in any way to a theoretical framework that can be used
to direct the process of change.
(c) Difficulty in transferring knowledge of successful types of
change from one organisational or technological setting to
another:
This problem was recognised some time ago by researchers
at the Tavistock Institute. (See Emery, 1966 and p.208 above.)
Job design changes that have proved successful in, for example,
a chemicals processing plant are difficult to state in terms
that make them directly applicable to, say, clerks in an
insurance office. Job design objectives and the techniques
for implementing them are heuristic devices rather than
theoretical frameworks of analysis and change. Job design
changes that are worked out in particular organisational and
technological settings tend, therefore, to be bound to the
settings in which they originate. Except in the most general
of terms, each job design application must start afresh and
solutions that are worked out are not cumulative. The job
designer cannot compile a toolkit of solutions over a number
of applications.
Difficulty in implementing job design changes that
cater for individual differences:
If a group of workers as a whole rejects a proposed job
design change, that change will invariably not take place.
But where there is general acceptance of change, there are
always likely to be some who will find that the new duties
and "responsibilities" bring fatigue, stress, frustration
and anxiety. There may on the other hand be some who
continue to find their jobs too restricting. This also
applies to the autonomous group solution, except perhaps
to the extent that the group has "responsibility for" its
own internal task allocation and choice of work methods.
Job design changes, therefore, generally impose a standard
solution upon a more or less heterogeneous work force.
Difficulty in calculating the durability of a given change:
Penzer (1973; see p.96 above) points out that people who
respond positively to job enrichment tend to become frustrated
once the novelty has worn off and no further enrichment is
forthcoming. Jenkins (197*+; see p.97 above) also notes
this problem. The beneficial effects of job design changes
may, therefore, be short lived. This is perhaps one way in
which the job designer can ensure that his skills will
be required again at some future date.
The implementation of job design imposes static
organisational solutions that may be approximately "right"
at the time of implementation but which are liable to be
overtaken by developments - organisational, technological and
human. The project type organisation advocated by Miller and
Rice (1967; see above, pp.l67~l73) attempts to overcome this
problem, but is not really a job design theory since it is not
directed specifically at change of job content. It is a
prescription for organisational design that is likely to affect
the design of jobs, although Miller and Rice do not explore this
possibility. Their theory is more of a conceptual guide than
a framework of organisational analysis and change. Job
design theories do not appear to be capable of generating jobs
or organisational design solutions that have a built-in
capacity to react and adapt to change. Autonomous groups
may, depending upon their degree of autonomy, have some
capacity to cope with change, but Miller and Rice (1967)
have suggested that this capacity may be severely limited where
change implies alteration in the composition of the group
or threatens its very existence.
An Approach to the Solution of These Problems
These five problems seem to be symptoms of the same underlying
weakness of job design theories - the difficulty in translating
prescription into action. It was argued above that implementation
of job design depends upon two components of the theory - a
statement of the objectives that are to be achieved, and a model
of the situation that is to be changed. An adequate model of the
situation to be changed should indicate, therefore, how the desired
changes can be made operational. None of the job design theories
fulfils this criterion very well. It ha.s been shown above that
there is general agreement about the objectives of job design, i.e.
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about the kinds of job design changes that are considered to be
desirable. The key to the solution of this problem of translating
prescription into action appears to lie in the formulation of an
appropriate model of the situation that is to be changed. But
what attributes should such a model possess?
One of the major arguments of this thesis is that an appropriate
model for a job design theory should possess at least the following
three attributes:
(a) The model should take the organisation as a whole as the
basic unit of analysis, and not some segment of the
organisation.
(b) The model should be a normative one showing how an
organisation should function, and not a framework for a
descriptive analysis of how particular organisations function.
(c) The model should be a general one, i.e. applicable to
any type of organisation and not restricted to a particular
type of work or to a particular technology.
The reasons for suggesting that an appropriate model should possess
these attributes will be given for each attribute in turn.
(a) The model should take the organisation as a whole as the
basic unit of analysis:
Two of the five main problems discussed above arise when job
design theory does not regard the organisation as a whole
as the unit of analysis. First, there is the difficulty
of calculating the effects of particular job design changes
on other jobs and sections in an organisation. Second, there
is the related difficulty of making job design objectives
operational. Job design generally takes place at the inter¬
face between managerial and non-managerial jobs. The problem
of job design is essentially one of allocating managerial
tasks to those who perform non-managerial tasks. This is
difficult if the job designer is not aware of the totality
of tasks - managerial and non-managerial - that are available
to allocate to members of the organisation, and the relation¬
ships between these tasks. Job design theories that take
the individual job or the organisational sub-system as the
basic unit of analysis are not capable of adequately
expressing the complete range of possibilities in the situation
that is to be changed.
Three job design theories adopt on the surface a
model of the organisation as a whole. These are:
project type organisation - Miller and Rice
socio-technical system design - Emery et al
organisational design - Wild
The approach of Miller and Rice is not a true job design
theory, as noted above; it is a prescription for
organisational design based on a model that is more of a
conceptual guide to the analysis of organisation than a
detailed framework for organisational analysis and change.
Socio-technical system design is based upon an organisational
model but the approach to the implementation of the theory is
to split the organisation under analysis into operating
systems which are dealt with separately. The organisational
design approach advocated by Wild does not in fact incorporate
an organisational model tut concentrates on showing how certain
organisational characteristics (such as tasks, task relation¬
ships, work methods, work organisation etc.) can be
manipulated to produce the desired objectives. Wild (1975)
gives little indication of how this manipulation is related to
organisational design (see p.24l»above) but merely states that
orgnisational design is a necessary approach. Wild's (1975)
recommendation that an approach to the design of jobs should
take account of organisational design is here accepted. The
socio-technical system model of organisation is inappropriate
for the design of jobs because in practice it does not possess
the attribute of regarding the organisation as a whole as the
basic unit of analysis.
The model should be a normative one showing how an organisation
should function:
The design of jobs and the design of organisations are closely
interrelated as argued above. Job and organisational design
attempt to prescribe how organisations should function and
what characteristics jobs should possess. These overall
objectives imply that job design theory should be based on
normative models rather than on descriptive analyses.
Organisational change of any kind that is not based on a
model of how the organisation should function - i.e. a
normative model - can only be directed by the opinions,
assumptions and prejudices of those who are implementing the
change. The techniques that job design theories use to
implement their recommendations are heuristic; they are not
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based on organisational models that are themselves bases
for a framework of organisational analysis and change.
It should be possible to state a model of organisational
functioning in such terms that the model is not outdated by
developments; there should be some level of generality
that expresses unchanging prerequisites of effective
organisational functioning. Organisational change in the
direction of these prerequisites, whatever they may be,
will, therefore, not meet with the difficulty of calculating
the durability of particular changes as discussed above.
Change in the required direction will always be desirable.
The problem, then, is to formulate a normative model in
sufficiently general terms such that it is still appropriate
to the task of job and organisational design.
(c) The model should be a general one, i.e. applicable to any
type of organisation:
Investigation and dissemination of the results of job design
changes is hindered to the extent that job design prescriptions
and solutions are applicable only to certain types of work
or in certain types of organisation. A job design theory
that is based on a general model of organisation would to some
extent solve the problem of transferring job design knowledge
from one organisational setting to another. A model that
will apply to a chemicals processing plant and to an insurance
office must rely on terms that express types of task - managerial
and non-managerial - rather than specific task content. The
model should make no distinction between the methods of
performing certain types of task, i.e. as to whether they
should be performed by individuals, groups, machinery, or
comput ers.
Job design theory should incorporate a model of the situation
at which change is directed; the attributes that such a model
should possess and the reasons for suggesting these attributes
have now been presented. An attempt has been made to indicate how
a model that possesses these attributes will to some extent solve
the problems that current job design theories face. The following
chapter, Chapter 3» describes the development of a model that
possesses the three attributes discussed - a general, normative model
of organisational functioning.
CHAPTER 3:
SYSTEMS, CYBERNETICS AND PRODUCTION
CONTROL.
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SYSTEMS, CYBERNETICS MP PRODUCTION CONTROL
The Aim of this Chapter
It was argued, at the end of Chapter 2 above, that existing
techniques for achieving job design objectives are heuristic in nature
and are based on partial, descriptive models of organisational
functioning. It was further argued that a model appropriate for
the design of jobs should possess at least the following three
characteristics:
(a) It should be a model of an organisation as a whole and not
merely a model of part of an organisation. The model
should thus be capable of expressing a breakdown of the
"total task"* of the organisation, identifying the totality
of individual tasks that are required for the effective
functioning of the organisation.
(b) It should be a normative rather than a descriptive model;
that is, it should reflect the way in which an organisation
must function if it is to be effective, rather than provide
a description of how any particular organisation does in
fact function.
(c) It should be a general model, not bound to one organisational
type or technological setting.
The aim of this Chapter is to develop a model that possesses
these three characteristics.
Job design that goes beyond horizontal enlargement involves the
reallocation of managerial tasks to those who perform non-managerial
* This is a term used by Burns and Stalker (1961, p.97)-
tasks. One obvious starting point for job design is, therefore,
an examination of the managerial function and in particular of the
managerial tasks that are available for reallocation. In a limited
sense, the nature of specific non-managerial tasks is determined by
the nature of the business that an organisation conducts and the
technology that it uses. What this does not determine is the way
in which tasks are combined into jobs, the methods of performing
specific tasks, and the relationships between workers who perform
these tasks. But given the nature of the organisation's business,
the specific non-managerial tasks that have to be performed in the
conduct of that business are comparatively easy to identify. The
problem lies in identifying the managerial tasks that must be
performed. Job design is a process by which workers are given
supervisory/managerial tasks to perform and a job design theory
should ideally be capable of identifying the tasks that make up
the management function, and showing how these could be reallocated
to workers.
The question that is really being posed here is "what is the
nature of management?" Now a multitude of writers have attempted
to deal with this question and it is not the intention here to review
their answers. The definition that forms the foundation of this
Chapter (and of this thesis as a whole) is that management is the
organisational function concerned with information processing and
control. The term "management" is thus used here to refer to an
organisational function and not to the individuals who have been
assigned to carry it out. The use of this definition may be
justified from two points of view. First, this is a widely used
view of the nature of management. Second, it has been suggested
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that organisational control systems are a prime determinant of
organisation structure. These two points of view are examined
in more detail in the following two sections.
Management, Information Processing and Control
The view that management is a process of information processing
and control is by no means new and can be detected in the writings
of "classical" management theorists. Brech's (1965) definition
of management, for example, ascribes four elements to the process:
planning, coordination, motivation and control. Brech describes
how these four elements are related to each other in a "feedback
cycle" (Brech, 19&5, p.lU). At the planning stage of the process,
objectives are set and the means of achieving them determined. The
motivation and coordination stages of the process are concerned
respectively with stimulating loyalty and satisfactory performance
in employees and with maintaining harmony between the various work
activities of the organisation. The control stage of the process,
for Brech, concerns checking actual performance against the
objectives that were set in order to ensure that adequate progress
has been made. Information about the success or otherwise of the
operations of the organisation is then fed back to the subsequent
planning stage of the process so that improvements may be made to
overall-performance in the future. This completes Brech's
"feedback cycle". But the entire process - set objectives, operate,
measure performance against objectives, review objectives, operate,
and so on - may be regarded as a control process. "Control" is
not really a discrete part of the management process, it is the very
nature of the process as a whole.
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This view is reflected in the following statement of
Bavelas and Barrett (1951):
"It is entirely possible to view an organisation as
an elaborate system for gathering, evaluating,
recombining and disseminating information." (p.59
in Yukl and Wexley, 1971- )
The degree to which an organisation is effective in processing
information, they argue, determines the effectiveness of the
organisation as a whole. Information processing is thus a
fundamental rather than a derived aspect of organisation:
".... it is the essence of organised activity and the
basic process out of which all other functions derive.
The goals an organisation selects, the methods it
applies, the effectiveness with which it improves its
own procedures - all of these things hinge upon the
quality and availability of the information in the
system." (Bavelas and Barrett, 19515p-59 in Yukl
and Wexley, 1971-)
The division between non-managerial and managerial work
(i.e. between manual and intellectual work) can be regarded as
a division between the operations of an organisation and the control
of those operations. A number of theorists have made use of this
dichotomy. Ansoff (1969b), for example, develops a "theoretical
conception of the firm" (p.13) which is based on the distinction
between what he terms the "logistic process" and the "management
process" respectively. This distinction is illustrated in
Figure 3.1. The logistic process concerns the conversion of
resources (labour, materials, money, information) into products or
services. The management process on the other hand is concerned
with information processing and control:
"The inputs to the [management] process are the perceived
needs for modification of the logistic process; the
outputs are action instructions for changing or re¬
directing the logistic process." (Ansoff, 1969b, p.13.)
The management process controls the logistic process by measuring its
Figure3»1sAnsoff'sbasicmodelfthfi m;Ansoff,969b,p.14.
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performance and deciding how to improve or maintain that performance
as necessary. The arrows that are labelled "action needs" and
"action instructions" in Ansoff's model represent the flows of
information about the logistic process and about management process
decisions respectively.
J.G. Miller (1972) draws the same distinction, between what
he terms "matter-energy processing" and "information processing"
organisational sub-systems. Miller's objective is to derive a
taxonomy of organisation structure that will "... provide a workable
scheme by which all organisations, regardless of their structures
and particular suprasystem functions, can be related to each other
and upon which generalisations and models can be based." (Miller,
1972, p.13.) Reeves, Turner and Woodward (1970) differentiate
between "production technology" and the "administrative system"
(see p.8); Reeves and Woodward (1970) distinguish the "executive
system" from the "design and programming system" (p.1+7). These
distinctions are of course similar to that made by (E.J.) Miller
and Rice (1967) who divide the enterprise into operating systems
and managing systems. They analyse operating systems in terms
of their import - conversion - export processes and argue that
managing systems can be analysed in exactly the same way. Boundary
control, the fundamental management task, is a sub-system which
imports measurements and other data relevant to performance,
converts this information by comparing the measurements with
performance standards, and exports decisions to stop, continue
or modify the process that is being controlled.
The relationship between an organisation's operations and
its management has thus been described in a number of different
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terms. The terminology that appears to be most appropriate,
however, are "operating system" and "information processing
system" for what Ansoff has called the logistic and the management
process respectively. These terms are suitably descriptive while
maintaining a generality of application.
The design of operating system jobs has tended to rely on
studies either of the individual job or of the operating system
itself. But job design takes place at the interface between the
operating system and the information processing system and the
nature of the latter cannot, therefore, be ignored.
Organisation Structure and Control
A second reason for regarding management as an information
processing and control function lies in the hypothesised relation¬
ship between the control system and the structure of an organisation.
The late Joan Woodward's celebrated study of the organisation
structures of firms in South Essex claimed to have established a
causal link between the technology employed in production and certain
aspects of organisational structure and behaviour (Woodward, 1965).
Woodward's results were based on a typology of manufacturing
technology ranging on a scale of complexity from unit and small
batch production, through medium to large batch production and
component assembly, to continuous process production. Organisation
structure (e.g. levels of authority, ratio of supervisory to non-
supervisory staff) and certain aspects of organisational behaviour
(e.g. managerial attitudes, tone of industrial relations) appeared
to be related to production technology in a more consistent and
predictable way at the extremes of the scale; but firms in the
intermediate points (i.e. medium to large batch production and
component assembly) proved more difficult to analyse. Woodward's
research group thus turned its attention to firms in the centre of
the scale of technological complexity in an attempt to refine their
analysis of technological variables to a point where differences in
organisational structure and behaviour in this group of firms could
be more satisfactorily explained. (See Woodward, 1970a.)
Recognising that in many instances the technology (i.e. the tools,
machinery and other equipment) used in this type of production is
not rigidly determined by the task in hand and that management can
generally exercise considerable choice in the matter, the research
team were led to study the ways in which manufacturing tasks are
controlled, and hence to analyse the relationship between technology
and control.
Considerable problems arose in measuring and classifying
technological variables in a way that would make valid inter-firm
comparisons possible. A number of avenues were followed without
success, but one "common thread" did appear to run through most of
the work that had been done. This common thread was the concept
of variety. Production tasks differ in the amounts of variety
that they are capable of generating and this appeared to be the
one underlying variable which could explain differences in patterns
of behaviour, not only between firms in the centre of the scale of
technological complexity, but across the whole range:
"The variety might depend upon the nature of the product,
the nature of the market or the nature of the manufacturing
processes themselves, but looking on it from the point of
view of the constraints in the work environment, variety,
whatever its cause, seemed to have similar effects on
patterns of behaviour." (Rackham and Woodward, 1970,
p.30. Cybernetic theory uses the term "variety" in a
rather different way, and this is defined below.)
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In other words, the "technical system" creates variety, which leads
to uncertainty and unpredictability, which the "social system" then
has to cope with. (These are the terms used by the research group.)
The relationship between technology and organisational structure
and behaviour, therefore, is affected by the degree of uncertainty
and unpredictability in the production task (Rackham and Woodward,
1970, p.35). This conclusion produced the hypothesis that
".... organisational structure is not so much a function of
technology as a function of the control system...." (Reeves and
Woodward, 1970, p.37). Where production technology is the main
determinant of the control system, as is likely to be the case in
both unit and continuous process production, organisational structure
and behaviour tend to be more consistent and predictable. Where
there is a choice of technology for performing the manufacturing
operations, there will also be a choice of control systems, and
organisational structure and behaviour become less consistent and
predictable. Management in batch production thus has a wider choice
of control procedures to adopt, and the control system in this type
of firm is more likely to reflect the attitudes and beliefs of top
management than to be determined by technology (Woodward, 1970a, p.xi).
Control, therefore, is an intervening variable affecting the link
between technology and organisational structure and behaviour. This
conclusion helps to explain the anomalies in the results of the
original South Essex study concerning the firms in the centre of
the scale of technological complexity.
The research of Woodward et al thus suggests that there are
identifiable relationships between (a) the technology of an operating
system, (b) the nature of the information processing system, and
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(c) organisational structure and behaviour. In medium and large
batch production and in component assembly, the information processing
system (i.e. the control system) is not rigidly determined by
technology and the opposite may in certain instances be true. The
dependence of job and organisational design upon the nature of the
information processing system is, therefore, considerable.
Cybernetics and Control
".... if we wish to think about control in the firm we
should use a control system as a model."
(Beer, 1972, p.112. )
In thinking about management as an information processing and
control function, it is natural to turn to the field of cybernetics
for assistance. Cybernetics is the science of "control and
communication in the animal and the machine" (Weiner, 19*+7)- The
name is derived from the Greek "kybernetique", and occurs frequently
in the work of Plato, meaning "the art of steersmanship". It was
also used by Ampere (in 183*0 to describe the study of means of
government; the French translation is "cybernetique". Unaware of
these earlier uses of the word the American mathematician Norbert
Wiener believed that he had coined the word cybernetics, giving it
the meaning cited above. His choice of word was influenced by
James Watt's mechanical regulator, called a "governor", and by
Maxwell's theoretical analysis of "The Theory of Governors" (published
in 1868). (See Guilbaud, 1959-)
/
Cybernetics is concerned with control of systems, animate and
inanimate. The central hypothesis of cybernetics is that the basic
nature of the process of control is independent of the type of system
being controlled. Whether the system is animate or inanimate, social
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or economic, the nature of its control may be described and analysed
in the same terms.
Development of systems and cybernetic theories has been
influenced by the realisation of the enormous complexity of
apparently simple systems. For example, if the relationships
between each pair of a group of seven people are to be described as
either "friendly" or "hostile", there will be a total of
1,000,000,000,000 different possible states that their relationships
can adopt.* The cybernetic term for this complexity is "variety"
which is defined as the number of distinct elements (in the above
example, states of relationships) in the system. This affects
system control in a fundamental way; the controller must be able
to deal with any state that the system is capable of entering, if
control is to be effective. In other words, the controller must
be able to generate as much variety as the system being controlled;
".... only variety can destroy variety" (Ashby, 1956, p.207;
see also Beer, 1959, p.50). This has been called by Ashby "The
Law of Requisite Variety".
Stafford Beer (1959) suggests that systems can be classified
(a) as either simple, complex or exceedingly complex, and (b) as
either deterministic or probabilistic. Cybernetics then is
concerned with control in exceedingly complex, probabilistic systems.
* There are 7 people, therefore there are n(n-l)= 42 relationships
to consider. Each relationship can be in one of 2 possible
states, friendly or hostile, so the total number of possible
states of their relationships is -
22 > io12'5 > 1,000,000,000,000.
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The popular notion of control, involving the use of force or coercion,
has no place in cybernetic theory which deals rather with the
arrangements whereby systems move towards optimum performance through
self regulation. Certain natural systems - the human body and
higher forms of animal life are examples - are able to modify their
behaviour on the basis of past experience, either to maintain or to
improve conditions that are favourable to them in some respect. In
nature, control mechanisms are "homeostatic" rather than "autocratic"
and cybernetics, therefore, deals with the former.
A homeostat is a device that holds a variable within desired
limits by a self regulatory mechanism. The homeostat incorporates
a measuring device which activates a compensatory mechanism that
moves a variable back towards the required level as it begins to
move away from this level. Control in the homeostat operates
automatically as the system begins to go out of control. The
measuring device monitors the changing level of the variable under
control and the output or performance of the system is fed back to
the measuring device and so operates the compensatory mechanism
when necessary. "Feedback", therefore, is the basis of self
regulation. This arrangement is illustrated in Figure 3.2 which
indicates the four basic components of the process of control:
1. a receptor which continuously measures performance;
2. a control apparatus or comparator which determines the
difference between actual and desired performance;
3. an effector which rectifies deviations from desired performance;
U. feedback, of the system's output or performance, which






The arrows in Figure 3.2 represent information flows - messages about
the current state of the variable under control, messages about
the action required to restore it to the norm, messages about how
successful this action has been, and so on. The homeostat
(thermostat) that controls domestic heating systems operates in
precisely this manner. Feedback does not manifest itself in the
domestic thermostat in the form of wires or tubes or other mechanical
contrivances; the arrow labelled "feedback" in Figure 3.2
represents the concept of using information about a system's out¬
put to affect subsequent outputs. With the domestic thermostat
it is the temperature of the air in the house that is both output
and input of the system.
Feedback control is not switched on and off by some external
agency. It is activated by the system itself as it goes out of
control. A further fundamental characteristic of feedback control
is that it acts not against a given disturbance or set of disturbances
to the system but against all manner of disturbances including
those whose causes are unknown and those which could not have been
predicted by the system designer. Thus:
"Arrangements are not made to record every possible
state of the system and every best answer to every state.
Arrangements are instead made to ensure that the system will
be able to find, or to learn to find, the answers to
problems it is set." (Beer, 1966, p.302.)
Systems that have this capability are called "ultrastable systems"
(Beer, 1966, p.291; the concept is Ashby's, 1956). An ultra-
stable system can return to its normal state of functioning after
having been disturbed in a manner not predicted by its designer.
The domestic thermostat can restore the house temperature regardless
of what has altered it. (Catastrophe aside, that is: it could
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clearly not cope with another ice age or with the house burning
down, although it could cope with someone bringing blocks of ice
into the house, or with an indoor barbecue.)
Figure 3.2 illustrates the basic, general cybernetic concept
of control. It can be used to describe and analyse a variety of
control mechanisms in mechanical, organic, social and economic
systems (see for example the discussion in Weiner, 1950). The
province of cybernetics may now be defined as including exceedingly
complex, probabilistic systems of a self regulating nature.
Management Cybernetics
A number of writers have suggested that cybernetic models of
control can be usefully applied to the study of (usually large)
organisations. This view has led to the development of what is
now called "management cybernetics" (George, 1971, Chapter 10,
and Beer, 1959, 1966 and 1972). Examples of the use of cybernetic
models of organisation include:
1. The analysis of internal communication networks (Churchman,
Ackoff and Arnoff, 1957).
2. The analysis of organisational adaptation to change
(Cadwallader, 1959).
3- The analysis of the effect of information feedbacks on
the pursuit of specific organisational objectives
(Haberstroh, i960).
Cadwallader further claims that a cybernetic approach to organisational
modelling focuses attention on a number of areas:
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"l. the quantity and variety of information in the
system;
2. the structure of the communication network;
3. the pattern of the subsystems within the whole;
U. the number, location and function of negative
feedback loops in the system and the amount of
time-lag in them;
5. the nature of the system's memory facility;
6. the operating rules or programme determining the
system's structure and behavior." (Cadwallader,
1959, p.U39.)
Miller and Rice (1967) found cybernetic models of organisational
control useful in analysing alterations in the power and authority
structure of a steel works faced with changing environmental
conditions. Changes in the market for steel rendered the company
strategy of maximising production inappropriate and led to the
introduction of two new strategies - maximising customer satisfaction
and conserving resources. These new strategies, argue Miller and
Rice, each required a different mode of control. The strategy
of resource conservation, for example, required a "segmented control
system", illustrated in Figure 3.3. The higher order system is
here responsible for overall review of performance standards while
the lower order unit control systems measure performance, compare
this with the standard, and make any necessary alterations to the
operation. The strategy of maximising customer satisfaction,
on the other hand, required an "integrated cybernetic model" of
control, illustrated in Figure 3.*+. Here each unit is not permitted
to concentrate on attainment of its own standards but the enterprise
Figure3.3>Se ment dcon rolsys m;Mill raRic ,1967p.240.
Figure3*4»Integratedcyberneticcontrolmo el;Kill rdRic ,1967<p.241.
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as a whole is related to the changing external environment. Both
these models are elaborations of the basic feedback concept
illustrated in Figure 3.2 above.
The application of cybernetics to the study of the management
function is not explored further by Miller and Rice, but this topic
has been pursued in some depth and over a prolonged period by
Stafford Beer (now at the University of Manchester Business School).
An attempt is made here to summarise his theory of management
cybernetics. The sources that are used (he has published
extensively) are his three main books on the subject: "Cybernetics
and Management" (Beer, 1959)? "Decision and Control" (Beer,
1966) and "Brain of the Firm" (Beer, 1972). Cybernetics has
been defined as the study of exceedingly complex, probabilistic,
self regulating systems. Industrial and social systems, however,
tend not to meet all these criteria, but it is Beer's contention that
such systems, in order to be effective, should be designed as
cybernetic systems. His main concern lies with describing how
this can be done (see Beer, 1959, p.23).
Natural systems are frequently self regulating; they teach
themselves to operate in the most effective way through time. Beer
thus states that:
"It is a primary aim of industrial cybernetics to harness
this ability of a system to teach itself optimum behaviour.
To do it, however, we must know how to design the system
as a machine - for - teaching - itself. There must be
exactly the right flow of information in the right places;
rich interconnectivity; facilities for the growth of
feedbacks and so on." (Beer, 1959, p.57.)
The problem of control lies in coping with variety, and self
regulation and variety reduction both require information. It is
information that "kills" variety and cybernetic systems are usually
systems for handling information. Effective control cannot be
achieved by attempting to enumerate all the possible states of a
system, or even the most important ones, because the number of such
states is enormous. Any system of organisation management that
does not take this into account will be highly inefficient. In
Beer's words, ".... cybernetics is the science of control,
management is the profession of control ...." (Beer, 1966, p.239).
The basic nature of the control process is common to all types
of system. Beer describes how "... cybernetics is actually done
by comparing models of complex systems with each other and seeking
the control features which appear common to them all" (Beer, 1972,
p.112). By looking at an example of control which has been shown
to be eminently successful, argues Beer, one gains insight into
the structure of effective control. Beer chooses to consider the
human nervous system as an example of successful control - of
"good management par excellence" (Beer, 1972, p.115). Comparing
a model of the way in which the human body is organised and
controlled with the management of an enterprise, should indicate the
deficiencies of the latter and suggest ways of overcoming them.
Beer's model of the nervous system comprises a five level hierarchy
of "control echelons" that are serially arranged on a "vertical
command axis" that represents the spinal column. This division
into five levels Beer admits, is arbitrary (1972, p.128), but he
claims that this seems to reflect the major functional differences
that are involved. Beer's model is shown in Figure 3.5.
Beer contends that this control hierarchy is a fairly accurate
analogue of a firm's management hierarchy and that the functional
























Figure 3«8» The human nervous a.ystem as a five tier hierarchy of
control; B~eer, 1972, p. 129.
reflected in the functional differentiation between levels of
management. Control echelon 1 corresponds to first line super¬
vision; control echelon 5 corresponds to the Board of Directors.
In the body, echelon 5 is the cerebral cortex and this explains the
title of Beer's "Brain of the Firm" (1972).
Beer is concerned with analysing existing management structure
and with showing how it may be made to work more effectively. The
criterion of success (given that the ultimate goal is organisational
survival) is effectiveness of information handling or effectiveness
of control. This is a descriptive model; Beer states that
".... it is contended that all viable organisations are really like
this already" (1972, p.198). Beer's model is not, therefore,
appropriate for the design of jobs. In fact his model provides a
rationale for existing hierarchical organisation structures. To
reject this model of the human nervous system as a prototype of
effective organisational control is not to reject the fundamental
cybernetic hypothesis that the process of control is invariable.
Models of Production Control
A number of writers have taken the simple feedback mechanism
of Figure 3.2 as a building block for models of production control.
One example is the "enterprise model" developed by Boyd (1966) and
shown in Figure 3.6. Boyd's enterprise model distinguishes three
levels of control (as opposed to Beer's five levels). Each level
of control determines the activities of the level below, and this
model thus represents a three level hierarchy of control.of control.
Strategic planning, in Boyd's model, deals with overall directional
control of the enterprise and works on an annual time scale. Tacti
KIVIROMiSHT
figure 3°6t The hierarchy of enterprise control; Bo.yd, 1966, p. 364
in Starr, 1970.
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planning is concerned with the means of achieving the goals set
at the strategic level and works on a monthly time scale. Operating
control is concerned with .the direct control of the physical
operations on a daily basis. Boyd claims that this type of model
has several advantages:
1. No distinction is made between manual and automated
information flows, or between human and machine decisions;
2. It is applicable to all levels of the management hierarchy
and to all staff activities;
3. It presents a realistic view of management objectives;
U. It is the type of model that users - i.e. managers -
can understand and appreciate.
The concept of control of control is also discussed by Eilon
who defines it as:
".... a mechanism that measures, monitors and responds
to information about the performance of a controller.
In other words, it evaluates the actions and behaviour
of a control procedure and acts in order to improve it."
(Eilon, 1966.)
Bridgeman and Green (1966) similarly describe how "nested control
loops" within an enterprise reflect the exercise of control over
different time spans. Overall control (Boyd's strategic control)
would normally be exercised by a Board of Directors whose decisions
may determine the functioning of the organisation over a period of
years. Within this "outer control loop" there are others operating
on shorter time scales; a foreman may be responsible for performance
over an eight hour shift.
The model of production control shown in Figure 3.7 is one
used in production planning at Serck Audco (Ransom and Toms, 1968).
Two levels of control are identified here, operational planning and
Figure3.7:Productioncontrolcycle-Ser kAudco;Ra s ma dToms,1968v.22.
policy review. These appear to correspond to Boyd's operating
and tactical levels of control respectively.
A further example may be drawn from the work of Alcalay and
Buffa (1966) in developing a detailed model of a general production
control system. Their aim was to derive a mathematical statement
of the optimisation of a general production system and their model
is shown in Figure 3.8. This model is similar to that of Boyd,
depicting the management function again as a three tier hierarchy
of control of control. The three tiers in the Alcalay and Buffa
model are policy formulating, forecasting and planning, and day to
day control.
Examples of policy formulation include decisions concerning:
• selection and design of products,
• selection and design of equipment and processes,
• system location,
• facility layout.
Examples of planning decisions include:
• system maintenance and reliability,
• cost control,
• inventory control.
There are a number of operational aspects of a production system to
consider, but the control process is the same regardless of the
factor being controlled. Day to day control of stocks of finished
goods, for example, consists of:
• measuring the stock level,
• comparing the actual level with the norm,
• reordering a standard quantity if stocks are too low.
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Figure 3.8s General structure of control of a production system;
Alcalay and Buffa? 1966, p. 308 in Starr, 1970; Buffa?
1969, p.4821
This represents a basic day to day feedback loop which adjusts
stocks. In time it may become apparent that the standard reorder
quantity requires adjustment, perhaps because orders are frequently
not completed to schedule. This adjustment is made, at the fore¬
casting and planning level, i.e. the "optimum control system"
would be altered with a new figure for standard reorder quantity
in place of the previous one.
Decisions taken at the policy formulating level depend partly
•on information from the environment of the organisation, and partly
on information passed up from the forecasting and planning level.
Thus the decision to modify product design or to stop making a
particular product would be made at this level.
The model of Alcalay and Buffa also shows how the control
process receives inputs (a) from "other organisation systems", and
(b) from outside the organisation in the form of"general pertinent
information" and "incoming orders". Information from other
organisation systems is seen as input to the day to day and fore¬
casting and planning control loops. Information from outside the
organisation is seen as input to the forecasting and planning and
policy formulating control loops.
Together these models indicate, therefore, that the management
function can be regarded as a three tier hierarchy of control of
control, i.e. as a hierarchy of feedback control loops. None of
the above models was formulated, even indirectly, for the purpose
of job design, but as models of the management function as an
information processing and control function they approach the
expression of the "total task" of that function and this is one of
the attributes appropriate for a theory of job design.
Production Control and Workers' Control
The work of Boyd and of Alcalay and Buffa in the field of
production control resembles in certain important respects the work
of Neil Chamberlain concerning workers' control. In his book,
"The Union Challenge to Management Control", Chamberlain (19^8)
identified "three distinct phases of doing business" or three
"management functions" at which the union challenge that he was
describing could be directed. These three "management functions"
are essentially those identified by Boyd and by Alcalay and Buffa.
Emphasis has been placed here on the invariant nature of the
process of control, and it is interesting that Chamberlain should
give the following quotation from Oliver Sheldon*:
"Whether capital be supplied by individuals or by the
State, whether labour be by hand or by machine, whether
the workers assume a wide control over industry or are
subjected to the most autocratic power, the function
of management remains constant." (from Chamberlain,
19^8, p.20).
The three constant phases, or functions, of management that
Chamberlain identifies are direction, administration and execution.
Direction concerns the definition of overall objectives, or
what A.K. Rice (1958) would call establishing the primary task of
the enterprise: ".... the definition of objectives, the
determination of what is to be done" (Chamberlain, 19^8, p.22).
The ultimate criterion for such a decision depends upon whether or
not a higher authority in the enterprise can set it aside. If
a decision can be so set aside, then it is not direction by
Chamberlain's definition. The function of direction is normally
carried out by the Board of Directors.
* The Philosophy of Management, Pitman, 192*1, p.*+8.
Administration is the function that determines how to carry out
the objectives set by the direction function. Administration,
therefore, is constrained by direction although it "operates
within a framework of discretion" (Chamberlain, 19^8, p.23) in
choosing between alternative methods of satisfying overall objectives
Administration does not constitute a source of final authority and
decisions made at this level may be overruled by the direction
function.
Execution is the function responsible for ensuring that the
decisions made at the administration level are carried out:
"If direction determines what is to be done and
administration establishes how it is to be done,
execution is responsible for seeing that it is done."
(Chamberlain, 19^8, p.2l+).
Execution, in constrast to the other two levels, is distinguished
by an almost complete absence of discretion.
Chamberlain also includes "a note on coordination as a
management function" (Chamberlain, 19^+8, p.27). Coordination
is carried out in conjunction with each of the three management
functions described and is, therefore, not given the status of an
independent management function by Chamberlain. This topic is
explored in further detail below.
More recently, writing about worker participation in general
- from job enrichment to worker directors - Thomason notes
Chamberlain's work, claiming that the three levels of management
that he identified ".... are capable of providing us with all the
schema that we need to organise thinking about 'participation'"
(Thomason, 1973, p.138). The section that follows may thus be
regarded as an exploration of this claim made by Thomason.
A Model of Organisational Information Processing and Control
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It is now possible to formulate a model of organisational
information processing that fulfills the three criteria stated at
the beginning of this Chapter. If it is to be appropriate for
job and organisational design, the model must be:
(a) a model of the organisation as a whole;
(b) a normative model; i.e. a model of how organisational
information processing and control must be carried out if
this is to be effective; and
(c) a general model, not restricted to one type of organisation.
The model presented here is based principally upon the work of Boyd,
Alcalay and Buffa, and Chamberlain that has been discussed above.
It appears both necessary and sufficient to regard the
management function as a three tier hierarchy of control of control.
The terminology that has been used to describe these three levels
has varied from author to author. The terminology that appears to
be most appropriate, and which will be used here, is given in
Figure 3-9 which illustrates the basic three tier hierarchy of
organisational control. The term "operating system" is taken
from Miller and Rice (1967) in recognition of the fact that the
model applies not only to production systems. The model as a whole
is based on the simple feedback control loop and the arrowed lines
represent information flows and feedbacks between each of the levels
of control, between the lowest level of control (routine control)
and the operating system, and between the enterprise as a whole
and its environment.






Figure 3.9s The three tier hierarchy of organisational control.
planning, what Alcalay and Buffa call policy formulation and what
Chamberlain calls direction. It is assumed, a priori, that any
enterprise has one overriding goal - survival. Primary decisions
are defined here as decisions which determine:
1. The task or tasks of the enterprise; what products are to
be made and/or what services are to be provided.
2. The financial resources to be used in achieving the task or
tasks of the enterprise.
These two sets of primary decisions determine the framework within
which control at the planning level takes place.
"Planning" is essentially what Boyd calls tactical planning,
what Alcalay and Buffa call forecasting and planning and what
Chamberlain calls administration. Planning is defined here as the
determination of how the task or tasks of the enterprise are best
achieved given the resources that are to be available. Control at
the planning level thus determines how the operating system or
operating systems of the enterprise will function, and how these
operating systems will be controlled. Planning control thus
establishes the performance standards which the operating systems
are to work to, and which the routine control level is to monitor.
"Routine control" is essentially what Boyd calls operating
control, what Alcalay and Buffa call day-to-day control, and what
Chamberlain calls execution. Routine control is defined here as
the day-to-day monitoring and adjustment of the operating system in
accordance with the standards and procedures established at the
planning level. The planning level of control may determine the
expected weekly output of a machine and how this is to be measured.
Routine control is thus concerned with measuring the output of the
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machine and determining how to increase or reduce that output if it
deviates from the standard. In any operating system there will be
a number of factors that the routine control function must monitor.
In a production system, these will include:




• allocation of tasks
• size of the work force
• layout of facilities
• hours of work
• maintenance of equipment
• material wastage.
Routine control is distinguished from the other two levels of control
by the fact that decisions made at this level do not result in
change. Only primary and planning decisions can alter the routine
control function or the operating system. Routine control works
within the framework established at the planning level.
The three tier hierarchy of control of control illustrated in
Figure 3-9 has the following three configurational properties:
1. Each level is a "controller" in its own right. It operates
by measuring the performance of the level below, comparing
actual with desired performance, deciding what action should
be taken, and passing on instructions to ensure that this
action is taken.
2. Each level constrains the area of freedom of the level below.
Primary decisions constrain the area within which planning
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is carried out; planning decisions constrain the routine
control function.
3. Each level operates continuously, if on different time
scales. Primary decisions may have only been taken once,
but they must be under continuous review, and must be altered
as information from the planning level and from the environment
of the enterprise may indicate. Planning decisions and
routine control decisions must be reviewed constantly in
a similar manner. Primary decisions may constrain the
activities of the enterprise over a number of years,
planning decisions may also constrain activities over a
period of years, and routine control is likely to be
concerned with daily, weekly or monthly performance.
It is possible to regard the relationship between the enter¬
prise and the environment as such that the output of one is the
input of the other. This relationship is illustrated in Figure
3-10. The primary decision to obtain more financial resources will
take the price of money into account; the planning decision to re-
equip a department with automatic machines may depend partly on the
availability and price of the machinery and partly on the availability
and price of labour; the routine control decision to replenish stocks
of material will take into account the reliability of each of the
possible vendors. Information about the environment of the enter¬
prise may be regarded as input to each of the three levels of control.
In an enterprise that has more than one operating system, the
problem of coordination arises. The large enterprise may have a
number of operating systems, such as:
• production departments,
organisation availablemachinery manpower ordersreceived stocks workinprogress etc»
ENVIRONMENT






• marketing and distribution,
• personnel,
• accounting,
• research, development and design.
The hierarchy of organisational control shown in Figure 3.9 will apply
to each operating system, but coordination between the respective
control hierarchies is necessary. Coordination may be regarded as
an exchange of information between the control hierarchies of
different operating systems. This is illustrated in Figure 3-11-
In particular, coordination may be regarded as the process of
transmitting information concerning the action decisions of one
controller to another controller or controllers. This is illustrated
in detail in Figure 3.12 which also indicates that this information
exchange is mutual. Where there are three or more operating
systems with three or more control hierarchies, each level of
control in each control hierarchy will transmit information to and
receive information from all other controllers at that level concern¬
ing their respective action decisions.
As a whole, this model states that if information processing
and control in an organisation is to be effective, an identifiable
set of control and coordination tasks must be carried out. These
tasks taken together constitute the management function. The complete
model of organisational information processing and control is shown
in Figure 3-13; only two operating systems and their respective
control hierarchies are illustrated in Figure 3-13, but the model is
easily extended to take account of any number of operating systems.
This model, therefore, provides a framework for analysing the
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Figure 3.11: Coordination in the hierarchy of organisational control.





"total task" of an enterprise, the tasks of the operating system
and the tasks of the information processing system. This is a model
of the organisation as a whole. The model gives no indication as
to who or what should carry out either the tasks of the operating
system or the tasks of the information processing system. This
model can "be used, therefore, to analyse any type of organisation
of any size and is, therefore, a general model.
This model possesses the three characteristics considered to
"be appropriate for the purposes of job and organisational design.
Nothing has been said up to this point about how tasks should be
allocated to members of an organisation because this model on its
own gives no indication as to how this should be done. The following
Chapter attempts to show how job characteristics that have come to
be regarded as desirable can be made operational using this model.
CHAPTER b:
TOWARDS A GENERAL THEORY OF JOB MP
ORGANISATIONAL DESIGN.
20 6.
TOWARDS A GENERAL THEORY OF JOB MP ORGANISATIONAL DESIGN
The Aim of this Chapter
At the end of Chapter 2 above, a number of conclusions concerning
the current status of job design theories were presented. It was
argued that while there appears to be wide agreement over the
objectives of job design, none of the current theories adequately
solves the problem of making these objectives operational, that
is of translating prescription into action. In Chapter 3 above,
an attempt was made to develop a general model of organisational
information processing and control, and it was argued that this
model provides an appropriate framework for operationalising job
design objectives. This type of model was considered to be
appropriate for two principal reasons:
1. The function of management can be conceptualised as an
information processing and control function, and
2. Since job design takes place at the interface between
managerial and non-managerial tasks, a method of analysing
managerial tasks is a necessary basis for implementing
job design.
It is the aim of this Chapter to develop a general theory of
job and organisational design based on the information processing
and control model described above. But it is necessary first to
examine in detail how specific job design objectives, i.e. desirable
job characteristics, can be made operational. Some of these
objectives are more easily made operational than others. It is
probably easier to give a job more "variety" than it is to increase
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its "task identity". The model of organisational information
processing and control described above, however, has properties in
common with psychological theories of skill performance and learning
that are also based on cybernetic concepts. So it is to the
desirable job characteristics "feedback" and "continuous learning"
that attention is first directed here.
Feedback and the Performance of Skill
Models of man as an information processor are now commonplace
in psychology, certainly amongst "cognitive" as opposed to
"stimulus-response" psychologists (see the brief discussion on
p.119 above). If one piece of work is to be singled out as having
contributed most to this development, it is undoubtedly that of
Miller, Galanter and Pribram (i960). Their work is outlined below.
One area in which the concept of man as an information processor is
of fundamental importance concerns theories of skilled performance.
To the psychologist the word "skill" means a great deal more
than everyday use of the word implies. Universal human abilities
such as walking, breathing, talking, scratching and so on are
regarded as skills by the psychologist, and these skills can be
shown to have characteristics in common with what are popularly
regarded as skills, such as playing tennis or rock climbing.
Skilled performance appears to possess three major characteristics:
1. it involves an organised sequence of activities;
2. it is purposive; and
3. it is dependent upon feedback.
(Fitts and Posner, 196?, pp.1-2.)
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The nature of the feedback that the performer requires varies
with the skill being exhibited, but:
almost every act is dependent upon comparison either
of feedback with input, so that he may determine the
appropriateness of his previous responses, or a comparison
of progress toward a goal with some conception of what
is desired." (Fitts and Posner, 1967, P-3.)
Feedback dependency thus extends to the performance of universal
skills as well as to special learned skills. It is difficult
and frequently impossible to carry out the simplest perceptual-
motor tasks without adequate feedback. Stratton's experiments
in the late 1890s with spectacles that inverted the retinal image
of the wearer illustrated the necessity for adequate visual
feedback (see Annett, 1969, p.19)- A great deal of practice is
required before the wearer can overcome this disruption to normal
visual feedback, and move around a room without bumping into
furniture. The difference between the wearer of these spectacles
and a blind person is that the former is still receiving visual
feedback of a sort. Similarly, delayed auditory feedback makes
speech inordinately difficult. This can be demonstrated using
a tape recorder with a second playback head displaced from the
record head so that the speaker hears his recorded voice through
headphones a second after he has spoken. This arrangement quickly
induces slurring of speech, a reduction in speed, increase in
pitch and intensity and stuttering (see Annett, 1969, pp.l9~20).
Performance of the simplest universal skills as well as of the
most complex learned skills, is dependent, therefore, upon adequate
feedback.
309-
Feedback and the Learning of Skill
Not only is performance dependent upon feedback, the learning
of a skill is generally difficult or impossible in its absence.
Thorndike's "law of exercise" in its original formulation stated
that the probability of an act being performed correctly increased
with practice or exercise (see Hilgard and Bower, 1975, p.33).
A number of repetitive skills such as rote memorising and muscular
skills may be explained in this way. Thorndike, however, eventually
altered his view of the law of exercise. The type of experiment
used to disprove the original formulation of the law were those in
which repetition took place without feedback. Thus, asking
someone to draw lines three inches long on paper while blindfold
does not lead to any improvement in performance over any length of
time, however protracted. When the person is informed after each
attempt whether the line that he has just drawn is too long or too
short, performance does begin to improve. The law of exercise is
thus restated rather than repealed; repetition of "connections" -
that is repetition with feedback - improves performance,but repetition
of "situations" does not (see Hilgard and Bower, 1975, p.39)>
The acquisition of skill thus requires information processing
of some kind on the part of the learner. This information processing
is concerned with the objectives of the learner and the consequences
of actions made in the pursuit of those objectives. Feedback
can thus be seen as contributing more to the process of learning
than the correction of preceeding actions. Fitts and Posner (1967,
p.28) argue that feedback serves three functions in providing:




If a skill is to be learned, knowledge of the results of each
attempt must be available. But feedback also provides reinforcement
in that responses, or attempts to perform, that are seen to be
successful are more likely to occur again than responses that have
failed. Fitts and Posner argue further that:
"Much of the incentive which motivates the activities of
man comes from the consequences of his own movement.
If behaviour is goal directed, then the successful
approach to the goal can serve to sustain behaviour."
(Fitts and Posner, 1967, p.27)
Feedback thus provides more than knowledge of results and reinforce¬
ment of successful attempts, it has a motivational component as
well.
Examining the development of motor skills in children,
Connolly (197*0 presents the "model of skill" shown here in Figure
*+.1. Connolly's illustrations of this model concentrate on motor
skills but he emphasises that the process ".... has obvious
similarities to other cognitive activities, to problem solving,
concept formation and aspects of perception" (Connolly, 197*+?
p.5*+0). The problem of skill learning and performance, he argues,
is the problem of translating a plan of intention into a programme
of action. Thus for motor skills:
"The plan is expressed via the effector organs in
movements and postures the success and adequacy of
which must be evaluated in relation to the plan.
This brings in the notion of feedback." (Connolly,
197*t, p. 538)
There are two types of feedback in Connolly's model:
1. through the musculature and other senses (intrinsic feedback),
and
2. through knowledge of the consequences of the actions (extrinsic
change
Figure4.1:Thebasiclo icalcompon ntsfasyst mwithfeedb ckco trol- usedtoexplainmotorbehaviour;fr mConn lly,1974P»539«
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feedback).
The plan "instructs" the effector organs - muscles - which produce
the behaviour required, in this case a particular motor skill.
The results of this behaviour upon the environment are picked up
by the receptor mechanisms (extrinsic feedback) and this along with
information about the state of the effectors themselves (intrinsic
feedback) is sent to the comparator. The comparator, also working
under instructions from the plan, decides upon the appropriate
corrective action to take for the next attempt. This model of
skill is, therefore, based on the simple feedback control mechanism
illustrated in Chapter 3, in Figure 3.2.
Feedback and Behaviour
These attempts to explain the processes of skill performance
and learning in terms of information processing reflect models of
human behaviour as a whole that are based on the same concepts.
Any human behaviour that is purposive can be interpreted in the
same terms used to describe skill performance and learning. For
example, Mackay's (1956) "information flow model of human behaviour"
is shown in Figure b.2. This model contains, Mackay argues, the
minimum requirements of an information flow system that is to
exhibit purposive behaviour. There are clear similarities between
this model of human goal-guided behaviour and Connolly's model of
skill described above; these models are again both based on the
simple feedback control mechanism (Figure 3-2).
The classic attempt to base a theory of human behaviour on
cybernetic concepts is that of Miller, Galanter and Pribram (i960)
whose book "Plans and the Structure of Behaviour" has become
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F - the line upon which X and Y are assumed to lie.
X - the desired (ie goal-guided) activity.
Y - the present activity.
R - the receptor system.
G - the control system.
E - the effector system, the "active agent".
Figure 4.2: The minimum requirements for goal-guided activity;
fromMackay, 19^6, p.360.
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a classic in the current Zeitgeist of cognitive psychology..."
(Hilgard and Bower, 1975* p.l48). As a cognitive theory it endows
man with some kind of "internal representation" or "schema" of
himself and of his environment. This schema, it is postulated,
is used in a purposive way to determine behaviour. The name that
Miller, Galanter and Pribram give to this internal representation of
the world is "Image":
"The Image is all the accumulated, organised knowledge that
the organism has about itself and its world." (Miller,
Galanter and Pribram, i960, p.17)
The problem to which Miller et al direct their attention concerns
how this Image becomes translated into behaviour. They suggest
that a "Plan" is necessary, a set of instructions analagous to a
computer programme that guides and controls the required behaviour.
(Connolly's (197M model of skill outlined above is based on the work
of Miller, Galanter and Pribram.)
Human behaviour is normally capable of being described on a
number of different levels. The behaviour of a high-jumper for
example may be described:
• in terms of the biochemical changes taking place in
his blood and muscle tissues;
• in terms of physiological responses such as heartbeat,
blood flow and oxygen demand;
• in terms of his gross motor actions, concerned with
running and jumping;
• in terms of winning a medal for the highest jump of
the contest.
An adequate account of behaviour, argue Miller et al, should, therefore,
describe all levels simultaneously:
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"The point is that we do not want to pick one level and
argue that it is somehow better than the others; the
complete description must include all levels. Otherwise,
the configurational properties of the behavior will be
lost." (Miller, Galanter and Pribram, i960, p.13)
The organisation of human behaviour, they argue, is hierarchical and
may be illustrated by an analogy with a computer programme in which
instructional routines and sub-routines can be hierarchically
"nested". Their definition of "Plan", therefore, is as follows:
".... any hierarchical process in the organism that can
control the order in which a sequence of oj^erations is to
be performed." (Miller, Galanter and Pribram, i960, p.l6)
Miller, Galanter and Pribram argue further that accounts of
behaviour must be based on recognisable, elementary units of
behaviour, "... something that a psychologist can use as a biologist
uses cells, or a physicist uses atoms ..." (Miller, Galanter and
Pribram, i960, p.21). The classic fundamental unit of analysis in











of the reflex arc
is dependent on antecedent stimuli to set it
in motion; it describes behaviour in purely
reactive terms. Neural tissue, however, is
active rather than simply reactive, and is not
dependent upon outside excitation to put it
into action. As an explanation of purposive
human behaviour, the reflex arc is inadequate.
Behaviour, argue Miller, Galanter and Pribram,
is determined not just by stimuli but by
comparisons between what is actually happening
and what should be happening. They call this
comparison a "Test":
the response of the effector depends upon the
outcome of the test and is most conveniently conceived
as an effort to modify the outcome of the test."
(Miller, Galanter and Pribram, i960, p.25)
Behaviour is thus started and maintained by an incongruity between
the existing state and the state that is to be achieved.
Behaviour will then last until the incongruity is removed. Miller
Galanter and Pribram illustrate these concepts by what they call
the "TOTE Unit", and this is shown here in Figure U.U; TOTE is
an acronym for Test, Operate, Test, Exit. The TOTE unit is
essentially another version of the feedback control mechanism
shown above in Figure 3-2. And Miller, Galanter and Pribram
state that:
"The interpretation toward which the argument moves
is one that has been called the 'cybernetic hypothesis'
namely, that the fundamental building block of the
nervous system is the feedback loop." (Miller, Galanter
and Pribram, i960, p.26)
Using the TOTE unit, or the feedback loop, as the basic "building
block", Miller, Galanter and Pribram suggest that complex behaviour
can be explained by "nesting" TOTE units within each other.
Behaviour can then be described as a series of attempts to carry
out plans which comprise a number of sub-plans which themselves
each comprise a number of sub-sub-plans, and so on.
Figure U.U: The TOTE Unit; from Miller, Galanter and Pribram,
I960, p.26. """ '
Consider a man hammering a nail into a piece of wood. He tests
the nail after each blow to see if the head is flush with the
surface of the wood, and until it is, he will continue to hammer
(i.e. to operate). This action may be part of another plan that
concerns joining two pieces of wood together; this plan may in
turn be nested inside the plan of making a chair; this plan may
in turn be nested inside the plan of earning a living, and so on.
Feedback, Learning and Development
The motivational role of feedback has been discussed above.
A number of writers on human motivation have argued that the
opportunity to develop skills and knowledge, that is the
opportunity to learn, is motivating in itself. Herzberg's
(1966) theory of psychological growth, for example, claims that
humans have innate needs for:
• knowing more,
• acquiring relationships in knowledge,
• creativity, and
• real growth (improved perception of reality).
White (1959) has suggested that "effectance motivation"
should be regarded as innate, referring to a basic need to develop
"competence":
".... activities in the ultimate service of competence
must be considered to be motivated in their own right.
It is proposed to designate this motivation by the term
effectance and to characterise the experience produced as
a feeling of efficacy." (White, 1959* P-329)
Maslow (19^3) also discusses the motivational role of curiosity
learning and experimenting and argues for the existence of:
".... a desire to understand, to systematise, to organise,
to analyse, to look for relations and meanings."
(Maslow, 19^3, p.385)
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Gardner Murphy (1958) argues that the nature of man is determined
by three factors. First, man is a product of the process of
evolution which has given him the characteristics that distinguish
him from all other forms of life. Second, this biological frame¬
work is subjected to a "cultural molding" as the knowledge and
beliefs of individuals become transmitted to others. In addition
to these influences on man's behaviour, however, "There are deep
forces within us that strive fundamentally for gratification
of the need to understand" (Murphy, 1958, p.l8). Murphy refers
to this need as a "third human nature". Arguing more as a social
philosopher than as a psychologist, Murphy claims that:
"This urge towards discovery, this living curiosity,
beginning with a sort of 'freeing of intelligence'
from cultural clamps and moving forward in a positive
way activated by thirst for contact with the world
and for understanding and making sense of it, will
begin to develop a society in which the will to
understand is the dominant new component." (Murphy,
1958, p.19)
The motivational role of feedback or knowledge of results in
any human activity may, therefore, ultimately be attributed to
an innate desire to expand human capabilities, to learn and to
understand more, to develop more effective means of living and
of coping with our environment. It is clear that this view has
a philosophical as well as an empirical component.
Isomorphic Models : Organisational Control and Learning
It was the intention of Stafford Beer, whose work is outlined
in the previous Chapter, to explore the managerial implications of
the similarities between his model of the human nervous system
and his conception of organisational management. It is the
intention here, on the other hand, to explore the implications
for job design theory of the similarities between the model of
organisational control developed in Chapter 3 above and the models
of human learning described in this Chapter.
Postulating the foundations of general system theory, Ludwig
von Bertalanffy (1968) makes the claim that:
there exist models, principles, and laws that
apply to generalised systems or their subclasses,
irrespective of their particular kind, the nature of
their component elements, and the relations or 'forces'
between them."(von Bertalanffy, 1968, p.31)
Such models, principles and laws are called "isomorphisms"
(von Bertalanffy, 1968, p.32). The models describing
organisational control and the models describing the human learning
process that have been discussed above clearly display a number
of structural similarities since they are all derived from the
same basic concept - the feedback control loop. These models,
therefore, are isomorphic. Von Bertalanffy claims that there
are at least three reasons for the existence of isomorphisms:
1. They arise partly from our perceptions of the world
around us, from the ways in which we choose to look
at it.
2. They arise also partly from the structure of reality
itself and our ability to impose our conceptual constructs
on that reality, to make schematic, abstract pictures
of it.
3. They arise also from the assertion that all "systems"
have common properties, that there are universal
principles that apply to systems in general.
These statements represent the foundation of general system
theory and reflect the fundamental cybernetic hypothesis regarding
the universal nature of the process of control. Control of
operations in an organisation can be conceptualised and analysed
in precisely the same terms as "control" of human goal-directed
behaviour. It is suggested here, therefore, that the isomorphic
nature of these two types of model creates an appropriate basis
for a general theory of job and organisational design.
Basis for a General Theory of Job and Organisational Design
At the end of Chapter 2 above, it was suggested that a theory
of job design should incorporate four components. These
components are:
1. A theory of human motivation and/or human nature.
2. A model representing the situation that is to be designed
or changed; it was further suggested that this should be
an organisational model.
3. A statement of job design objectives, in terms of desirable
job characteristics, derived from component 1 - the theory
of human motivation.
H. A technique for implementing the desired changes, based
on component 2 - the organisational model.
The objective of this section, therefore, is to postulate a general
theory of job and organisational design incorporating these four
components. Each of the four components will be examined in turn.
Component 1, a theory of human motivation and/or human nature:
One of the conclusions reached at the end of Chapter 2 above
321.
was that theories of human motivation that have been incorporated in
job design theories have been influenced greatly by the'work of
Maslow. It is not the intention here to contest that influence
but largely to accept it, and to base this first component upon
the assumption that Maslow's theory (with some slight modification)
is essentially correct. In the light of recent research concerning
the hierarchical ordering of human needs that Maslow specifies,
Lawler's (1973) reconsidered list of needs appears to be fairly
representative of current thought. He identifies six basic needs:
(a) existence needs - sex, food, water, oxygen.
(b) security need.
(c) social need.
(d) need for esteem and reputation.
(e) autonomy or freedom need.
(f) need for competence and self-actualisation.
(Lawler, 1973, p.32)
Lawler points out that research evidence has not supported Maslow's
contention that these needs are arranged in a five- or six-step
hierarchy of prepotency. Lawler claims that it is safer to assume
only a two-step hierarchy; when existence and security needs are
fulfilled, the remaining needs become potent in an essentially
unpredictable way. The need for competence and self-actualisation,
in Lawler's scheme, retains the characteristic of being the only
need that does not disappear on fulfilment. The other needs,
once met, cease to be motivating agents; the experience of self-
actualisation, on the other hand, stimulates the desire for more.
The "highest order need", therefore, is that which concerns
competence and self-actualisation. It has been suggested above that
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the fulfilment of these needs is based on opportunities for
learning which are in turn dependent upon adequate feedback. The
provision of continuous learning and feedback of performance
results have been recognised as desirable job characteristics by
a number of job design theorists. These characteristics will,
therefore, be emphasised in Component 3, described below.
Component 2, a model representing the situation that is to be
designed or changed:
The model of organisational information processing and control
that was developed in Chapter 3 above constitutes this component.
Component 3, a statement of job design objectives, in terms of
desirable job characteristics:
The general agreement amongst job design theorists concerning
the types of job design characteristics regarded as desirable was
noted at the end of Chapter 2, above. In so far as these
characteristics are based upon similar theories of human
motivation, this agreement is not remarkable. Since Component 1
of the theory put forward here is based on a similar theory of
motivation, it is not the intention to argue with the list of
desirable job characteristics given in Figure 2.10 above. It is
suggested, however, that emphasis should be placed on the
characteristics "provision of continuous learning" and "feedback"
for three reasons:
1. these characteristics are related to the highest order need
for competence and self-actualisation;
323.
2. the model of organisational information processing and
control and the models of the learning process that were
described above indicate various ways in which these
particular characteristics can be made operational;
3. making these characteristics operational can lead
automatically to the incorporation of other desirable
characteristics in the jobs concerned.
The provision of feedback facilitates learning and improvement
in job or task performance. But once a job or task has been
learned, the continued provision of feedback will serve to maintain
the level of performance achieved but will lead to no further
learning. This is particularly true of non-managerial jobs.
There is only so much that one can learn about screwing wheels
onto cars, assembling electronic components, or taking thermo-
formed sheets of plastic from a machine. The provision of
continuous learning thus requires more than the provision of
continuous feedback. Once one has learned how to carry out a
set of instructions, or "plan" (Miller, Galanter and Pribram,
I960; Connolly, 197^), effectively learning will cease. Learning
can only continue if the person can alter the plan itself, and
where that plan is in fact a sub-plan nested within a larger plan
or series of plans. Continuous learning can only take place where
the original plan can be changed in the direction of performing
some higher order plan more effectively, and not just in the
direction of performing the original plan more effectively.
The provision of continuous learning in work thus requires
that the job itself can be changed by the person who is performing
it; feedback of results can be used not only to improve individual
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task performance but also to improve the performance of the operating
system itself. The original plan - carrying out a production task -
lies within a higher order plan - controlling the operating system.
Continuous learning can only be provided, therefore, where there is
opportunity to alter a lower order plan in order to improve overall
performance of a higher order plan.
The total task of any organisation can be regarded as a hierarchy
of such plans, sub-plans, sub-sub-plans and so on. The overriding
plan concerns survival of the organisation. From this arise plans
concerning the most effective use of the resources available. The
lowest order of plan that has to be carried out concerns the various
production, service and clerical tasks on the shop floor and in the
office. The provision of continuous learning in work, therefore,
depends upon the allocation or reallocation of the various sub-
plans of the organisation to its members. This issue will be
considered in more detail below.
Giving operators more control over the work that they perform
in order to provide continuous learning entails the transfer of
managerial tasks to those who previously performed exclusively
non-managerial tasks. So providing continuous learning can
automatically provide other desirable job characteristics such as
responsibility, autonomy, and variety. This issue will also be
considered in more detail below.
Component 4, a technique for implementing the desired changes:
The technique advocated here is a ten-step method of organisational
analysis that is based on the general model of organisational
information processing and control that comprises Component 2 (and
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which is described in Chapter 3 above). This analysis can be
applied to any type of industrial or commercial organisation regard¬
less of the nature of the goods or services produced, the manner of
their production, or the size of the organisation. The objective
of this analysis is to produce a breakdown of the "total task"
of an organisation (i.e. all the tasks that must be performed in
the pursuit of the organisation's objectives) in such a way that
the objectives given in Component 3 can be made operational. This
method of organisational analysis is set out in ten stages, as
follows:
Stage 1. Identify the operating systems of the organisation and
their current work methods.
The products (or services) that are created and the manner of
their creation are analysed. The assumption is made at this stage
that, given the business that the enterprise under analysis is
engaged in, the individual operating tasks that have to be performed
can be completely specified. No assumptions are made concerning how
individual operating tasks should be combined into jobs in ways
other than those currently in existence. In a large organisation
there will be a number of different types of operating system; the
analysis at this stage is concerned solely with the "operations" of
each of these, i.e. with what Ansoff calls the "logistic" processes.
(See Figure 3.1 above, p. 268.)
Stage 2. Identify the control factors of each operating system.
Some of the control factors that arise in production systems
have been mentioned above (such as amount of material wastage,
throughput or processing times, product quality, output, operator
efficiency and so on). In a hotel the control factors would be
entirely different but might include supplies of clean linen,
amount of dust in bedrooms and public rooms, stocks of alcohol,
quality of meals, speed of service in the dining room and so on.
At this stage all control factors are listed, not just what appear
to be the more important or "key" control factors.
Stage 3. Analyse how the routine control operations for each
control factor are carried out.
This may be done using the "routine control grid" which is
illustrated in Figure U.5• This analysis shows:
(i) all the control factors relevant to each operating
system;
(ii) who (or what) measures the state of each factor;
(iii) who compares the actual state of each factor
with the standard;
(iv) who decides the necessary corrective action;
(v) who transmits this decision to the operating system.
By dealing with all the routine control operations for all control
factors, this analysis should identify any gaps in an organisation'
current control system, e.g. where information is not being passed
on to the following control operation.
Stage h. Analyse how the planning operations for each control
factor are carried out.
This may be done using the "planning control grid" which is
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illustrated in Figure h.G. This analysis shows:
(i) who sets operating system performance standards;
(ii) who measures the results of the routine control
operations, and the sources of the available information;
(iii) who compares what has actually happened with what
should have happened;
(iv) who decides the necessary corrective action (i.e.
action to alter the way in which the operating system
functions or the way in which routine control is
carried out);
(v) who transmits this decision to the routine control
function.
By dealing with planning related to all control factors, this
analysis should again identify any gaps in an organisation's
current control system, e.g. where information concerning performanc
is not readily available. In completing the planning control grid,
it may be useful to group control factors in such a way as to
reflect strong interdependencies.
Stage 5. Analyse how primary decisions are made.
This may be done using the "primary decision making grid"
which is illustrated in Figure U.7. This analysis will show:
(i) who measures the results of the planning for all the
operating systems in the organisation;
(ii) who compares these results with the overall objectives
of the organisation - trying to survive in the business
of making product X with Y amount of resources;
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(iii) who decides the necessary corrective action (i.e.
action to change the nature of the organisation's business
or to adjust the amount of resources with which it is
conducted);
(iv) who transmits this decision to the planning function.
Once again this analysis should indicate any shortcomings in an
organisation's existing control system.
Stage 6. Analyse how coordination between the routine control
functions of each of the operating systems is carried out.
This may be done using the "coordination grid" illustrated in
Figure U.8. This analysis shows:
(i) who transmits information concerning each control factor
to the routine control functions of other operating
systems; -
(ii) who monitors information received from other operating
systems.
The coordination grid lists all the control factors of each operating
system whether information about each of them is provided to other
routine control functions or not. This analysis can then be used to
identify gaps in .an organisation's existing coordination arrangements
ut the routine control level.
Stage J. Analyse how coordination between the planning functions
of each of the operating systems is carried out.
This analysis is conducted in precisely the same manner as that
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control level.
Stage 8. Analyse how information concerning the organisation's
environment is collected and used as input to the
control operations at all levels.
This may he done by considering each control factor of each
operating system and examining the types of information that may
have to be obtained from outside the organisation in order to make
effective decisions concerning each of those factors. The sales
department, for example, may be responsible for maintaining a
certain level of sales. In setting that level (a planning decision
information will be required concerning current and projected
demand for the product, current and projected output from
competitors, competitors prices, product substitutability, changes
in consumer tastes and so on.
Stage 9- Analyse how information concerning the organisation is
transmitted to the organisation's environment.
This may again be done by considering each control factor of
each operating system and examining the types of information that
may have to be transmitted to the organisation's environment in
order to ensure effective overall control of each of those factors.
In order to maintain adequate stocks of suitable quality components,
for example, suppliers may have to be informed of production require
ments in advance.
Stage 10. Produce job and organisational design proposals.
The analysis is now complete and provides two types of
information:
1. The analysis provides a comprehensive breakdown of all
managerial and non-managerial tasks currently performed in
an organisation, and indicates who performs these tasks.
2. The analysis identifies any managerial tasks that should
be but which are not being performed.
This analysis can, therefore, be used in two ways:
1. To identify and repair any flaws in an existing
organisational control system.
2. As a framework for change in job and organisational design.
The second of these uses is the main concern here, and this is
treated in more detail in the following section.
Job and Organisational Design
The ten-stage method of organisational analysis described
above thus provides an appropriate framework for the development
and implementation of job and organisational design proposals. In
other words it provides a framework for making job design objectives
operational. Job design, it has been suggested here, generally
takes place at the interface between managerial and non-managerial
tasks. Job design thus invariably entails the transfer of routine
control tasks previously performed by managers to either individual
operators or groups of operators. In one of Herzberg's (1968)
examples, the quality of operators' (stockholder correspondents)
letters was originally checked by management (supervisors) before
posting. The job enrichment scheme relaxed this monitoring arrange¬
ment and operators began to check their own letters. The control
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factor concerned in this example is quality of reply to stockholders'
questions. Previously, after the operator had written the letter,
the manager would read (measure) it, check it for inaccuracies
(compare), decide whether or not it should be reworked (decide),
and ask the operator to do so if necessary (take action). Job
enrichment gave to the operator all four routine control operations
for this particular control factor. The manager in this case
maintained some involvement in routine control; 10 per cent of all
letters had still to be checked for accuracy in place of the previous
100 per cent check.
The analysis described above thus indicates how operators
or groups of operators can be given additional responsibility.
Operators can be asked to perform parts of the routine control of
one or more control factors; they could be asked to perform the
measurement and comparison stages, leaving decision making to the
manager. Operators can, on the other hand, be asked to perform
all the routine control operations for one or more control factors.
The analysis also indicates:
1. How job design changes of the type just described can be
introduced gradually by asking operators to perform measurement
and comparison operations and by gradually relaxing managerial
support in decision making as operators become more confident.
Operators can be given responsibility for one or two control
factors at first, again increasing the number of factors
controlled as confidence grows.
2. How these types of changes to the jobs of operators will affect
the jobs of managers.
There are, therefore, various ways in which the job characteristic
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"responsibility" can be made operational. The organisational
analysis method described above presents a framework within which
all the various options can be identified and considered.
The analysis described above also indicates how operators or
groups of operators can be given more autonomy. In the stockholder
correspondent example cited above, operators became involved in a
routine control operation that had previously been performed
entirely by management. But management still performed a ten
per cent check on the work of the correspondents who, in sharing
routine control in this way, were not fully autonomous in the sense
of carrying out the entire routine control function for that control
factor on their own. Autonomy can be increased, therefore, by
iwithdrawing managerial supervision over the performance <xF the routine
control operations. Gulowsen's (1971) scale of autonomy"'! measures
a
autonomy across a number of control factors (such as work methods,
output, quality, hours of work and so on) but does not take into "
account variations in autonomy up the control hierarchy. How many
"autonomous groups" exercise planning level control over jithe way
M
m which their work is carried out, their output rate, and how their
work as a whole is controlled? Where a group of workers ifio exercise
planning level control over one or more control factors, they will
invariably also exercise routine control over those factors.
The analysis described above also indicates how operators can
be provided with feedback or knowledge of the results of their
performance. Feedback of results does not imply that the operator
measures his or her own performance, compares actual performance with
standard, decides whether or not it is good enough and what action
to take if it is not. Providing feedback simply implies that someone
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- the operator, another operator, a manager - performs the routine
control operations and tells the operator what action is required
in order to improve performance in future. Once it is known how
routine control decisions are taken, there is no great difficulty
in arranging for these decisions to be transmitted to the appropriate
operator or group of operators. Feedback of results can lead to
improved performance; it was noted above that feedback is an
essential component of the learning process. The provision of
feedback, therefore, can provide operators with the opportunity to
learn how to improve performance,to do the job more effectively.
But as also noted above, this will not necessarily lead to
continuous learning.
The analysis described above also indicates how operators
can be given work that involves continuous learning. In order to
provide continuous learning, either the operator must continually
be given new tasks to learn, or he must be able to decide for him¬
self how to alter the task that he is performing in order to improve
overall performance in some way. In other words the operator must
either be given new plans (i.e. sets of instructions) to perform,
or he must be able to decide for himself how the current plan could
be adjusted in order to improve performance of the higher order plan
within which the current plan is nested. The former course of
action, moving operators from one operating task to another, is
akin to job rotation. The success of this measure in providing
continuous learning will be dependent upon the types of task that
the operator is rotated through. Job rotation tends to be used
where individual tasks are fragmented and monotonous and any learning
that takes place is thereby limited. If work is to provide
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continuous learning, therefore, operators must be given information
feedback that permits evaluation of the success of the current
plan, and must be allowed to alter that plan if things appear to
be going wrong or if performance could be improved.
An approach to the provision of continuous learning in work may
be made by creating autonomous groups of operators that is groups
which perform the entire routine control function for their operating
systems. The "plan" for this group of workers is now "to operate
and exercise routine control over the operating system"; the
"skill" that the group now has to learn is "the operation and
routine control of an operating system". This only partially
meets the requirement that jobs should provide continuous learning.
Operators can only alter the operating system to a limited extent
because the routine control function is constrained by the decisions
taken at the planning level. Planning establishes the performance
standards that the routine control function is expected to maintain.
If operators performing the routine control function suspect that
these standards are inappropriate, they can only transmit relevant
information to the planning level and await a decision. Opportunities
for continuous learning will, therefore, be greatly enhanced where
operators exercise control at both the routine and the planning
control levels. The tasks of both the operating system and the
routine control function are essentially "sub-plans" within the
higher order plan for the functioning of the enterprise that is
established at the planning level of control. It is at the planning
level that the methods of working in the operating system and the
methods of performing routine control are decided. It is now
possible to state a general proposition concerning the nature of
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continuous learning: continuous learning -will only occur where
the plan (set of instructions) that is being performed, is part of
a higher order plan (higher order set of instructions) and where
the person or persons concerned perform not only the operating
tasks that are involved but are also responsible for determining
the contents of both orders of plan.
In order to provide continuous learning in work, therefore,
operators must be allowed to perform the routine control and planning
functions. To give operators control of primary decision making
is not necessary to the provision of continuous learning, but this
measure would expand the area of involvement of those concerned
and thus expand the opportunities available. These proposals
have three major implications for organisational design:
1. There will be an upper limit to the size of a group of
operators that can carry out the routine control and
planning functions as one cohesive unit.
It may be possible for the operators in separate operating
systems within one large organisation to work in this
manner, perhaps leaving the coordination tasks to those
who previously acted as supervisors. This proposal is
similar in intent to that of Schumacher who argues that in
designing organisations, "The fundamental task is to achieve
smallness within large organisation" (Schumacher, 1973,
p.228). The "first principle" of what Schumacher terms
his "theory of large-scale organisation" is the"principle
of subsidiary function", which states that for higher levels
to perform certain functions rather than lower levels, on the
assumption that the higher level will automatically be
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qualified to perform them better, is an injustice
and at the same time a grave evil and disturbance of right
order .(Schumacher, 1973, p.230).
The theory developed here indicates how smallness can be
achieved within large organisations. But where groups of
operators perform routine control and planning functions,
there will be an upper limit to the number of operators
within one operating system who together can deal with all
these tasks. This limitation in turn places a constraint
on overall organisational size.
2. If an organisation is designed in such a way that operators
perform all the control tasks up to and including those of
the planning level, then those operators will be responsible
for the design of their own jobs - for the way in which they
perform the operating and routine control tasks and for the
way in which these tasks are allocated to the operators
themselves. One aspect of organisational functioning that
these operators will now be required to learn will concern
the most effective design of their own jobs. The "design
of jobs" is an inseparable part of the process of
organisational design.
3. The procedures that the conventional organisation uses to
obtain, record, disseminate and store information relevant
to the control process are unlikely to be appropriate in
an organisation designed along the lines proposed here. An
information system must be designed that presents the
information required in a format that makes it available
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to all those who will have to use it. Control information
will be used by groups of operators for different control
functions and the means by which is obtained and presented
must take account of this. The design of information
systems is, therefore, a fundamental part of organisational
design.
To summarise briefly, there appear to be three major consequences
that arise when groups of operators perform all control tasks up to
and including those at the planning level:
1. there is an upper limit to the number of operators that
can effectively control one operating system as a group;
2. this type of organisational design obviates the need for
detailed design of jobs;
3. this type of organisational design emphasises the need
for the design of appropriate information systems.
The Learning Organisation
Two major themes of both empirical and theoretical studies in
organisational behaviour have concerned (a) the development of
human potential through work, and (b) the ability of organisations
to cope with a changing environment. The first of these concerns,
the development of human potential, has attracted the interest of
numerous writers, including Herzberg (1966), Argyris (1957),
McGregor (i960), Likert (1961) and Schein (1970). These writers
hold two basic assumptions in common. First, that man has an
innate desire for growth in competence; Herzberg (1966) refers
to the process of "psychological growth", Argyris refers to the
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tendency to develop towards "maturity". Second, that this human
goal is not inconsistent with the goal of organisational effective¬
ness. The writers cited above offer various prescriptions for
fulfilling both of these goals simultaneously, principally by
changing managerial style, or by redesigning jobs.
The ability of organisations to cope with a changing environment
is a second area of concern in the study of organisational beahviour.
Burns and Stalker (1961) for example argue that an organisation
facing changing technological and market conditions will find
conventional management systems inappropriate and suggest that an
"organic" system of management is more appropriate. An organic
system of management is more flexible, less hierarchical and has
a lower degree of work specialisation than the "mechanistic"
system with which it is contrasted by Burns and Stalker. Miller
and Rice (1967), whose work is discussed above (pp.157~173)>
similarly argue that organisational effectiveness is influenced
by the relationship between market forces and organisation structure.
They conclude that if an organisation is to be capable of adjusting
to environmental changes, organisation structure should allow
for periodic rearrangements of personnel. To this end they
prescribe a "project type organisation" in which personnel
possessing appropriate skills and knowledge are brought together
to perform specific tasks and are disbanded to join other new
groups as the original task or tasks disappears and new
circumstances require new groupings of personnel. Permanent
groupings, argue Miller and Rice, generate resistance to change
which the project type organisation attempts to overcome.
The respective prescriptions of Burns and Stalker and of Miller
and Rice are directed at developing organisational flexibility in
the face of novel environmental circumstances and pressures. Both
sets of authors, however, claim that their prescriptions will not
necessarily apply to organisations fortunate enough not to have
to constantly react in this way to external influences. Burns
and Stalker thus suggest that the "mechanistic" system of
management may be appropriate for organisations whose environment
is reasonably stable. Similarly, Miller and Rice suggest that
permanent employee groupings may be a satisfactory organisational
solution where environmental stability can be assured.
The techniques that have been suggested for improving the
development of human capabilities through work are not necessarily
consistent with the organisational goal of flexibility in dealing
with change. Conversely, organic systems of management or
project type organisations are not necessarily consistent with
the development of human potential. An organisation that is
capable of improving performance in both of these areas
simultaneously may be designated a "learning organisation". This
type of organisation will continue to find ways of improving
performance of the primary task or tasks of the organisation, and
it will continue to improve the capabilities of its members. It
has been suggested above that the optimum organisational design
solution is that where the group of operators in an operating
system perform all the necessary operating tasks and control
tasks up to and including planning. It is further suggested,
therefore, that this design solution approaches the criteria for
a "learning organisation". The operating group becomes a self-
regulating, learning unit; the unit will be able to develop better
operating methods, better methods of controlling operations, and
will be able to provide its members with work that possesses a
number of desirable characteristics such as opportunity for
continuous learning, feedback, responsibility, autonomy and social
interaction opportunities.
This prescription is clearly idealistic and not easily achieved.
The first stage in developing some of the above ideas was to find
out if the general model of organisational control does indeed
provide a suitable framework for organisational analysis and
design. In the Chapter that follows, Chapter 5, two organisational
case studies are described in which an attempt is made to answer
that question.
CHAPTER 5:
TWO CASE STUDIES IN THE ANALYSIS OF
ORGANISATIONAL INFORMATION PROCESSING
AND CONTROL.
TWO CASE STUDIES IN THE ANALYSIS OF ORGANISATIONAL
INFORMATION PROCESSING AND CONTROL.
Introduction
Towards the end of Chapter k above, a ten-stage method of
organisational analysis was described. It has been argued that
this type of analysis, concerned principally with organisational
information processing and control, is an appropriate framework
for examining job and organisational design choices. The purposes
of this Chapter are: (a) to describe how this analysis was applied
to the production control systems of two manufacturing units, and
(b) to show how the results of this type of analysis can be used
to generate job and organisational design options and to examine
their effects.
This method of analysis is based on the general model of
organisational information processing and control described in
Chapter 3, and incorporates the following ten stages (these are
described in detail above):
1. Identify the operating systems of the organisation and their
current work methods.
2. Identify the control factors of each operating system.
3. Analyse how the routine control operations for each control
factor are carried out.
1+. Analyse how the planning operations for each control factor
are carried out.
5. Analyse how primary decisions are made.
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6. Analyse how coordination between the routine control functions
of each of the operating systems is carried out.
7. Analyse how coordination between the planning functions
of each of the operating systems is carried out.
8. Analyse how information concerning the organisation's
environment is collected and used as input to the control
operations at all levels.
9. Analyse how information concerning the organisation is
transmitted to the organisation's environment.
10. Produce job and organisational design proposals.
To conduct a complete and detailed analysis of even a small
organisation using this method is a large task. To test the validity
of the method, the analysis was restricted to one type of operating
system - production systems - providing comparable evidence of the
method's value in different industrial settings. The advantages
obtained through this approach are offset by the lack of attention
paid in each case study to coordination between the production
system and other operating systems, and to the organisation's
information exchange with its environment. After a brief description
of the production (i.e. operating) tasks of the manufacturing units
studied, the analyses concentrate on the operations of the basic
control hierarchy, that is with routine control, planning and primary
decision making concerned with each production system studied.
It is hoped that by presenting the first case study in some detail,
the method of analysis is illustrated to a degree that permits a
briefer description of the other case study*. Both case studies will
* A third case study is presented in Appendix IV. It is not included
in this Chapter because the pattern of results is similar to that
obtained in the studies described here.
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be described before examining the implications of their results in
terms of job and organisational design.
Conduct of the Case Studies
The production systems and production control methods of three
manufacturing units were studied: a factory belonging to Ferranti
Ltd., making precision electronic components, and two factories
of Wilkie and Paul Ltd., in Edinburgh, making tin containers and
vacuum formed plastic items respectively. Each case study took
place in two stages. First, a preparatory phase was undertaken
that involved obtaining background knowledge of the production
methods of each company. This preparatory phase covered the first
two stages of the analysis - identifying the operating system and
the relevant control factors. Regular visits to each factory were
necessary to complete this phase. By meeting and talking informally
to the staff of the respective production departments an understanding
of each company and its manufacturing processes was obtained. The
relationships that were established with the staff in the production
departments at this stage greatly facilitated the work that followed.
The second phase of each case study involved interviewing all
personnel above operator level in the production department being
studied. These interviews were carried out in private and in each
case in an office provided by the company concerned, away from the
noise and constant interruptions that generally prevent prolonged
conversations on the shop floor or in individuals' regular offices.
The purpose of these interviews was to discover how the various control
operations were carried out. A tape recorder was used (only one
respondent refused to be recorded but permitted notes to be taken)
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and a transcript was made of the relevant information "before erasing
the tapes. The interviews were semi-structured and examples of the
types of questionnaires used are given in Appendix IV. The production
personnel were asked questions about their job and specific questions
about their involvement in certain aspects of production control.
Inferring from their replies who performs which control operations
and how is a fairly straightforward task; a complete transcript of
one interview is also given in Appendix IV which illustrates this
process of inference in some detail.
It should be noted that these analyses deal with the "normal"
production operations of the companies studied. Certain exigencies
naturally require special procedures for their control, analysis
of which would require lengthy and complex description that is not
directly relevant to the purpose in hand. Any definition of
"normal" however, must be subjective; it is taken here to mean
what the production personnel in each case regard as normal. The
parameters of production performance are expected to vary within
limits which when exceeded present the company with an "abnormal"
situation that requires exceptional control procedures. Such an
abnormal variation arose during the first case study. The material
being used in the manufacture of a particular component began to
exhibit unusual properties and 90 per cent of production of that
component had to be scrapped. The normal routine control operations
were unable to deal with such a problem and large numbers of people
were involved in finding a solution. Such occurences are infrequent
and are to some extent unique, and the analysis carried out does
not attempt to cover them.
1. CASE STUDY I : FERRANTI'S ROTATING COMPONENTS GROUP
The first company that was approached in connection with this
research was the Rotating Components Group of Ferranti Ltd. The
Rotating Components Group operates from a factory on an industrial
estate near Dalkeith, about five miles south-east of Edinburgh.
Ferranti Ltd. employs over 20,000 people in factories,
laboratories and offices in the United Kingdom, Canada, U.S.A.,
Republic of Ireland, Germany, Italy and Austria. Their first
Scottish factory was opened in 19^-3 at Crewe Toll in Edinburgh to
manufacture gunsights. After the war, the increase in demand for
electronic products prompted an extension of their activities in
this field. The size of the factory at Crewe Toll has been
increased several times and other factories have been built in
Edinburgh, Dundee, Dunblane and at Dalkeith. In Scotland, Ferranti
is the largest single company in the electronics industry and employs
well over 6,000 people.
The factory at Dalkeith was opened in 1963 and now houses the
Measurement and Inspection Department and the Rotating Components
Group. These two divisions operate independently and it is with
the latter that the research was carried out.
The Rotating Components Group
The organisation chart of the Rotating Components Group is shown
in Figure 5.1. This Group is actually a part of Ferranti's
"Inertial Systems Department" and the General Manager of the Rotating
Components Group reports to the General Manager of that Department.
The responsibility of the Rotating Components Group's General Manager
Figure 5.1: Organization chart of Ferranti's Rotating Components
Group.
5.1 a shows the organization of the production sections.
5-1 b shows the quality, design and sales departments.
The Group's Administration Department has been omitted























falls into five main sections: Production, Quality, Design, Sales
and Administration. The following are outwith his direct control
but are provided to the Group as "central services": Machine Shop,
Stores, Despatch, Work Study, Personnel, Cost and Wages Departments.
It was not possible to collect detailed information concerning the
operations of these other Departments, whose staff is ultimately
responsible to superiors in other parts of the company.
Products and Markets
The Rotating Components Group employs over a hundred people
and is principally concerned with the manufacture of a wide range
of precision electronic components with an annual turnover of
approximately £1 million. A proportion of this turnover goes to
other Ferranti units but outside commercial concerns provide an
expanding market for the Group. The current range of rotating
components includes precision potentiometers, optical shaft encoders,
miniature a.c. motors and a variety of gyroscopes. Within these maj
product groups, however, there is an enormous range of possible
variations with no two customers requiring the same specifications
for their products. For example, potentiometers, being components
which "rotate",have a central shaft. Two potentiometers may be
identical in every respect except for the length of this shaft.
The number of different specifications, for all products, is roughly
3,000, and the Group manufactures almost exclusively to order. The
differences may be negligible or fundamental, but consequently each
item must be individually identified on the shop floor, once its
assembly has begun. The paperwork which accompanies items through
the production process caters for this and is described below.
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The output of potentiometers accounts for 50 to 60 per cent
of the total; these are used extensively in airborne systems,
analogue computers, radar equipment, simulators, industrial process
plant and machine tool control systems. The range of motors
manufactured is used in aircraft, missiles and professional equipment.
Gyroscopes are used mainly for "in-house" applications such as the
airborne navigation systems manufactured at Crewe Toll. For some of
these products, this factory is the sole source of supply.
All the final stages of assembly and testing of these
components are performed in two "clean rooms" which are subject to
temperature and humidity control. There are also a number of
regulations designed to control dust in these rooms. Anyone entering
either of the rooms must wear a nylon overcoat, and in the larger room,
a nylon hat must also be worn. Certain operations, such as filing
of metal, cannot be done in these rooms, and some materials may not
be used in case they shed contaminating fragments. A very small
particle entering one of these highly sensitive components may render
it useless, and this could be fatal if the component is in use,
say, in an aircraft. The sub-assembly and intermediate inspection
stages are carried out under less stringent conditions outside the
clean rooms, but here too cleanliness is important.
Manufacturing Facilities
The layout of the Rotating Components Group's manufacturing
facilities is shown in Figure 5-2. The layout is determined
essentially by process, although similar processes for different
products are carried out in different areas (e.g. windings for
potentiometers and for motors; final assembly of gyroscopes and
Fipyve 5.2: Layout of the Rotati)y? Components Group's manufacturing
facilities.
A: H/L Potentiometer Assembly. 1: Quality Engineer (Mechanical).
B: Final Test Section. 2; Chief Quality Engineer's Office.
C: Potentiometer Winding Room. 3: Assistant Quality Engineer's Office
D: Motor Winding Room. and one Production Engineer.
E: Inspection Section. 4: Office of other two Production
F: Female Sub-assembly. Engineers.
G: Changing Room. 5: Quality Engineer (Electrical).
IH: Processing and Fitting Section. 6: Planning Engineers.
I: Progress Section. 7: Engineer I/C Control.
J: General Potentiometer Assembly. 8: Timekeeper.
K: Gyro and Motor Assembly. 9: Office of Test Foreman, Senior
L: Encoders Assembly. Foreman and two Assembly Foreman.
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of encoders).
The Group's labour force is divided in the following way:
There are four sub-assembly sections which produce the component
parts used in the final products. Although the final products may
all be different, many of them use common sub-assemblies or component
parts. Each section is supervised by a chargehand who sits at a
desk in the area. Figure 5-3 gives a brief description of the
function and composition of each of these sections.
There are four final assembly sections, described in Figure 5.U.
In these sections, each Operator builds the product from the sub¬
assembly stage to the finished item. The work is done by hand, with
the use of some special tools or "jigs and fixtures". A high degree
of manual dexterity is required of the Operators, and some have been
recruited from the watch-making trade where similar skills are required.
There is one Inspection Section and one Final Test Section. The
former carries out the inspection of all finished sub-assemblies,
and performs intermediate inspections during the build-up of final
assemblies. Most of this work involves making only a visual check,
sometimes with a microscope, on the quality of the item. In the
Final Test Section, finished products are tested to ensure that they
are fit for all the uses to which they will be put, before being
despatched to the customer. Each Operator is responsible for the
test of one item, or batch of items, at a time, and the testing is
carried out on special rigs which are used to monitor certain
performance characteristics of the products. A summary of the
functions and composition of these sections is given in Figure 5 • 5 •
There is also a Progress Section responsible for issuing jobs
to each section on time and in the required sequence. This is
Figure 5.3: Sub-assembly sections.
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■Figure 5.4s Final assembly sections.
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Gyro and Motor
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Encoders Assembly main assembly of encoders,
but with some sub-assembly
work
5 0 5
* High Linearity - a type of potentiometer
Figure 3.3s Inspection and Test sections.
Section Name Functions Number of Operators
Male Female Total





Final Test Section final electrical testing
of all finished products 6 5 11
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achieved through a complex paperwork system operated by three male
and four female Progress Clerks. The Progress Supervisor takes
charge of the running of this section.
These eleven sections make up the production system or operating
system under analysis.
Stage 1 of the Analysis : The Tasks Involved in the Manufacturing
Process
Although the Production and Quality Departments in the Rotating
Components Group are shown separately on the organisation chart
(see Figure 5*1)5 together they constitute one operating system
within the factory - the production system. In the words of the
Group's General Manager, they constitute the factory's "assembly
machine"; each section operates rather like a position on a conventional
assembly flow line where products move through various assembly
stages passing a number of inspection points on the way, and a final
test at the end.
To illustrate how the factory operates, the manner in which an
individual order is processed, from the time it is placed to despatch
to the customer, will be examined. This description will apply to
the manufacture of any of the Group's products. An outline of the
materials flow through the production process is given in Figure 5-6.
The Sales Department receives the order, say for four potentiometers.
Unless it is a repeat order, the Design Department will be asked to
scrutinise the customer's requirements to ensure that the product
can be made by the Group. Having been thus vetted, the Sales
Department sends the order to the Production Engineer responsible






















will be told this if necessary, but usually the Sales Department
know from experience whether it will be suitable or not. If the
order is to continue, the Design Department produces a set of
drawings for the new potentiometer. A copy of this drawing is
sent to the Planning Engineer responsible for potentiometers. He
compiles a list of step-by-step instructions itemising all the
operations necessary to build the product. He may also have to
design new instruments or appliances - "jigs and fixtures" - to
facilitate the assembly process. These will be made in the
Processing and Fitting Section, one of the sub-assembly areas.
The list of instructions is typed by a Progress Clerk onto a "route
card", a master copy of which is retained in the Progress Section.
The route card accompanies the potentiometers from the sub-assembly
stage through to the finished product and serves to identify these
particular items from others on the shop floor. It is unlikely
that any new specifications be required of the sub-assemblies. If
this was the case, the Planning Engineer would draw up a similar list
of instructions for their manufacture and these would proceed as
any others through the appropriate sub-assembly section. Another
copy of the initial design drawing is filed in the main assembly
section for use by the Operator whose task it will be to assemble
those potentiometers.
A copy of the order is sent to the Progress Section. The
delivery date on the order is converted into a "period number"
which indicates when the items must be ready to despatch to the
customer. This number is stamped on the top right-hand corner
of each route card. The year is divided into periods each containing
one working week. Normally, one week will equal one period, but
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the two weeks holiday in July when the factory is shut, plus the
working week following, equals one period. The current period
number is displayed on boards that_all sections can see. Thus it
is possible at a glance to decide whether any batch is ahead of
schedule, on schedule, or "in lag", i.e. late. The route cards
accompanying the jobs in each section are stacked in order of period
number with the lowest number at the front. When Operators finish
the job they are doing, they are normally given the route card, and
job, at the front of the queue.. The Chargehand must see that this is
done. Occasionally, an Operator may not have enough experience to
tackle the first job available and the Chargehand must then find
an easier job from further back in the queue. Ideally, however,
the job which must be delivered first should be started first. This
method of progressing jobs is referred to as the "period batch system"
and it applies to all the production, inspection and test sections
in the factory.
Sub-assembly Stages:
The Progress Section has compiled a "master parts list" for each
product. This is simply a list of all the parts and materials
that go into the product. Some of those must be put together before
going into the final item, and many of these "sub-assemblies" are
common to different products within each product group. All
potentiometers, for example, require "housings", "wipers" and
"formers". If the only difference between two potentiometers is
their shaft length, they will both use the same type of former,
housing and wiper. These parts are put together in the sub-assembly
sections. Knowing the due date for the job and how long it will take
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to complete all the sub-assembly stages, the Progress Clerks calculate
when to issue each part of the job to the appropriate sub-assembly
section. They calculate the period in which each stage must be
completed and this is stamped on the top of the route card. There
will be other potentiometers requiring sub-assemblies besides the
four we are interested in. The route card may accompany a batch
of up to 20 items. Sub-assemblies are usually small, easily carried
around, require minimal storage space and are completed in
comparatively short periods of time; (The Progress Section usually
allows one week for the manufacture of each batch). For these
reasons, the batches may be larger than in final assembly.
A Progress Clerk requisitions the parts and materials for the
sub-assemblies and puts them into a plastic box, appropriately
labelled, rather like a child's construction kit. The Progress
Clerk takes these to the sub-assembly section where they are placed
in bins, and the route cards are arranged in period number sequence.
As Operators finish the jobs they are doing, they are given the jobs
from the front of the queue. Each Operator works on a complete
batch until it is finished. Most of the work is done by hand and
is comparatively simple. Wire is wound onto coils and formers by
machine; parts have to be glued together, terminals must have leads
soldered to them; small parts may have to be cleaned and varnished.
In the period when an item must begin its final assembly stages
(if it is to be finished on time) all the sub-assembly stages must be
complete. The Inspection Section must have checked all the sub¬
assemblies and passed them as suitable, i.e. as conforming to the
inspection schedules which are drawn up by the Quality Engineer
(Mechanical). The schedule is a list of instructions telling the
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Inspection Operator what to look for and when to reject an item. It
may be possible to repair or "rectify" defective items. This is
normally done by the Assembly Operator responsible. Many components
made at the sub-assembly stage are reasonably inexpensive and it is
often cheaper to scrap defective items. Some are inevitably
irreparable and must be scrapped anyway. The fact that a certain
percentage of each batch of sub-assemblies will be scrapped is taken
into account by the Progress Clerks when making up the batches. The
'fecrap factors" which are used were calculated some years ago, however,
and there is no statistical analysis performed at present to up-date
these estimates. If they have been revised, it has been by subjective
judgement. All information concerning the start and finish times
of each batch, the batch size and the percentage of scrap produced
is recorded in the "issue books" kept by the Progress Clerks. This
record is used mainly for reference.
Final Assembly Stages:
Having ascertained that the requisite sub-assemblies, parts and
materials are available, the Progress Clerk issues these, as with sub¬
assemblies, to the appropriate section which in this case would be
General Potentiometer Assembly. The quantity of work, or "loading",
of each section is decided by the Production Engineer in conjunction
with the Progress Supervisor. The Work Study Department compute
standard times for each job which are used in operating the bonus scheme.
The Production Engineer can calculate how many man-hours he has
available in any one month. From the issue books, the amount of work
in progress in each section is tallied and the available capacity for
that month, in man-hours, can be shown. Using the estimated standard
times as a guide, and knowing the man-hours available, each section
can be loaded for the coming month, and, to a lesser extent, for two
or three months to follow. The Production Engineer must be aware
of the loading in his sections because he has to quote delivery
dates on incoming orders. Account must also be taken of the amount
of "rectification work" which will have to be done. This refers to
those items which have been rejected by Inspection or Final Test and
have been returned for repair. This work will consume a significant
proportion of the man-hours available.
The sub-assemblies and parts for each potentiometer are again
put in a plastic box by a Progress Clerk who takes this to the
assembly section with the route card which is placed in the queue of
other potentiometer work, depending on its period number. At this
stage, the four potentiometers will probably make up one batch.
Finished items are bulkier than sub-assemblies and would be correspond
ingly more difficult to move around in batches of 20. Potentiometers
are seldom more than a few inches long and storage is no problem.
However, the throughput time of a final assembly is longer than that
of a sub-assembly. So batches of final assemblies are never larger
than five items. Should an order arrive for a large number of items,
this will be broken down into several small batches.
The Chargehand in the section must give the job at the front of
the queue to the first Operator available if that Operator is capable
of doing the work involved. Sometimes this decision is a complex one
the Operator may be capable but the Chargehand may know that a
different Operator would do the job quicker and better. The less
capable Operator may require further experience and the Chargehand
may give him the job for this very reason. If, however, that
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particular job is "in lag" and the customer is an important one, the
Chargehand will hold the job back for a more experienced Operator.
He may have had instructions from a superior to this effect.
Once the Operator has the route card and the box containing the
requisite parts, he will obtain the copy of the design drawing and
commence assembly. It has been pointed out above that each job is
given a standard time by the Work Study Department. Each Operator
informs the Timekeeper, who sits just outside the clean rooms, when
he starts and stops each job. This information is used in the
calculation of bonuses. At certain points during the assembly of
the potentiometers checks are made on the quality of the work carried
out. The items are taken to the Inspection Section where the
Inspection Operators check the items against the inspection schedule.
If all the items in the batch pass this inspection they are returned
to the Operator to continue assembly. If one or more items are
rejected, these are returned to the Operator for rectification. The
good items remain in the Inspection Section until the defective items
have been rectified satisfactorily, then the whole batch returns to
the Operator to continue assembly. Items may pass several times
between final assembly and the Inspection Section. This may be for
checks at subsequent assembly stages or because items have to return
for rectification, perhaps more than once. The faults which arise
are largely characteristic of the production of precision electronic
components. The tolerances to which the Operator must work are
frequently narrow and materials can exhibit remarkable variability
in quality; errors due to careless workmanship are infrequent.
When the items are complete, they are taken to the Final Test
Section where their performance is monitored on suitable test rigs.
If any of the items are rejected at this stage, they are again
returned to the Assembly Operator to be rectified before returning
once more to the Final Test Section. Items performing just outside
the required parameters may be granted a "concession" if the
customer is willing. The case is typical where an item in test
fails to meet a stipulated performance parameter but is nevertheless
capable of fulfilling the purpose for which it is required. The
Sales Department frequently know from past experience with particular
customers what is acceptable and what is not, but the customer will
be informed if necessary.
When the four potentiometers pass Final Test successfully, or
are granted a concession, they return to the final assembly section
to be labelled, then go to the Inspection Section to have the informa¬
tion on the label checked. The items then go to the Despatch
Department where they are consigned to the customer.
Stage 2 of the Analysis : Identification of Control Factors
The place of the Rotating Components Group in Ferranti's
organisation structure means that certain control factors arising
in the production system are controlled by other operating systems.
This is true of labour and materials costs, quality of incoming
materials and piece-parts, quantities of piece-parts in stock and on
order, quality and speed of packaging and time taken to complete
deliveries. The complete list of control factors arising in and
controlled in the production department, and the sections in which
these arise, is as follows:
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Control factors Sections
1. Group output Final assembly
2. Throughput time Sub-assembly
3. Throughput time Final assembly
h. Throughput time Inspection
5. Throughput time Test
6. Quality of products Sub-assembly
7- Quality of products Final assembly
8. Quantity of scrap Sub-assembly
9. Reject concessions Final assembly
10. Methods of work All assembly
11. Methods of work Test and Inspection
12. Operator efficiency Sub-assembly
13. Operator efficiency Final assembly
Ik. Operator efficiency Inspection
15. Operator efficiency Test
16. Task allocation within a section All assembly
17. Task allocation between sections All assembly
18. Task allocation within a section Test and Inspection
19. Task allocation between sections Test and Inspection
20. Size of work force All sections
21. Shop floor layout All sections
Stage 3 of the Analysis : The Routine Control Operations
Before illustrating the use of the "routine control grid" that was
suggested in Chapter U above, the routine control operations will be
described in some detail. This case study is used to show precisely
how the analysis works in practice and the next case study is
presented in a much briefer format. The routine control of each
factor is analysed in turn. The description of the routine control
of each factor shows how the four control operations - measurement,
comparison, decide action and take action - are carried out. The
job-titles of the personnel involved in carrying out these control
operations have been underlined; these are the names that are
entered in the routine control grid. (The routine control grid is




The output of the Group is measured by a Clerk in the
Administration Department who visits the Despatch Department three
times a week to record what has been sent to customers since his last
visit. The Cost Department also compiles a statement of turnover
for the final accounts but this, while accurate, does not appear until
the end of the month following that to which it refers. So the
figures from Despatch are the ones used for routine control purposes:
the output figure is converted into a percentage of the forecast
monthly total output and the Administration Clerk compiles graphs of
the output of each of the main product groups, along with a. totals
graph, and updates these weekly. Copies are posted in the
Administration Department and in the Production Engineers' offices.
The records of the Progress Section, as with those of Despatch,
could be taken to indicate output figures. These records are
updated by information from despatch and may be inaccurate at any
given time. They are used only for reference.
Comparison:
The Production Engineer in each section must quote delivery dates
on all orders for his products and determine the loading of his
section. If the forecast output is not being met, the Production
Engineer must decide how serious the deviation is from his knowledge
of the overall situation. Some superfluous operations on an
inspection schedule may be holding up a number of expensive items.
This could be corrected. If a third of the labour force is absent
with 'flu, the output achieved may he the best possible in the
circumstances.
Decide Action:
If the Production Engineer does decide that output is lagging
significantly and he can discover the reason, he will try to find
out what can be done to remedy the situation. Sometimes, an
individual job may have a noticeable effect on the total output
figure and the Production Engineer must decide, in the event of
some delay, what priority to give such a job. Parts from suppliers,
or from the factory Machine Shop, may not have arrived. He must
decide whether to call on the suppliers to hasten delivery, or
attempt to obtain parts elsewhere. Sub-assemblies may have been
delayed in one of the Group's own sections and the Production
Engineer must decide what priority he can put on these if necessary.
Take Action:
If some job or jobs are to be given priority, the Production
Engineer will inform the Foreman who will, in turn, instruct the
Chargehand accordingly. The Chargehand must then give that job to
the first Operator available. If suppliers or the Machine Shop
have not provided ordered components, the Production Engineer will
usually deal with them in person or instruct the Progress Supervisor
to deal with the situation. If a Sub-assembly section has delayed
the necessary components the Production Engineer will instruct the
Foreman to ask the Sub-assembly Chargehand what can be done.
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2. Throughput time, Sub-Assembly
Measurement:
The Sub-assembly Chargehands and Senior Foreman are able to
see immediately that a job has not been completed on schedule by
looking at the period numbers at the tops of the route cards. The
issue books kept by the Progress Clerks give a historical record of
the start and finish times of all jobs handled by these (and all
other) sections. From this it is possible to compute the actual
throughput Lime of any particular batch, but no statistical analysis
is performed on these figures. This record is used only for
reference. The Work Study Department calculates a standard make
time for each job in connection with the bonus scheme. These
figures are not directly relevant for measuring throughput time for
two reasons. First, the calculations are performed in such a way
as to allow most Operators to earn significant bonus by completing
jobs in less than the standard time. Second, even allowing for this
discrepancy, the calculation does not account for the multiplicity
of delaying factors which affect the throughput times of jobs such as
Operator error, material shortage, design faults, and so on. These
figures may therefore be used as a rough indication of how long a
job should take, but no reconciliation is attempted between theoretical
and actual times.
Comparison:
The Sub-assembly Chargehand will often be the first to notice
that a job has been delayed. Depending on why this has happened, the
Chargehand may try to correct the situation, or, in a more serious
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instance, inform the Senior Foreman. The Senior Foreman may discover
such jobs for himself, if the Chargehand does not tell him, and if he
feels that the case is a serious one, he will inform the Production
Engineer. If a Progress Clerk notices that a parts or materials
shortage will hold up some work, he will inform the Progress Supervisor
if he believes that the situation warrants the latter's attention.
The Progress Supervisor monitors the situation by checking the items
he has in stock and on order, and by finding out when parts or
materials will be delivered. If any of this information reveals a
comparatively serious situation, the Production Engineer will be
notified either by a Progress Clerk or by the Progress Supervisor.
Decide Action:
The Sub-assembly Chargehand will be able to solve a large number
of problems which cause delays. Slow Operators may require further
instruction; a job may be stopped to allow another to go ahead.
The Senior Foreman is expected to handle more pressing problems of
hold-ups, perhaps where a large number of costly items are delayed,
or when an important customer is waiting. From his knowledge of the
stock availability situation, the Progress Supervisor will decide
whether to take any action in this area or not. He may contact the
supplier; this may be an outside company, another Ferranti unit, or
the factory Machine Shop. The required parts may have been "lost"
in stores and the Progress Supervisor may decide to investigate this
in person or through a Progress Clerk. The Production Engineer may
decide that the delayed job, or jobs, be brought to the front of the
queue, regardless of period number, in order that such jobs may be
completed earlier. Neither the Senior Foreman nor the Chargehand can
take such a decision to override the period hatch system.
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Take Action:
The Sub-assembly Chargehand may be able to initiate action in
person, or will undertake to do that directed by the Senior Foreman
or Production Engineer. This will usually mean giving certain jobs
to certain Operators, or giving particular jobs special priority and
completing them as fast as possible. The Progress Supervisor might
contact a supplier for undelivered materials or check the stores
contents in case items have been mislaid or overlooked. A Progress
Clerk may perform the latter task.
3. Throughput time, Final Assembly
Measurement:
An historical record of start and finish times of all final
assemblies is given in the issue books kept by the Progress Clerks.
The actual throughput time of any job can be calculated but no
statistical analysis of throughput times is carried out. By looking
at the period numbers on the route cards in each section, the Assembly
Chargehands and Foremen can tell which jobs are behind schedule, and
the extent of the delay. Each week, a Progress Clerk compiles a
report on the number of potentiometers that are in lag; this does
not show which orders are delayed. A copy of this "lag sheet" goes
to the appropriate Production Engineer. When the factory was
investigated, this was only carried out in the potentiometer sections
but it was planned to extend the report to all final assemblies.
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Sometimes, a Customer will telephone the factory to find out why
an order has not been received and how long he will have to wait for
it. He may contact the Sales Department or a Production Engineer
directly. This may be the first indication to the latter that this
order is behind schedule. The Sales Department will usually inform
the Production Engineer concerned of customers' complaints but some¬
times this will depend entirely on who the customer is.
Comparison:
A Progress Clerk is sometimes the first to see that a particular
job, or jobs, will be behind schedule perhaps due to lack of parts
in stores. This can be seen from the issue books and the Clerk will
notify the Progress Supervisor of any significant hold-ups . As in a
Sub-assembly Section, if a Chargehand notices a job that is delayed,
he may do nothing if it is not important, try to correct the situation
himself, or inform the Foreman if the instance is in his opinion serious
enough. The Foreman must then decide whether anything should be
done, and if so, what. The Foreman in turn may decide to inform the
Production Engineer if the problem is one with which he feels unable to
cope. The latter will be informed of most jobs that are behind
schedule, either through the Foreman, the Progress Supervisor, the
Sales Department or the Customer. He must decide how much attention
each case merits taking into account the value of the order, the
customer, and the extent and cause of the delay.
Decide Action:
If a job has been delayed through negligence or some unavoidable
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factor, e.g. where the only Operator skilled enough to do that job
is absent, the Chargehand will normally be able to decide on the
appropriate corrective action. In most cases this will be without
difficulty; the delayed job must be begun as soon as the Operator
is available. The Chargehand will take the more intractable problems
to the Foreman who in many cases will be able to decide what to do.
It may even be necessary to stop work on one job in order that another
be completed first.
If a job has been delayed through material shortage, the Progress
Supervisor will be responsible for deciding what can be done to
remedy the situation.
It is frequently the case that rectification work builds up in
front of work not yet started, because the former have lower period
numbers (otherwise they would not have been assembled first). If
a job has been delayed in this queue to such an extent that to allow
it to make its own way to the front would take longer than the
customer is prepared to wait, then the Production Engineer must
decide whether or not to give that job priority, and place it at the
front of the queue.
Take Action:
Whatever action the Progress Supervisor decides to take with
respect to material shortage, he will deal with it himself. He will
contact the source of supply in an attempt to hasten delivery, or
attempt to find an alternative supplier. The Chargehand and Foreman
will take action in all those cases where they are competent, but only
the Production Engineer may override the period batch system and place
a job at the front of the queue regardless of its period number. The
Production Engineer would ensure that this was done through the
Foreman.
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U. Throughput time, Inspection
Measurement:
The period numbers on the route cards in the section reveal
those items which are behind schedule. The Inspection Chargehand
and Test Foreman can see this immediately. The Progress Clerks
also have a record of throughput times but this is used only for
reference.
Comparison:
The Inspection Chargehand may attempt to hasten the progress of
a delayed job. An Operator may not know how to handle a new
inspection schedule; a piece of apparatus may be faulty or require
adjustment. If the duration of a delay, or its cause, is more
serious, the Chargehand will inform the Test Foreman if the latter
does not know of it himself. He may decide what, if anything, should
be done, or he may decide to take the problem to his superior, the
Assistant Quality Engineer, if he feels that he will be unable to
cope with the situation himself.
If a Production Engineer has decided that a particular job be
given priority and that job is in the Inspection Section, an
Assembly Foreman (sometimes the Senior Foreman) will approach the
Inspection Chargehand to find out how quickly that job will be ready.
He may, if necessary ask the Inspection Chargehand to return the
job to the assembly section with all haste, if the delay is not caused
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by lack of materials or apparatus. This latter point may better be
subsumed under control of final assembly throughput time but serves
here to illustrate the high degree of interdependence between these
factors.
Decide Action:
The Inspection Chargehand will attempt to solve all those
problems which she thinks she is competent to deal with. It will
also be possible to give a job to a more proficient Operator; or
an Operator may require further instruction which the Chargehand
can provide. The Test Foreman will be informed about and asked
to deal with more serious delays, such as those arising from the
complex technical problems which frequently arise.
If the solution to a particular problem is likely to affect
the future operation of the Inspection Section, the Test Foreman
will ask the advice of the Assistant Quality Engineer. For
example, an inspection schedule may require alteration in some
fundamental aspect.
Take Action:
Whoever decides what action should be taken to speed the
passage of jobs that have been delayed in this section, the
appropriate instructions will be relayed to the Inspection Charge¬
hand for implementation. The Assistant Quality Engineer may
transmit his orders in person, or through the Test Foreman.
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5. Throughput time, Test
Measurement:
From the period numbers on the route cards, the Test Foreman
and Test Chargehand can identify instantly those jobs which are
lagging. As jobs enter the section, the Test Chargehand records
each one in a book and cancels this entry when each job leaves.
A separate page is kept for each day and it normally takes no more
than three weeks for one page to be cancelled completely. This
record is used only for reference; the Test Chargehand can tell
from his book which jobs are in his section at any given time, and
how long any particular job has taken to be tested. A page may
not be cancelled until all the jobs listed on it have left the
section, and consequently, jobs which have been held up are high¬
lighted.
Comparison, Decide Action and Take Action operations are the
same as those of the Inspection Section with the Test Chargehand
here performing the same tasks as the Inspection Chargehand.
6. Quality of Products, Sub-Assembly
Measurement:
On completion, each batch of sub-assemblies is taken to the
Inspection Section where an Inspection Operator checks each item
against the pertinent inspection schedule. If the Operator
believes that an item should be rejected, the Inspection Chargehand
may be asked to confirm this. Some of the more experienced
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Operators, however, are allowed to reject items on their own authority.
Comparison:
So it may be either the Inspection Chargehand or an Operator
who decides whether an item be rejected or not. In a small number
of problem cases the Chargehand may ask the Test Foreman, and
sometimes also the Engineer I/C Control, for assistance.
Decide Action:
Items which pass this inspection are taken to the Stores for
issue as component parts of final assemblies. Rejected items
return to the Sub-assembly section. The Sub-assembly Chargehand,
sometimes in conjunction with the Senior Foreman, decides whether
the items be rectified or scrapped. The technical assistance of
the Engineer I/C Control may also be enlisted at this stage.
Jointly or severally, this group will decide how the items are
to be rectified.
Take Action:
It is the responsibility of the Sub-assembly Chargehand to
reissue items to be rectified to the Operator responsible.
7. Quality of Products, Final Assembly
Measurement:
Quality checks are made both during and after the final assembly
stages. At certain points during the assembly items are taken to
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the Inspection Section where an Inspection Operator checks the work
carried out. As in the inspection of sub-assemblies, the Inspection
Chargehand will frequently be asked to confirm any checks on suspect
items. On completion, items go to the Final Test Section where Test
Operators perform a variety of tests as listed on the test schedule
for each type of item. The Test Chargehand also lists the number
of each product tested and the number failed. The Test Foreman
graphs these figures and a copy of this is put in the Assistant
Quality Engineer's office.
Comparison:
The procedure relating to final assemblies in the Inspection
Section is the same as that for sub-assemblies with the Inspection
Chargehand or an experienced Operator making decisions to pass or
reject items. In the Test Section, the Test Chargehand is the
sole arbiter. Here, the Operator merely marks the test results on
a card and passes this to the Chargehand who compares these with the
requirements specified and decides whether or not to accept items.
Either Chargehand may consult the Test Foreman about problems which
they feel are outwith their competence. From the graph in his
office, the Assistant Quality Engineer can see the failure rates of
each product. If, in his opinion, this rate is too high for any
product, he informs the Production Engineer concerned.
Decide Action:
If an item passes an inspection, it automatically returns to
the assembly section to continue its build-up. On passing through
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the Test Section, items automatically go to Despatch. Items which
fail an inspection or test are separated from their batch and are
returned to the appropriate assembly section for rectification. The
Assembly Chargehand will normally decide what action should be taken
to rectify any particular item, but the Assembly Foreman will be
involved in problematical cases. They may both participate in
determining the appropriate course of action, or the Foreman may
arrive unilaterally at a decision. If the Assistant Quality
Engineer has approached a Production Engineer with the information
that the failure rates on his products are excessively high, the
latter must decide on the appropriate action.
Take Action:
The Assembly Chargehand will return the items which must be
rectified to the Operators who made them, giving them the agreed
directions on the repair action to be taken. If the Production
Engineer has been involved, and if he deems it necessary, he will
examine the situation as thoroughly as possible and instruct his
Assembly Foreman or Assembly Chargehand to take whatever action is
necessary, such as ensuring that only experienced Operators are
given difficult jobs, work benches and floors are kept clean, or
checking any tools or equipment used for faults.
8. Quantity of Scrap, Sub-Assembly
Measurement:
The Quality Engineer (Mechanical) deals with all items that
have been designated as scrap. The Sub-assembly sections each have
a "scrap-bin" into which these items are placed. The Quality-
Engineer empties these at the end of each month, sorts the items
into product groups and maintains a record of the quantity scrapped
in each group. Progress Clerks also record the percentage scrap
in each batch but no overall statistics are calculated.
Comparison:
The scrapped items are then handed over to the Production
Engineer and his Planning Engineer who examine it and decide if
there are any parts which can be salvaged.
Decide Action:
The Production Engineer and the Planning Engineer also decide
the manner in which parts will be salvaged. In some cases, the
costs of rectifying damaged items may be greater than those of making
new ones. The Planning Engineer puts the appropriate instructions
onto a sheet which is made into a special route card headed "Scrap
Recovery".
Take Action:
It is a Progress Clerk who types the route card and ensures that
the items are issued to the appropriate sub-assembly section. Once
there, it is up to the Sub-assembly Chargehand to give the job to
an Operator.
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9> Reject Concessions, Final Assembly
Measurement:
If an item fails a final test by a small margin it may be
possible to allow it to pass by granting a concession, i.e. if the
item is fit for its intended purpose then the deviation from require¬
ments may be waived. The Company specifies certain "in-house"
tolerances which are occasionally narrower than those which customers
request. The item may be acceptable to the customer but not
necessarily acceptable to the Company. The Assembly Chargehand,
sometimes along with the Assembly Foreman, will note those items
on which it may be possible to grant a concession.
Comparison:
They notify the Production Engineer who, with the assistance of
the Planning Engineer, considers the case and decides whether to ask
for a concession or have the item rectified. If the former course
is adopted the Planning Engineer completes a request form which is
sent to the Design and Sales Departments.
Decide Action:
The Design Department examines the consequences of deviations
from specification. The Sales Department contacts the customer, to
determine whether or not the item is acceptable, if they are not
certain from past experience what that customer will decide. The
Chief Quality Engineer, or his deputy, the Assistant Quality Engineer,
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must also be signatory to the concession form. Recalling the
existence of "in-house" quality requirements, the Chief Quality
Engineer must be satisfied that the product itself, regardless of
the customer's requirements, is fit to bear the Company's trademark.
He thus has power to prevent the sale of an item even though the
customer would accept it. The Company has a central quality
assurance body to which the Quality Engineers are partially responsible.
Take Action:
If a concession is granted, the item is returned to the Assembly
Chargehand who issues the item to an Operator for labelling from
whence it goes to Despatch. If a concession is not granted, the
product is returned to the assembly section to be rectified.
10. Methods of Work, All Assembly
Measurement:
By "methods of work" is meant the actual operations performed
in assembling an item and the sequence in which they are carried out.
Direct monitoring of these methods is achieved through dealing with
problems as they arise during the assembly process. Indirectly,
deviations in other factors such as quality or throughput time may
indicate that work methods are ineffective. If an Operator
experiences difficulty with a particular job, he or she will normally
inform the Chargehand. The latter should then inform the Foreman who
should in turn contact the appropriate Planning Engineer. Should the
Operator find the Planning Engineer conveniently available, his
advice may be asked without the Chargehand or Foreman knowing.
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This is discouraged since in the event of another Operator meeting
the same problem the Chargehand might not be able to deal with it in
person and effort would be wasted in re-contacting the Planning
Engineer.
Comparison:
The Chargehand or Foreman may be familiar with the
decide whether or not to do anything about it. If not,
Engineer will examine the problem.
Decide Action:
The Chargehand or Foreman will be capable of solving some
problems without assistance from the Planning Engineer. If an
Operator has misunderstood some of the Planning Engineer's instructions,
the Chargehand will be able to provide the necessary help. The
Planning Engineer must solve those problems which the Chargehand or
Foreman cannot. If an Operator is unable to carry out the instructions
or use the "jigs and fixtures" provided, the Planning Engineer,
having been responsible for both, must rectify the situation. He
will take intractable problems, that have possible effects on future
orders, to the attention of the Production Engineer who may on
occasion involve the Production Manager.
Take Action:
The Chargehand is expected to deal with simple problems in this
area where a word or two of instruction will suffice. With more




more experienced Operator onto a difficult job. The Planning Engineer
may have to write a new set of instructions or design new jigs and
fixtures. Any new route cards required are dealt with by Progress
Clerks in the normal manner. The Planning Engineer can personally
provide instruction for Operators on the performance of certain
operations or use of certain tools. He is usually capable of solving
these problems but may on occasion act under instruction from the
Production Engineer or Production Manager.
11. Methods of Work, Test and Inspection
Measurement:
As with the assembly sections, if an Operator has difficulty,
he or she informs the Chargehand (Test or Inspection)who approaches
the Test Foreman who informs either the Engineer I/C Control or the
Quality Engineer (Mechanical).
Comparison:
The Chargehand or Foreman may be able to identify the nature of
the problem. If not, the Engineer I/C Control or the Quality Engineer
will determine the cause of the problem and decide if anything should
be done.
Decide Action:
If the Chargehand or Foreman can solve the problem, the Engineers
will not be involved. The latter may on occasion have to decide
whether or not to alter an inspection or test schedule, or whether to
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replace or repair test gear. Should radical alteration appear
necessary, say in inspection or test schedules, the Assistant Quality
Engineer, and sometimes the Chief Quality Engineer, may be involved.
Take Action:
The Test or Inspection Chargehand may be able to take necessary
action alone; he or she may provide extra instruction for Operators.
The Test Foreman may also be involved, perhaps in distributing
difficult jobs to particular Operators, but normally he will instruct
the Chargehand to do this. The Engineer I/C Control or the Quality
Engineer may rewrite a test or inspection schedule. They may also
check test gear if it is suspect. New test gear may have to be
designed. The Engineers may personally instruct Operators in the
use of schedules or test gear.
12. Operator Efficiency, Sub-Assembly
Measurement:
The Sub-assembly Chargehands have a responsibility for training
their Operators and are able to distinguish the better ones by
observation. Initially, an Operator will be taught to perform some
of the easier types of work and will do this until the Chargehand
considers that the Operator is capable of more difficult tasks. Thus
the "training period" is protracted and the Chargehands formulate a
detailed knowledge of the capabilities of their Operators.
Operators working normally are expected to earn a bonus. The
Work Study Department calculate the standard times for each job in
such a way that this is possible and when this Department calculates
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the weekly bonuses, those Operators not earning bonus are identified
and this provides some indication of efficiency.
Each route card indicates the Operator who performed the job,
how long it took and what rectification work was necessary. These
details are used only for reference while the job is on the shop floor
and the only use made of them thereafter occurs when an Operator's
work is suspect. Indication of this will generally come from the
sources mentioned above and if the case is a serious one, the Production
Engineer will have the Clerkess in the Quality Department extract a
record of the Operator's recent work from the route cards. This
procedure is comparatively rare.
Comparison:
There are no pass or fail rates stipulated against which an
Operator's performance may be measured. Due to the nature of the
work, faults develop in items no matter how skilled the Operator is.
A certain proportion of items are expected to fail their first
inspection and be rectified or scrapped. Operators working on
difficult jobs may produce higher failure rates than those on easier
tasks, and this is expected. The Sub-assembly Chargehands are
expected to appraise the efficiency of their Operators and inform the
Senior Foreman of any instances they feel merit attention. Usually,
the Chargehand will not inform the Foreman without first attempting to
ameliorate the situation in person. If such an attempt fails, the
Chargehand informs the Foreman who may in turn take the case to the
Production Engineer.
Decide Action:
If the Sub-assembly Chargehand is the first to detect an
inefficient Operator, the initial action will be to determine the
cause. The Operator may have personal problems, or may require
more training or instruction. In either event, the Chargehand must
decide how to alleviate the problem. In cases where the Senior
Foreman has been informed, it will be his responsibility to decide
what should be done and, usually, instruct the Chargehand accordingly.
Where the Production Engineer is notified, and where he feels the
case worthy of his attention, he will examine all the information he
has available, from the Chargehand and Foreman, from the bonus
records, and from the Operator's past production record. At this
stage, attempts by the Chargehand and Foreman will normally have
failed to improve the Operator's work, and the Production Engineer
will consider moving the Operator to another section, or dismissal.
If the latter course of action is preferred, the Personnel Department
must be notified since it is only through that Department that an
Operator can be fired.
Take Action:
The Sub-assembly Chargehand will speak to the Operator in an
effort to persuade him or her to improve their work. The Chargehand
may provide additional training or instruction. The Senior Foreman
may wield his higher authority in a similar persuasive bid, or
instruct the Chargehand to do this. They may decide not to give the
Operator difficult work to perform where mistakes are more costly.
The Production Engineer may either have the Senior Foreman move the
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Operator to another section, or ask the Personnel Department to
arrange for the Operator to he transferred to another part of the
Company or dismissed.
13- Operator Efficiency, Final Assembly
Measurement:
The Assembly Chargehands are expected to monitor the efficiency
of their Operators by observation, as with the Sub-assembly sections.
The Work Study Department's record of bonus earnings are similarly
available and the Clerkess in the Quality Department can compile the
history of a Final. Assembly Operator's performance from route cards.
The third time an item fails a test and is returned for
rectification, the Test Chargehand must inform the Assembly Foreman
concerned who signs the back of the card signifying that he is aware
of the situation. It is also the responsibility of the Assembly
Chargehand to inform the Foreman when any Operator's work is
particularly bad.
Fortnightly product quality examinations are conducted, called
"strip reports", where representatives from Production, Quality and
Design Departments observe and criticise while an Operator dismantles
one of his products which has failed a test. A report is written
and circulated. The Production Engineer receives a copy. These
reports are so infrequent as to render them inadequate as an indicator
of individual Operator efficiency on a continuous basis. However,




The Assembly Chargehands will attempt to solve any problems they
can. On deciding that an Operator's performance is particularly bad,
the appropriate Assembly Foreman will be informed. The latter may
also attempt to handle the matter, as in a Sub-assembly Section, or
he may notify the Production Engineer. Information from bonus records
and possibly a report on the Operator's recent work will be taken into
consideration by the Production Engineer in deciding whether or not
an Operator's work is sub-standard. As indicated in the above
discussion on Sub-assembly Sections, this decision is highly subjective.
Decide Action:
It may be possible for the Assembly Chargehand to overcome any
small problems which arise. The Assembly Foreman's advice will be
taken in more serious cases. If a case has reached the Production
Engineer,he will decide whether or not the problem can be solved
within the Department. If not, he will ask the Personnel Department
to arrange either for transfer of the Operator to another Department,
or dismissal. Here, the decision actually lies with the Personnel
Manager.
Take Action:
The type of action which the Assembly Chargehand may undertake
is to offer the Operator further training or instruction. It is
also possible for a Chargehand to ensure that an Operator is not given
work which is beyond his capabilities to perform effectively. More
serious cases the Assembly Foreman deals with, the action he would take
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being similar to that of the Chargehand. The Production Engineer
may speak to the Operator in an attempt to persuade him to improve.
Alternatively, he may move the Operator to another section in the
Department. If these attempts are unsuccessful, the Personnel
Department arranges for the Operator to be transferred to another
Department in the Company, or dismissed.
l^t. Operator Efficiency, Inspection
Measurement:
Since most Operators in this section, particularly the less
experienced ones, must present any reject items to the InspecLion
Chargehand for confirmation, the latter is able to form a knowledge
of each Operator's capabilities and, if the standard of an Operator's
work falls, will soon discover this. The Chargehand also examines
two complete jobs done by each girl every week. The result of this
"overcheck" is kept in a folder with a page for each girl and this is
passed to the Test Foreman at the end of each month. If an Operator
makes a serious error, such as accepting items that are obviously
faulty which could prove expensive if used in final assemblies, the
Test Foreman completes a "fault slip" showing how this mistake arose;
for example the Operator may not have had sufficient experience to
deal with the job she was given, or the instructions on the schedule
may not have been clearly understood.
As with the Assembly Sections, the Work Study Department provides




It is again difficult to stipulate the point at which an Operator
may be deemed inefficient. If the Inspection Chargehand is the first
to detect a lapse, she will attempt to solve the problem herself.
Through the results of the "overchecks" and any "fault slips" which
arise, the Test Foreman may decide whether anything should be done. If
the case is serious, the Chargehand or Foreman will inform the
Assistant Quality Engineer who examines the situation and formulates
a view on whether the Operator's work is of the required standard.
Decide Action:
The Inspection Chargehand may decide to give an Operator further
training or advice. The Test Foreman may proffer a similar solution
or put the Operator on a different type of work where mistakes could
be less costly. The Assistant Quality Engineer or the Chief Quality
Engineer will decide serious cases. If they feel that the Operator
should be removed, the Personnel Department will be asked to do this.
Take Action:
The Inspection Chargehand undertakes personally any Operator
training required and is also responsible for ensuring that the
Operator is given only particular types of work. The Test Foreman
may reprimand the Operator, perhaps using his powers of persuasion
to improve the work. The Assistant and Chief Quality Engineers may
attempt to move the Operator to another section in the Department.
If they request that the Operator be removed altogether, the Personnel
Department will either arrange for the Operator to be transferred to
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another department, or dismissed.
19- Operator Efficiency, Test
Measurement:
This operation is performed in the same manner as in the Inspection
Section (Test Chargehand substituted for Inspection Chargehand) with
one addition: items that are returned from customers as defective
are subjected to investigation. The Quality Engineer (Electrical)
performs this task and if it is discovered that an item was faulty
when it left the factory, it is possible to identify the Operator
who passed that item as fit for use by finding the original route
card. This is, however, a rare occurrence.
Comparison; Decide Action; Take Action:
These are the same as for the Inspection Section with the
Test Chargehand taking responsibilities similar to those of the
Inspection Chargehand.
l6. Task Allocation within a Section, All Assembly
Measurement:
The Chargehand is expected to know which Operators are good at
which jobs and will usually give a difficult job to a more experienced
Operator. The Foreman is also informed of the comparative abilities
of his Operators through the channels mentioned in the description of
control of Operator Efficiency.
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Comparison:
The Chargehand or Foreman, or both, will consider those jobs which
are either difficult, wanted quickly, or are for an important customer.
They decide if any particular Operator should be chosen, or if a job
should go to the first Operator available on reaching the front of the
queue.
Decide Action:
If a Chargehand or Foreman decides that a job does require special
attention, the most suitable Operator will be selected.
Take Action:
The Chargehand is responsible for giving particular jobs to
designated Operators.
17. Task Allocation between Sections, All Assembly
Measurement:
The Senior Foreman compiles a graph of "waiting time" for each
week from which he can see which sections, and which Operators, have
too little work and which are overloaded. The other Assembly Foremen
also report any excessive waiting time in their sections to the Senior
Foreman as it arises.
Comparison:
■The Senior Foreman decides whether or not the situation warrants
a re-allocation of labour. If he considers the change to be radical,
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he informs the senior Production Engineer who also examines the
situation.
Decide Action:
The Senior Foreman or the Production Engineer, or both, decide
what alterations to make to the distribution of Operators between
sections.
Take Action:
The Senior Foreman sees that this is done.
18. Task Allocation within a Section, Test and Inspection
Measurement; Comparison; Decide Action; Take Action:
The procedure is the same as that for Assembly, substituting
Test and Inspection Chargehands and Foreman for Assembly Chargehand
and Foreman.
19. Task Allocation between Sections, Test and Inspection
Measurement:
The Test Foreman monitors the situation by observation to determine
whether the balance of labour and work between the sections is
satisfactory.
Comparison:
Any possible reallocation is discussed with the Assistant Quality
Engineer who may, depending on the extent of the proposals, take the
problem to the Chief Quality Engineer at least for an approval of
plans made if not for a decision.
Decide Action:
It is thus either the Assistant Quality Engineer or the Chief
Quality Engineer, or both, to determine the distribution of Operators
between these sections.
Take Action:
The Test Foreman has the responsibility of carrying out any
redistribution.
20. Size of Work Force, All Sections
Measurement:
The Personnel Department maintains records of all employees; any
additions to or reductions of the labour force must be processed by
this Department.
Comparison:
The Personnel Department is informed of any changes that are to
be made in the size of the labour force (see Planning description
below). The Department must also be aware of any shortfall in labour
requirements as it occurs.
Decide Action:
The manner of recruiting and dismissing employees is entirely
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the responsibility of the Personnel Department, which is a "central
service" within the Company, but outwith the control of the R.C.G.
Manager.
Take Action:
Employees are dismissed only by the Personnel Manager. His
Department initiates a recruitment campaign if more labour is required.
Applicants are interviewed first by the Personnel Manager who
determines the suitability of the candidate. The appropriate Foreman
and Chargehand are asked to "interview" suitable candidates and present
their opinions. The "interviewing" takes place as the prospective
employee is shown round the shop floor. If the supervision agree
on the suitability of the applicant, he or she is hired. If either
is not satisfied, the Personnel Department is asked to provide another
candidate.
21. Shop Floor Layout, All Sections
Measurement:
The Senior Foreman has an overall responsibility for assessing
the existing layout.
Comparison:
Possible advantages from alterations to layout will be considered
by the Senior Foreman. Benches may be better positioned, test gear
may be moved.
Decide Action:
Small changes, the Senior Foreman will make on his own initiative.
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With more radical changes, he -will inform the Production Engineer if
an assembly section is affected, or the Assistant Quality Engineer if
a test or inspection section is involved. Often, an alteration in
the layout of an assembly section will affect that of an adjacent
test or inspection area. Mutual agreement is then reached between
the parties concerned.
Take Action:
The Senior Foreman is responsible for supervising the required
alterations.
Ferranti's routine control operations are summarised in the
routine control grid shown in Figure 5*7 (A to C).
Stage k of the Analysis : The Planning Control Operations
Although the planning control grid has a format similar to the
routine control grid, discussion of its content is better dealt with
by taking each of the control operations in turn rather than by going
through each control factor in turn. The interdependence of the
control factors makes this manner of exposition more satisfactory.
Once again the job titles of those who carry out the control operations,
and which therefore appear on the planning control grid, have been
underlined. (The planning control grid is shown in Figure 5-8 on
page 408,below.)
Information Sources:
Planning is dependent upon the availability of information
concerning the production (operating) system and its routine control.
Figure B.7(a): Routine control gr:i d for Ferranti's Rotating
Components Group.
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Figure 5.7(b)? Routine control grid for Ferranti's Rotating
Components Group, continued.
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Figure 5.7(c): Routine control grid for Ferranti's Rotating
Components Group, continued.
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In discussing planning, therefore, the first consideration is the
sources of this information. "Information sources" is not, therefore,
a control operation, but the first row of the planning control grid
is used for convenience to record these sources.
For most of the control factors there exist written records
that can be used to provide historical information regarding the
past fluctuations in a control factor (e.g. throughput times or scrap
quantities). In a number of cases, however, this information is not
necessarily in a usable format and may require further analysis or
collation to render it useful for planning purposes. The information
concerning throughput times is of this nature.
If performance of a particular control factor becomes unsatisfac¬
tory, indication that this has occured may come from information
regarding other control factors. Increasing throughput times may
be due to assembly operator inefficiency, or to slow methods of work
in the test or inspection sections. It may not always be necessary,
therefore,to have detailed information about the behaviour of all the
control factors in order to detect and attempt to rectify an error
in any one control factor.
Set Standard:
Performance standards for the assembly sections are established
by the General Manager and the Production Manager, the former having
the ultimate responsibility for decisions made. These are joint
decisions made after discussion that generally involves other
departments. The output targets, for example, are related to the
sales forecasts prepared by the Sales Department; product quality
is partly dependent upon the designs which the Design Department produce.
So these other departments are consulted when necessary. Performance
standards that apply specifically to the test and inspection sections
are established by the General Manager and the Chief Quality Engineer.
Layout of the shop floor is principally the responsibility of
production section personnel but the Chief Quality Engineer is
consulted if the layout is to be altered completely.
The process of setting standards establishes the overall
performance patterns expected of the production system, the performanci
standards that the routine control operations attempt to maintain.
The standards of performance that can be set are constrained to
some extent by the primary decisions. The quality of products that
are to be produced is determined in this case by the primary decision
to manufacture rotating components that will be used extensively in
airborne navigation systems; the Group is committed to manufacturing
products to the highest standards of quality possible. Similarly,
the amount of resources that are to be used to make these products
puts certain constraints upon the level of output that is possible.
The factory could increase output (and costs) by increasing overtime
and weekend working, but there will come a point where the only way
to go on increasing output will be to increase the amount of
resources used in production, i.e. to build a larger factory or build
an extension onto the existing factory, to house more machinery and
operators. Primary decision making thus constrains the standards
that can be set at the planning level of control.
At the planning level of control it is impossible to regard
control factors in isolation. They are generally closely interrelated
in such a way that any change in one control factor will affect
several others at the same time. The size of the work force must
405.
remain stable if stable output is to be achieved; operators must
be capable of working to the required quality standards; operators
must be able to work to a degree of efficiency such that throughput
times are consistent with delivery dates. These are just some
examples of the degree of interrelationship between control factors.
These interrelationships can become extremely complex and
performance standards should ideally be kept under constant review.
Measurement:
For the assembly sections as a whole, the Production Engineer
and the Production Manager are responsible for monitoring
performance. With regard to methods of work, the Planning Engineer
who draws up the Operators' assembly instructions is responsible
for monitoring the effectiveness of the methods used. With regard
to output and throughput times, the General Manager also has a
specific measurement responsibility due to the importance attached
to these factors. Output graphs are in fact posted in an
Administration area outside the General Manager's office. The
Sales Manager informs him of any important orders that are signifi¬
cantly overdue.
In the Test and Inspection Sections, the Assistant and Chief
Quality Engineers perform this measurement operation. With regard
to methods of work, the Quality Engineer (Mechanical) and the
Engineer I/O Control, who draw up inspection and test schedules,
also have a measurement responsibility.
The measurement operation involves monitoring the production
system's actual performance and noting the extent to which the system
is able to adhere to the performance standards.
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Comparison:
This operation is performed for the assembly sections by the
Production Engineer and the Production Manager; the Planning; Engineer
is again responsible for methods of work, and the General Manager has
a particular responsibility for output and throughput times. In
the Test and Inspection sections, comparison is carried out by the
Assistant and Chief Quality Engineers, with the assistance of the
Quality Engineer (Mechanical) and the Engineer I/C Control where
methods of work are concerned.
The comparison operation is carried out in order to identify
any problems in the operation or control of the production system
that might warrant a change in work method. Beneficial develop¬
ments that should perhaps be encouraged may also be identified.
Decide Action:
This operation determines any adjustments that have to be made
to either the production system or its routine control. The
members of the organisation who set the performance standards for
the production system have been mentioned above; in taking the
decision to change these standards, or to change the routine control
methods, additional members of the organisation are invariably
consulted.
The General Manager and Production Manager carry out this
operation for the assembly sections; the General Manager and the
Chief Quality Engineer carry it out for the Test and Inspection
sections. The Chief Quality Engineer is consulted about all
matters concerning plant layout since his sections are liable to be
affected, and he is also consulted in all matters related to
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product quality. The appropriate Production Engineer and the
Assistant Quality Engineer are consulted on matters concerning
methods of work in their respective sections.
Examples of the types of decision that may be taken at this
stage are:
• rearranging the shop floor layout to decrease throughput
times;
• changing from the "period batch" system to some other
means of progressing jobs through the factory;
• altering the ratio of inspection to assembly operators
in order to increase production;
• taking the responsibility for issuing work to operators
away from the chargehands and allowing the operators
to do this themselves.
It is the intention of this short list to be illustrative and not
comprehensive.
Take Action:
The Production Engineer in each assembly section is responsible
for ensuring that decisions taken are put into effect in his section.
The Planning Engineer deals with alterations to methods of work,
and if any changes are to be made to the size or composition of the
workforce, this will be the responsibility of the Personnel Department.
For the Test and Inspection sections the Assistant Quality
Engineer ensures that any planning decisions are implemented;
the Quality Engineer and Engineer I/C Control are responsible for
alterations to methods of work.
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Figure 8.8(a): Planning control grid for Ferranti's Rotating
Components Group.










































































































































Figure 5.8(b); Planning control grid for Ferranti's Rotating
Components Group, continued.


















































































Production Manager and Production Engineer.
Production Manager and Production Ehgineer.










General Manager and Production Manager
(Sales Manager and Chief Quality Engineer)
Production Manager and Production Engineer
Production Manager and Production Engineer
General Manager and Production Manager
Production Engineer































































In general, these are the personnel that are responsible for
acting upon the planning decisions that affect their respective
areas of responsibility.
Stage 5 of the Analysis : Primary Decision Making
Products
Measurement:
The discovery and recommendation of potential additions to
the Group's product line is the responsibility of the Design and
Sales Departments. The Sales Manager and Chief Engineer should
therefore keep themselves informed of any such developments.
The same is true for the possibility of discontinuing certain products
Comparison:
The suitability of any potential alterations to the product
line are assessed initially by the Sales Manager and the Chief
Engineer. At this stage any significant developments will be
brought to the attention of the Production Manager and the General
Manager. The latter will in turn examine the proposals from their
point of view and the Chief Quality Engineer will usually be
consulted because it is his task to ensure that any new product
conforms to the company's quality standards.
Decide Action:
The Rotating Components Group (RCG) is part of Ferranti's
Inertial Systems Department (ISD) and the General Manager (RCG)
is directly responsible to the General Manager of that Department.
Any product additions or deletions within existing groupings can be
made on the authority of the General Manager (RCG), in consultation
with the Sales Manager, Chief Engineer, Production Manager and Chief
Quality Engineer■ If it was considered necessary or desirable to
stop producing an entire group of components or to start producing
a completely new type of component, the General Manager (ISP)
would also be involved in making the decision.
Take Action:
The implementation of decisions taken at this level, as far
as the production system is concerned, is the responsibility of
the Chief Quality Engineer and the Production Manager. The staff
of the various sections will be informed of the changes; operators
may require additional training; Operators, Chargehands and
Foremen may be re-allocated to other sections to cope with altered
work loads; the floor layout may have to be changed.
Resources
Measurement:
The General Manager receives a detailed monthly report on
the financial status of the Group from the Accountants in the Cost
Department.
Comparison:
It is the responsibility of the General Manager to determine,
partly on the evidence of these reports, how well the Group is
performing and how trends may develop in the future.
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Decide Action:
The General Manager (RCG) has authority to expand his production
facilities and output at his own discretion provided this is
achieved through the Group's profits. If it appeared, however,
that another factory should be built to contain increasing production,
the General Manager (ISP) would be consulted. The respective
opinions and suggestions of the Chief Engineer, Sales Manager, Chief
Quality Engineer and Production Manager would also be taken into
consideration.
Examples of the types of decision taken here are:
• the purchase of new test gear, work benches and other
equipment;
• building an extension to the existing factory or
building a new factory;
• purchasing a computer (or the services of a computer
bureau) to handle the production progressing procedures.
Take Action:
The implementation of these decisions is again the responsibility
of the Chief Quality Engineer and the Production Manager. They must
ensure that the introduction, or removal of resources used in the
production system is carried out effectively.
The Primary Decision Making Grid is shown in Figure 5-9« It
is clear that the decisions taken at the planning and primary
decision levels will be dependent upon a good deal more information





































(RCG) = Rotating Components Group
(ISD-) = Inertial Systems Department
Figure 5.9: Primary decision making grid for Ferranti's
Rotating Components Group.
systems within the Group and from the company's environment as a
whole would have to be taken into account in addition to information
concerning the control factors in the production system. But
for reasons concerning the time required to analyse these
procedures and their accessability for study, the organisational
analysis in these case studies does not proceed beyond this point.
Discussion of the results of these case studies is postponed until
they have been described.
This will facilitate discussion of the similar results and
conclusions derived from these case studies.
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2. CASE STUDY 2 : WILKIE AND PAUL, PLASTICS PRODUCTION
DEPARTMENT.
Wilkie and Paul, Tin Boxes and Plastics
The second company approached in connection with this research
was Wilkie and Paul, Ltd., which now has two factories at Slateford
in Edinburgh, which manufacture plastic and tin containers
respectively. The second case study reported here thus concerns
the manufacture of plastic containers and the third, presented in
Appendix IV, deals with the manufacture of tin containers.
Wilkie and Paul was established in l86l in Leith, as brass
founders and tinplate workers. The original factory made oil
lamps for carriages, chandeliers and a variety of other brass,
copper and tin artefacts characteristic of that period. As sales
increased, the company twice moved to larger premises in Edinburgh.
The market for tin containers was considered by the company to be
an expanding one. So, in conjunction with one John Rhodes of
Wakefield, the first plant in the world to mechanise the process
of making tin containers was designed. The company moved to its
present site in Edinburgh in 1920, the machinery was improved, and
the market for the company's products in England expanded. In 1961
the company invested in plant for the manufacture of thermo-formed
(i.e. heat formed) plastic trays and other types of plastic container,
and this accounted in 1973 for approximately 60 per cent of the
company's turnover. Also in 1961 Wilkie and Paul became a subsidiary
of Scotcros Ltd., but almost full autonomy has been retained.
While these two case studies took place, a new factory was
nearing completion in Slateford, not far from the existing site.
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The tin container manufacturing machinery was moved to this new
factory in April 197*+ leaving the plastics side with more space in
the original factory.
Products and Markets
Wilkie and Paul employs approximately 200 people in the
manufacture of a number of types of thermo-formed plastic trays
and containers which are used for packaging foodstuffs. The
factory also produces all the plastic sheeting that it requires,
turning to outside suppliers only in emergencies.
The plastic trays are generally called "inserts" and are used
in the packaging of biscuits and confectionery. Containers, or
"tubs" are produced for margarine, butter, yoghurt and similar
products. Inserts and tubs are produced by vacuum forming and
pressure forming processes respectively. The factory also has
two machines for printing the sides and lids of tubs, but these
machines are not in regular use.
Repeat standard orders form the bulk of the factory's output.
Once machinery is operating on a given order, it is frequently
allowed to continue producing after the order quantity has been
reached as this is often more expedient than cleaning and resetting
the machinery immediately. The excess output is stored against
future orders. It is not standard procedure, however, to manufacture
for stock. The company also has the expertise and facilities for
designing and manufacturing novel or non-standard lines.
4
Manufacturing Facilities
The organisation chart for Wilkie and Paul's plastics production
department is shown in Figure 5.11. The organisation chart shown
in Figure 5-10 shows the departments common to both tin and plastic
containers production. The plant layout illustrated in Figure 5»12
is that of the older factory, before the tin box production was
moved to the new site. (A layout plan of the new factory had not
been finalised by the time these case studies were completed.)
The production of plastic containers at Wilkie and Paul is
divided into the six sections listed in Figure 5-13 which also shows
the composition of each of these sections, and the equipment
that each uses.
The manning arrangements for the extrusion, mixing and grinding
sections differ from those of the other sections. These three
sections operate on a "continental shift system". There are four
Supervisors and four groups of Operators. Any one Supervisor and
any one group of Operators works for five days, working 12 hour
shifts with 12 hours in between. At the end of this five day stretch
they take five free days before returning. So at any one time
there will be:
• one group operating a twelve hour shift;
• one group waiting to come onto the next twelve hour shift;
• two groups each taking a five day break.
The Supervisors are encouraged to work split shifts, thus supervising
two different groups of Operators for six hours each, in order to
prevent them from regarding any one group of Operators as "their"
particular group.
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Figure *5.-12;, Wilkis and Paul Plant Layout, January 1974.
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These sections operate for 2k hours per day over a seven day
week. The extrusion machines are in constant operation (apart
from maintenance and cleaning breaks) and the mixer and grinding
machines are operated as required. The mixing machine produces
mixes faster than the extruders can use it; the grinding machines
are dependent for their workload on the quantities of scrap or
"shred" returning from the forming sections. The Operators in
the extrusion, mixing and grinding sections are constantly employed
on operating the machinery, cleaning, setting and maintaining it,
and keeping the section area clean and tidy.
The vacuum and pressure forming sections operate in a somewhat
different manner from the extrusion, mixing and grinding sections.
Here there are two female Supervisors who work together over both
of these sections, without specific areas of responsibility. But
there are two female Chargehands who work only in the vacuum
forming section; one has responsibility for two vacuum forming
machines and four cutting tables, the other has responsibility
for six machines and twelve tables. These sections work a 5 day
week, the day shift operating from 8.00 a.m. to 5-00 p.m. A
Saturday morning shift, 8.00 a.m. to 12.00 p.m., is occasionally
worked if necessary (but the total number of such shifts that can
be operated in any one year is limited by statute governing the
use of female labour). Day shift Operators wishing to work over¬
time may remain until 7.00 p.m. on any weekday. A separate
evening or "twilight" shift operates from 6.00 p.m. to 10.00 p.m.
and consists of about 30 female Operators most of whom are married.
A night shift, 8.00 p.m. to 8.00 a.m., is worked by eight Operators
and one Setter, all male. Once the female Operators leave, the
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men operate only the forming machines; they do no cutting or
packing but leave this for the female Operators to complete the
following morning. Although these sections come under a
different Production Manager, the Supervisor in the extrusion,
mixing and grinding sections has charge of the forming sections
during the night shift.
The pressure forming and printing machines are not in constant
use. These activities provide a marginal contribution to the
work and output of the factory. The shredding machine is used
to render scrap from the pressure forming machines suitable for
regrinding. Scrap from the vacuum forming machines does not
require this treatment. Once put in motion by a Setter, the
shredding machine can be left unattended for some considerable
time. Pressure forming machines are also put in motion by the
Setters, but once they have ensured that the machines are running
satisfactorily, female Operators take over. The latter are
moved to and from the vacuum forming section as required.
The numbers of female Operators in the forming sections
(listed in Figure 5-13) are approximate. To operate the pressure
forming and printing machines requires up to ten Operators, but
it is not often that all these machines are working simultaneously.
Another reason for these numbers being approximate is that the
nature of the work has led to a rather high rate of labour turn¬
over in these sections (over 180 per cent per annum), and the
number of Operators on the factory floor can vary significantly
from month to month.
Any maintenance or repairs that cannot be carried out by the
Setters are referred to a separate maintenance section, under the
Plant Engineer. These mechanics and electricians deal with the
tin container production machinery as well.
Stage 1 of the Analysis : The Tasks Involved in the Manufacturing
Process.
Incoming orders are received by the Sales Office Manageress,
who records these in the Sales Office file, giving order copies to
the Production Controller (Plastics). Repeat orders comprise
the larger part of output and a small file is kept that lists the
standard material requirements of each product (allowing for normal
wastage). Knowing the material requirements and the current
scheduled work load, the Production Controller is able to
calculate a delivery date for each order and the Sales Office can
then tell the customer when that order will be delivered.
The Production Controller works from a large "load board"
which lists each machine in the extreme left hand column and
which has a time scale marked off in weeks across the top. The
board is used to schedule up to four months production in advance.
To programme a particular order, the Production Controller first
calculates how long it will take to make the required material.
He can then schedule this on one of the extrusion machines. He
can then schedule the completion of the order on one or more of
the forming machines, at any time after the scheduled completion
date for the material, depending on the orders that have already
been scheduled. Weekly schedules are prepared, based on the load
board, for all the machines in the plastics production department.
These schedules simply state the work that each machine will carry
out during that week, and they are distributed to the Production
Managers and the appropriate Supervisors at the start of each week.
Deviations from these schedules are inevitable and the Production
Controller has to adjust his load board accordingly. If a
particular order is likely to be significantly delayed, the Sales
Office can be informed almost immediately in case the customer
has to be contacted.
The weekly schedules distributed to the Production Managers
and the Supervisors gives only a brief account of the programmed
work load for each machine. Accompanying these schedules,
therefore, are "order slips" which indicate the product to be made,
the customer, the order quantity, and various specifications
concerning the material to be used, the forming cycle time and
packing instructions.
Figure 'y.lh illustrates the stages of the manufacture of
plastic inserts and tubs. The production of rolls of plastic
sheet, the basic material for the forming stages, is essentially
the first main part of the overall process. Plastic is actually
a mixture of various chemicals, but 90 per cent of this mixture
is basic polymer. The polymer is purchased from external
suppliers and is stored in silos at the rear of the factory.
(See Figure 5*12.) In order to give the basic polymer the
characteristics and colour required for the stages to follow,
various other chemicals (referred to as "lubricants and stabilisers"
and pigment have to be added to it. The company chemists have
compiled standard "mix cards" which indicate the exact amount of
each ingredient that must go into each type of mix. Working from
the weekly schedule, therefore, the Mixer Operator pumps the
required amount of polymer for each mix into the mixing machine
from the silos. The other chemicals and pigments are dropped in
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manually. The Production Controller sometimes schedules standard
mixes for stock when there is no other work to be done. The
completed mixes are pumped in to large vats("durabins") which are
taken when full by fork-lift truck to the storage area.
The Mixer Operator is also responsible for the routine
maintenance and cleaning of his equipment and the surrounding area.
He completes a "daily record sheet" indicating the number of
batches mixed on his shift. This is sent to the Work Study
Department where it is used in the wages bonus calculations before
being passed on to the production control section.
When required for extrusion, the vats of mixes are transported
to the appropriate extrusion machine and the mix is pumped into
a hopper above the machine. (Figures 5*15 and 5.16 show sketches
provided by the company of the two types of extrusion machine that
they use.) The calanderette extruder is much larger than the
older diamat extruders and the plastic sheet that the calanderette
produces is of a much higher quality. The mix is fed from the
machine's hopper into a heated barrel along which it is moved by
a motor-driven screw. The heat melts the mixture which is forced
out, i.e. extruded, through a narrow slit in the heated die to
produce a thin flat plastic sheet about three feet wide. On the
calanderette, the sheet is fed between two driven rollers causing
a small bank or "melt" of the material to build up at that point.
This has the desirable effect of pushing contaminating particles
to the edges of the material which are trimmed off in inch wide
strips and reground for future use. This trimming also ensures
that the material has a consistent, standard width. On the



























drawn over a "haul off roller" and any contamination in the sheet
remains. Small particles of dust and other material inevitably
find their way into the mixes and when the sheet that carries them
reaches a thermo-forming machine, the inserts or tubs do not form
properly. Any particle, hole or other weakness in the plastic
sheet produces low quality or unusable products.
One Operator controls the calanderette while another looks
after the diamats. In order to change from using one type or
colour of mix to another, the die, on both types of machine, has
to be cleaned. This is a time-consuming task and all those who
are available give assistance. Grinding and Mixing Operators may
be taken off their machines and the Supervisor and Production
Manager help when necessary. Normally, the job of the extruder
Operator is rather monotonous and uneventful. Once a machine is
set up and running satisfactorily it can generally be left
unattended for considerable periods of time. The Operator must
be nearby all the time, however, in case anything does start to go
wrong. When the machines are running smoothly, one other task
that the Operators have to perform other than watching the machines
is to periodically remove the plastic roll that has been produced
and start winding a fresh one.
The Operators perform a quality check on each roll that is
produced. Each roll is weighed and is then checked for three
factors:
(a) shrinkage: the length of a small strip of the plastic
cut from the roll is measured before and after immersion
in boiling water. Ideally it should shrink by about
8 to 10 per cent. Too little shrinkage is as bad as too
much because the forming machinery and its tooling is
designed to cope with shrinkage within certain limits.
(t>) gauge: the thickness of the sheet is checked using a
micrometer. Different standard thicknesses of material
are required for different products.
(c) width: the width of each roll is measured. The forming
machines require material that is wide enough to cover the
edges of the moulds used to produce containers, but not
so wide as to prevent the sheet entering the machine.
The Production Controller generally schedules work on the
extrusion machines one month before the material is required in
the forming sections. Rolls of plastic once ready for use are
labelled and kept in the roll-store at the rear of the forming
area. The output of each extrusion machine is recorded by the
Operator who completes a "run sheet" for his shift listing the
quantities extruded. This information is given first to the
Production Manager who keeps a graph of the output of each machine
on his office wall. The run sheets, like the Mixer Operator's
daily record sheet, go to the Work Study Department and to the
production control section.
The vacuum forming process is carried out as follows. Metal
moulds are made by the factory for each type of insert required.
The Setter has the tasks of mounting the required mould onto
the machine and attaching a roll of the correct material to the
end of the machine. Once the machine is in operation, female
Operators take over the running. As the plastic sheet is drawn
through the vacuum forming machine it is heated and softened.
It is pulled in this condition three feet at a time over the mould
in the machine. The air between the mould and each fresh footage
of sheet is quickly withdrawn through small holes around the base
of the mould itself creating a vacuum that sucks the soft plastic
sheet down into the shape of the mould. Hence the name of the
process. As the next three feet of plastic is drawn over the
mould the sheet just formed is cut off and removed from the machine
by an Operator. The forming cycle is usually between 2.5 and 5
seconds. The number of inserts made on any one cycle depends on
the size of the individual inserts. These have still to be cut
from the sheet and the Operator who removes the sheets from the
machine stacks (or "nests") a number of them before passing the
stack to the Operator at the cutting table. For each type of
insert, the number of sheets that can be cut simultaneously is
specified and each time the Operator passes on a stack, she ticks
a piece of paper. This is referred to as the "autocount" and
it is easy to calculate from this the approximate number of inserts
made during a particular run. Ho allowance is made by the
Operator for part - sheets that are scrapped after they have been
cut. The Operator who removes the sheets from the machine inspects
them briefly and any sheet that has on the whole been badly formed
is scrapped. But any sheets that are only partly damaged are
passed to the cutting table so that the good inserts can be kept
once the sheet is cut up.
The Operator at the cutting table places the nested sheets
between two boards that have blades set into them at the intervals
appropriate to that product. This sandwich of boards and sheets
is passed between a pair of rollers which compress the sandwich and
force the blades through the plastic sheets, thus separating the
inserts. The Operator takes the inserts out of the boards and
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removes the scrap material which is sent "back for regrinding.
(See Figure 5.14.)
Another Operator, the packer, stands at the end of the cutting
table and puts the inserts into cartons according to given packing
instructions designed to ensure that each carton is packed the
same way and contains the same number of inserts.
The Chargehand puts a small (pink) ticket onto each carton
once it is packed, indicating the contents. She retains a
(green) duplicate of this ticket and all the duplicates are
gathered at the end of each day and again given to the Work Study
Department, and the production control section.
The Supervisors initially allocate Operators to specific tasks
on specific machines, but the Operators rotate jobs every two hours
throughout the day. The packer goes on to stacking, the stacker
goes on to the cutting table and the cutting table Operator takes
over the packing. This scheme was introduced in an attempt to
alleviate the monotony of these tasks. Sometimes, depending on
the order being made, the machine may produce faster than the
cutting table or the packer can work. If there are Operators
available, two may work at the cutting table and two or more may
pack for each machine where this is required. The simplicity of
the tasks means that allocation of Operators to tasks and to
machines is highly flexible.
The pressure forming process works in a somewhat different
way. Again, plastic sheet is drawn over a mould after having been
heated and softened. But here a "former" pushes the plastic into
the mould to give it the shape required. This process produces
sharper definition and greater strength in its products than the
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vacuum forming process is capable of. Once the Setters have the
machinery working satisfactorily, Operators are moved in to take
over. Because the shapes are actually punched out of the sheet,
a cutting table is not required and all that the Operators have
to do is put the containers into cartons after removing them from
the machine. The ticket system used in the vacuum forming section
to record output is used here also. The pressure forming process,
unlike vacuum forming, does not cut the plastic sheet into three-
foot lengths. This process merely punches holes in the sheet,
leaving it intact along its length. So that this material can
be used again, it must be shredded, by feeding it into a shredding
machine. The Setters put this device in motion, but it can be
left unattended to gradually pull the used plastic roll through
its metal teeth.
The body and lid printing machines are rarely used.
Operators are drawn from the vacuum forming section as required. At
least two Operators are required for each machine, one to load the
items onto the machine (which may print tubs or lids at a rate of
up to 6,000 per hour) and one (sometimes two) to remove and pack
them into cartons when printed. Supervision may be carried out by
a female Supervisor from the vacuum forming section, or by the
Production Manager. The ticket system is again used to record
output.
All the waste material from the vacuum and pressure forming
processes, and trim from extrusion, is taken to the grinding
machinery by a Service labourer. Here Operators feed the waste
material into two exceptionally noisy machines that grind the waste
plastic into a coarse dust. This is put into bins, making sure
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not to mix different types of plastic, and this can be fed directly
into the extrusion machines or it can be used to make up fresh
mixes. After grinding the material is put into bags and weighed.
A daily record sheet is again filled in indicating the
quantities ground during each shift. This information is passed
to the Work Study Department and to the production control section.
Packed cartons of finished goods are taken to the despatch
area where, once properly labelled, the pink tickets are removed.
These tickets are returned to the production control section to
form a record of goods despatched. The company has its own
fleet of delivery trucks and vans.
Before passing to Stage 2 of the analysis, the respective
roles of the Work Study Department, the Stores and the production
control section of the plastics production department will be
described in some further detail.* As stated frequently above,
all details of daily output are passed to the Work Study Department,
where the calculation of wage bonuses is carried out. The
production department's budget or "target" is stated in terms of
standard hours, and bonus is paid (to all Operators, Chargehands
and Supervisors) when this figure is exceeded. In setting the
budget suitable allowances are made for time lost in machine
breakdown and repairs, material faults and other sources of delay
not attributable to the Operators or supervision.
* This information is essential to an understanding of what follows.
If the analysis had been carried out in more detail, the relation¬
ships between the production department and Work Study and Stores
would have been examined in the stages concerning co-ordination
between operating systems.
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The Work Study Engineers compile a weekly "performance sheet"
showing in some detail the output of each section in comparison
with its budget. (At the time of writing, this performance sheet
covered both tin and plastic container production and no decision
had been made as to how this information would be presented for
the separate factories.) The performance sheet shows for each
section the number of standard hours that should have been achieved
during the week, the standard hours actually achieved, the number
of man-hours used and the various allowances made for downtime,
with reasons. Everyone on both production staff, above Operator
level, receives a copy of the weekly performance sheet.
It is also the job of the Work Study Engineers to determine
the rate at which orders should be made, and the machines are
periodically timed to determine the duration of the forming cycle
on each machine for particular orders. It is possible to adjust
this speed within small limits, depending upon a number of factors
concerning the machine, the product being made and the quality
of the plastic material being used.
The Production Controller is primarily responsible for
scheduling the work of the production sections, updating the
schedules as they deviate from the intended programme, and keeping
the Sales Department informed of the progress of orders, particularly
those that may be delayed. The Production Control Clerkesses
maintain a record of goods despatched and also calculate what are
known as "mix variances" and "chemical variances". The main
reason for these calculations is to check withdrawals from the stores,




Knowing the number and type of batches mixed per week, and
having copies of the "mix cards", the Production Control Clerkess
calculates how much of each chemical should have been used. The
Stores Supervisor provides information on the stock levels of each
chemical at the beginning and end of each week and by subtraction
the Clerkess discovers how much of each chemical has actually been
used. The difference between theoretical and actual usage is
called the "variance", in this case the "Chemical Variance". There
are a number of sources of error mainly due to measurement problems,
and in any given week there is always some variance. Over four
to six weeks, however, these variances tend to cancel out,
indicating that pilfering from the stores is non-existent or
negligible and that the measurements are tolerably accurate.
Copies of these calculations are distributed weekly to the Technical
Director, and his Assistant, the Divisional Manager, the Production
Manager (Extrusion), the Administration Manager, the Stores
Supervisor and the Consultant Project Engineer.
(b) Mix Variances:
This is a calculation similar to the above which compares the
amount of mix that the extrusion section has used with the amount
of plastic roll that has been produced. The relevant information
comes from the stores stock check and from the extrusion Operators'
"run sheets". As explained in the description of the extrusion
process, the edges of the plastic sheet are removed and this "trim"
accounts for about 12 per cent of the material used. There is also
some slight wastage; the start and finish of each roll is trimmed
straight, badly contaminated material is scrapped completely and
not reground. The final "yield" should be approximately 85 per
cent, i.e. this percentage of material used should end up as
finished plastic roll. The calculation shows these assumptions
to be reasonably accurate. Copies of these figures are
distributed weekly to the Works Director, the Technical Director,
the Divisional Manager, and the Production Manager (Extrusion).
All the information on variances goes to the Administration Manager
for cost calculation purposes.
The work of one other section of the factory requires
explanation at this stage - the stores. The stores are run by a
Supervisor and two Operators (male). For the ingredients used in
the production process, the company chemists have calculated usage
rates and derived re-order quantities from these. Twice weekly,
the shelves are checked and the amount of each chemical is recorded
in the stock file. Once the re-order point is reached the
Supervisor contacts the appropriate supplier for the given re-order
quantity. There is no stores requisition procedure: plastic
roll and chemicals may be removed from the stores freely as required
But as described above, the production control section checks
the usage of chemicals and plastic weekly and any pilfering would
be quickly detected.
Stage 2 of the Analysis : Identification of Control Factors.
The production department as a whole is divided into a number
of sections which have been described above. For the purposes of
this analysis, however, the department can be divided into two main
sections; extrusion, mixing and grinding constitutes one of these
sections, and vacuum and pressure forming and printing the other.
Routine control within the sub-sections of each of these main
sections (e.g. of extrusion and mixing, or of vacuum and pressure
forming) is almost identical. So to avoid repetition, the
department is treated as comprising two sections. They are called
"extrusion" and "forming" respectively in the following exposition.
The complete list of control factors arising in and controlled
in the plastics production department, and the sections in which
they arise, is as follows:
Control factors Sections
1. Hours of work Forming
2. Hours of work Extrusion
3. Quality of materials used Forming
b. Quality of materials used Extrusion
5. Department output Forming
6. Section output Extrusion
7. Order throughput time Forming
8. Order throughput time Extrusion
9. Machine maintenance Forming
10. Machine maintenance Extrusion
11. Methods of work Forming and Extrusion
12. Product quality Forming
13. Product quality Extrusion
lU. Scrap, quantities Forming
15. Scrap quantities Extrusion
16. Operator efficiency Forming
17. Operator efficiency Extrusion
18. Task Distribution within
sections Forming
19. Task Distribution within
sections
Extrusion
20. Task Distribution between
sections Forming
21. Task Distribution between Extrusion
sections
22. Material costs Forming and Extrusion
23- Labour costs Forming and Extrusion
2b. Other costs Forming and Extrusion
25. Floor layout Forming and Extrusion
26. Size of work force Forming and Extrusion
Stage 3 of the Analysis : The Routine Control Operations.
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The routine control operations for the above 26 control
factors are described in brief in the pages that follow. Job
titles that have been underlined are those which appear in the
routine control grid which summarises these operations. This
grid is shown in Figure 5.17.
Stage 4 of the Analysis : The Planning Control Operations.
The planning control operations are summarised in Figure 5.18.
These operations are carried out for the Department as a whole,
and no distinction is made in Figure 5*18 between the forming
and extrusion sections. There is, therefore, a total of 16
control factors listed in Figure 5>l8.
Stage 5 of the Analysis : Primary Decision Making.
The primary decision making operations are summarised in
Figure 5.19* Although it is now a wholly owned subsidiary of
Scotcros Ltd., Wilkie and Paul has retained virtual autonomy
and still has a member of the original owners' family on the
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Figure 5.17a*: Routine control grid for Wilkie and Paul Plastics
Production Department.

































































*This Figure is in five parts, lettered a to e.
Figure 5.17b: Routine control grid for Wilkie and Paul Plastics
Production Department, continued.
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Figure 5.17c; Routine control grid for Wilkie and Paul Plastics
Production Department, continued.
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Figure b.l7d: Routine control grid for Wilkie and Paul Plastics
Production Department, continued.
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Figure 5«l7es Routine control grid for Wilkie and Paul Plastics
Production Department, continued.
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Material Costs Labour Costs Other Costs Factory Layout Size of Work Force.
MEASUREMENT
Cost Accountant. Work Study Clerkess,
Cost Accountant.
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(Assistant Production
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The Board of Directors approves and reviews all operating procedures and evaluates
alternatives.























Divisional Manager and Board of Directors. Operators: Extrusion section










Production Manager and Divisional Manager.
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*This Figure is in four parts, lettered a to d.

















compiled by Work Study
Engineers indicates amounts
of machine down-time and
reasons.
Work Study Engineers. No permanent records.
Records of quality of
plastic rolls held until
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Work Study Engineers' weekly
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reliable indicator - output
and productivity dependent
mainly on efficiency of
machinery.
No records. Administration section
keeps "transfer cards" for
Operators that have been
moved; these cards are





The Board of Directors approves and reviews all operating procedures and evaluates
alternatives.




























Production Manager and'Divisional Manager.
I ' i











Weekly and monthly reports
produced by Cost Accountant.
Weekly and monthly reports
produce'd by Cost Accountant.
Cost Accountant produces
monthly statements.






The Board of Directors approves and reviews all operating procedures and evaluates
alternatives.
























































DECIDE ACTION Board of Directors. Board of Directors.




Figure 5.19: Primary decision making /-rid for Nilkie and Paul
Plastics Production Department.
3. DISCUSSION OF THE CASE STUDY FINDINGS
Introduction
The following discussion is based upon the results of the two
case studies presented in this Chapter. A third case study (of
Wilkie and Paul Tin Box Production Department) is presented in
Appendix IV; this third case study has not been included in the
present Chapter because the pattern of results is very similar to
those of the two studies already described. The same method of
analysis was used to study two 'bo-ownership" enterprises and the
results of these case studies are presented in Appendix II.
Discussion of the results of these additional case studies
accompanies their respective descriptions and is not included in
this Chapter.
It is the intention here to discuss the results of the studies
of Ferranti's Rotating Components Group and Wilkie and Paul Plastics
Production Department in answer to three questions:
1. What is the value of this method as a technique of
organisational analysis per se?
2. How can this method be used to generate job and organisational
design choices?
3. How can the method be used to calculate the effects of
specific job and organisational design changes on other
positions and departments in an organisation?
Each of these questions will be discussed in turn.
480.
What is the value of this method as a technique of organisational
analysis per se?
This method appears to have a number of potential advantages
as a technique of organisational analysis. Any approach to the
study of organisational structure and functioning must adopt some
conceptual viewpoint, a way of looking at the phenomena in which
one is interested. But any particular approach to a problem or
group of problems necessarily precludes adopting other potentially
fruitful approaches. So in order to begin to overcome any
limitations or difficulties of a particular approach or conceptual
viewpoint, these limitations and difficulties should be clearly
recognised. In discussing this technique of organisational
analysis, therefore, an attempt is made to note some of the
possible limitations of the technique. The suggested advantages
and limitations of the technique are summarised in Figure 5-20.
One advantage of the technique is that it attempts to be
comprehensive; the unit of analysis is the organisation as a whole.
The first problem that was encountered in carrying out the analysis,
however, concerned the magnitude of the task. Even the smallest
organisation is capable of displaying considerable complexity when
subjected to detailed study. To complete all the stages of this
analysis is, therefore, a daunting task. The researcher approaching
an organisation must face problems concerning the time that is
required to conduct a full and detailed analysis, and concerning any
restrictions upon access to information that the organisation may
impose. These problems are surmounted where an internal research
team can be established, comprising members with substantial
experience of the organisation and the way in which it functions.
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Figure 5.20: Assessment of the value of this method as a technique of
organizational analysis per se.
POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES potential limitations
1. Comprehensive. 1. Time consuming to complete.
2. Focuses attention on role of
manager a3 an information
processor.
2. Directs attention from other
managerial skills.
3. Easy to describe managerial
tasks in terms of the model.
3. Gives a fragmented description
of the integrated process of
cont rol.
4. Model and approach readily
appreciated by management at
all levels.
4. Directs attention away from
other problem areas.
5. Highlights specific control
problems:
• gaps in control system
« coordination problems
• sources of conflict
5. Partial analysis may attribute
problems and solutions only to
areas studied in depth.
6. Analysis illustrates certain
characteristics of production
cont rol:
« number of levels of
hierarchy engaged in
each level of control





6. Limited sample examined here.
7. Other uses of the analysis:
• management development
• performance evaluation
• management job analysis
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The structure and functioning of organisations are complex phenomena,
and models used to describe, explain and analyse these phenomena must
reflect that complexity. The case studies reported here are thus
incomplete. The stages of the analysis concerning co-ordination
between operating systems and information exchange with the
enterprise's environment were omitted. The descriptions of the
routine control operations are relatively complete, but as planning
and primary decision making rely upon information concerning the
organisation's environment, the descriptions of control at these
levels is incomplete. An analysis of co-ordination operations is
also missing at both the routine control and planning levels.
These case studies present only a partial practical test of the
value of the technique.
A second advantage of the technique is that it focuses
attention upon the function of management as an information
processing and control function, rather than as a "leadership" or
"decision making" function. Decision making is only part of the
control process and the quality of decisions made will only reflect
the effectiveness with which the other control operations are
conducted. The technique thus attempts to analyse the management
function as a whole, and does not concentrate on any one specific
part of it. This approach may, however, direct attention away
from other necessary management skills such as scientific/technical
or social skills, although even these can be regarded as information
processing skills.
A third advantage of the technique lies in the comparative ease
with which industrial control operations can in practice be related
to the components of the model. After questioning managers about
their jobs, it was not particularly difficult to place the tasks
that they perform into the format of the model. An air of artificiality
may be introduced to the analysis where one individual performs two
or more consecutive control operations, and it could be argued that
the analysis describes in a fragmentary manner what is essentially
an integrated process of control. Organisational control, however,
is apparently carried out in a fragmented manner part of the time,
and the method of analysis should be capable of illustrating this.
A fourth advantage of the technique is the instant understanding
and appreciation that it receives from management at all levels.
The model is couched in terms that managers can readily relate to
their own work and problems; applying the technique as a research
tool is easier where respondents understand its nature and purpose.
Most managers admit to having "communication" or "information"
problems of various kinds. Attention paid to these problems,
however, may again direct attention away from other perhaps more
fundamental organisational problems.
The model upon which the technique is based is a logical
statement of an ideal organisational control system, i.e. what
components the control system should have if information processing
and control in the organisation is to be effective. A fifth
advantage of this technique, then, is its ability to highlight
control problems in a given control system. In Ferranti's Rotating
Components Group, for example, the procedures used for the routine
control of order throughput times do not provide adequate information
upon which to base planning decisions regarding this factor. Records
are kept of actual throughput times but they are not kept in a suitable
format. It is a time consuming task, using the existing records,
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to calculate the average throughput time of a particular type of
product; it is even more difficult to assess the effects of delays
with one type of product upon the throughput times of other products.
The management in this case were aware that the throughput times
for some items were excessive and that this made it difficult to
calculate and to meet delivery dates. There was not enough
information, however, upon which to base a decision to improve the
matter.* A more detailed consideration of the analysis could
identify actual and potential problems of co-ordination between
operating systems and could indicate potential sources of conflict.
But a partial analysis of the type described above may attribute
problems and solutions to the areas actually investigated, ignoring
the effects of (and possible effects of particular actions upon)
other parts of the organisation and other parts of the information
processing and control function, that have not been analysed.
The two case studies described in this Chapter (and the third
case study described in Appendix IV) appear to illustrate some common
characteristics of production control systems. One such characteristic
concerns the number of levels of management that are engaged in routine
* A report was submitted to the General Manager, as a result of this
research, suggesting that items requiring rectification should be
re-routed to separate sections. Items which were produced
correctly would continue assembly as normal. Through keeping
records of the items which required rectification separate from
those concerning straightforward items, it would become possible
through time to predict with greater accuracy the throughput time
for a particular order. And by taking troublesome items out of
the system, normal items could be produced much quicker. Thus
some delivery dates would be met earlier and all delivery dates
would be more accurate in the long run.
control operations. In the Rotating Components Group, the highest
level of management concerned with routine control is the Production
Engineer but the Production Manager and Chief Quality Engineer are
also involved on occasion. There can, therefore, be up to four










This does not include intermediary levels such as Senior Foreman,
Planning Engineer, or Engineer I/C Control. The same is true for
Wilkie and Paul where again up to four levels of management may be





A given routine control problem will not necessarily concern all
four levels every time that it arises. A second characteristic
of production control that these case studies illustrate concerns
what may be called "escalation" of routine control problems. This
research was not directly concerned with why particular routine
control problems were passed up the hierarchy to be dealt with,
but only how such problems were handled. Speculation as to why
this occurs is, however, still possible. It is extremely rare to
find one person performing all the routine control operations for
any control factor. Routine control of task allocation within
production sections appears to be one exception. In Wilkie and Paul
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the Extrusion Supervisor has full routine control over the distribution
of tasks within the sections for which he is responsible. It is
far more common to find routine control operations being performed by
a succession of personnel, each at a higher level than the last
l
person involved. The simpler problems are likely to be dealt with
by the person who first detects them, the first line supervisor
perhaps. But a number of problems are passed on up the hierarchy
before a decision is made by the Production Engineer (Ferranti) or
Production Manager (Wilkie and Paul). The process of "escalation"
may be due to at least three reasons:
1. The people who pass information about routine control
problems to their superiors are actually not competent to
deal with the problem raised.
2. The people who pass information about routine control
problems to their superiors assume that they themselves
are not competent to deal with the problem.
3. The people who pass information about routine control
problems to their superiors assume that this is a problem
that the superior should be made aware of.
Each level must, therefore, assess the consequences of not transmitting
such information to a superior. Where the information is not
transmitted, the subordinate is committed to providing his own
solution or to doing nothing about it. The subordinate may thus
place himself in line for a reprimand if he takes the wrong decision,
or if the matter gets considerably worse for some other reason and
the superior asks why he was not informed in the first place. It
may, therefore, be safer to transmit routine control information to
the superior rather than attempt to solve the problem as it is detected.
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There appears to be some flexibility regarding decision making at
the routine control level that is not present in either the planning
or primary decision making levels. In the latter cases, decision
making is virtually confined to the top two or three levels of
management (in the companies studied), but routine control decision
making may be carried out on a number of levels by a number of
different personnel. One problem confronting the job designer,
therefore, may lie in "de-escalating" routine control decision
making, rather than "de-verticalisation" as Wild (1975) has suggested.
The existence of a hierarchy of management of any kind at this level
may presuppose its usage in the operations of routine control.
While these conclusions refer to the case studies described
here, these obviously represent a rather limited sample of types of
production control system. It would be inadvisable, therefore, to
generalise from these findings with regard, for example, to the exact
number of hierarchical levels engaged in a particular level of
control. The technique of analysis could, however, be used to
advantage in comparing different types of control system, and
perhaps to compare the effects of different types of technology on
patterns of control. (See Woodward (Ed.), 1970a.)
A final advantage of this technique of organisational analysis
is that it may be used for more conventional personnel management
purposes. The analysis could be used as a basis for a management
development programme, for moving managers from positions concerned
with routine control into positions concerned with measurement and
comparison of routine control information for planning purposes, and
then into positions where planning decisions are taken, and so on.
The analysis could also be used to design performance evaluation
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systems; the model assists in the identification of suitable
performance measures for specific positions in the organisation, and
can also be used to derive appropriate means of measuring and
recording performance indicators and for arranging appropriate
feedback of results to the positions concerned. Finally, the
analysis can be used as a basis for managerial job analysis. It is
the simplest of matters to go through, for example, the routine
control grid for the Rotating Components Group and identify all the
control operations performed by the Production Engineer. Job
analysis has a number of uses, but is clearly relevant to the design
of jobs. The original objective of this technique was to produce an
analysis of the management function in an organisation that could
be used to redesign the jobs of lower level workers. To the
extent that the management job analyses that the technique produces
are valid, this objective has been fulfilled.
How can this method be used to generate job and organisational
design choices?
The routine control, planning and primary decision making grids
for the two production systems analysed above list all the management
tasks concerned with the basic hierarchy of control of those production
systems. The tasks involved in co-ordination between operating
systems and in information exchange with the environment, are not
included. If these analyses were to be used as a basis for job and
organisational design, the first question that would be dealt with
would be: which management tasks can be transferred to operators?
The objectives of this project would include at least some of the
"desirable job characteristics" listed in Figure 2.8 above. At
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least four of the major objectives listed there could be achieved by
reallocating or reorganising the production operations themselves:
variety, task identity, use of valued skills and abilities, and
group membership. Fulfilling these objectives would not necessarily
involve the transfer of management tasks to operators. The transfer
of management tasks to operators becomes necessary in order to provide
operators with the following job characteristics: responsibility,
autonomy, continuous learning and growth in competence, advancement,
and perhaps feedback also. These latter job characteristics require
reallocation of management tasks to operators and are more likely to
provide satisfaction of higher order needs such as autonomy,
competence and self-actualisation.
There appears to be little scope in either of the companies
studied for the introduction of job and organisational design changes.
This does not, however, preclude the gradual introduction of changes
in the direction desired. The ideal or optimum job design solution
could be regarded as the establishment of composite autonomous groups
of operators who carry out all the physical and routine control
operations within their operating system. To reach this solution in
either the Rotating Components Group or Wilkie and Paul would take a
very long time, even if the managements of these respective companies
considered that this was a worthwhile undertaking. But a gradual
move in this direction is possible. This could be achieved in the
following way; the suggested process is summarised in Figure 5-21.
The first stage would be to identify control factors which at the
routine control level are measured and controlled within the operating
system concerned, and which have the routine control operations
carried out by comparatively few hierarchical levels. In the Rotating
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Figure 5.21s The gradual introduction of .job and organizational
design change.
1. Identify control factors where routine control operations
are carried out within the first three levels of super¬
vision, and which are measured within the operating system
concerned.
2. Arrange feedback: of performance results concerning those
factors to be given directly to the operators concerned.
3. Involve operators in the measurement, comparison and decide
action operations for these control factors, but maintain
supervision; supervisor may in fact make most of the decisions.
4. Gradually withdraw supervisory assistance as operators gain
capability and confidence to take decisions themselves.
5. Identify other control factors that operators could control
and repeat the above process.
6. Eventually allow operators to perform all the routine
control operations for that operating system.
7. Repeat this process at the planning level.
8, Re-assess and redesign the jobs of (typically) first and
second line supervision (become "coordinators").
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Components Group and Wilkie and Paul, the following control factors
meet these criteria, and are controlled by no more than three levels
of supervision at the routine control level:
Rotating Components Group :
assembly: task distribution within sections,
task distribution between sections,
product quality.
test and inspection: task distribution within sections,
throughput time.
Wilkie and Paul :
extrusion: product quality,
task distribution within sections,
task distribution between sections.
forming: task distribution within sections,
task distribution between sections.
The second stage would be to provide operators with some form
of feedback that would indicate the results of different actions upon
performance concerning those control factors. Some suggestions for
providing feedback on the selected control factors are indicated in
Figure 5-22. The operators in these two production systems are not
involved in the routine control measurement and comparison operations,
and the third stage in the job design process would be to allow them
to perform these operations with supervisory assistance. Supervisors
could also allow operators to participate in taking decisions concerning
these control factors, even if the supervisors actually take most of
the decisions. The ways in which this stage would affect the
operators concerned are described in Figure 5-23.
The fourth stage of this process would consist of a gradual
4°2.
Figure 9.22: Suggestions for providing: feedback on selected control
factors.
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withdrawal of supervisory assistance as operators develop the
capability and confidence to perform all the routine control operations,
including decision making, by themselves. This gradual withdrawal
could extend over a considerable period of time. The success of
the process would be dependent upon the attitudes and abilities of
both the operators and supervisors concerned.
The fifth stage of this process would be to extend the operators'
jobs to cover other control factors, perhaps those that are closely
related to those that they already control. Operators in the
assembly sections of the Rotating Components Group could become
involved in the routine control of throughput times, output, scrap
quantities and perhaps floor layout. Operators in the test and
inspection sections could be allowed to participate in the routine
control of task distribution and floor layout. In Wilkie and Paul
Plastics, operators in the extrusion sections could begin to participate
in the routine control of output, throughput times and scrap quantities.
Operators in the forming sections could also participate in the routine
control of output, throughput times and scrap quantities, and
could gradually be given more opportunity to make decisions regarding
product quality. Again, in transferring control of these factors
to operators, new methods of supplying operators with appropriate
information concerning performance results would be required.
Transferring control of these factors would affect still higher levels
of the organisation hierarchy, and the time that would be required to
complete the process might be considerable.
The first major objective of this process would be to allow the
operators to carry out all the routine control operations for that
operating system. The second major objective would be to consider
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repeating the process just described with the control operations at
the planning level. It was suggested in Chapter k above that
provision of continuous learning as a job design objective would mean
allowing operators to decide how to carry out the production
(operating) tasks and how to carry out the routine control operations.
Operators would thus perform the planning control operations as
well as the routine control operations. It is most unlikely that
this would ever occur in either of the two companies studied here,
but this arrangement does work in one of the co-ownership companies
that was studied (Rowen GnlTwyn; see Appendix I ). If this type of
change did become possible and desirable in a conventional company,
it could be introduced gradually using the same process used to
transfer the routine control operations to the operators. (See
Figure 5-21.)
The transfer of both the routine control and planning control
operations to operators may not always be possible. It may only
be possible where certain basic conditions can be established:
(a) Where the company as a whole is small enough to permit all
its employees to participate directly in planning decisions; or
(b) Where the company is composed of semi-autonomous operating
systems each of which is small enough to permit all its
members to participate directly in planning decisions; or
(c) Where the organisation is being designed from scratch, thus
overcoming many of the problems created in attempting to
change conventional working methods in an existing company.
And where the company is small enough to allow all of its
members to participate directly in planning decisions, it would not be
a great step from there to participation in primary decision making
as well. (This also happens at Rowen Onllwyn, which has only 11
employees; see Appendix I.) At this point, the "organisation"
does not require to be designed, what does have to be designed is
a system of recording appropriate information in a format that can
be used by the members of the enterprise as a basis for collective
information processing and control. Organisational design (i.e.
defining positions, roles, role relationships, line and staff
functions, and so on) is replaced by the necessity for information
system design.
The final stage of this gradual process of job and organisational
design change concerns the re-assessment and redesign of the jobs of
higher organisational levels that are affected by the transfer of
control operations to operators. But this is listed as the last
stage of the process simply for convenience. This re-assessment
should be conducted throughout the change process. The following
section indicates how the effects of transferring control operations
alter the jobs at higher levels in the organisation.
How can the method be used to calculate the effects of specific
job and organisational design changes on other positions and
departments in the organisation?
The two case studies examined above illustrate quite clearly
that "vertical" job design changes for operators are likely to affect
not only first line supervisors but a number of levels and positions
in the organisation hierarchy. Contrary to the opinions of most
writers in this field, therefore, this problem is not confined to the
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changing role of the first line supervisor. This may he the position
most severely affected, hut where job design changes are extensive,
the impact on second and third level supervision may also he extensive.
It has already "been indicated that in the two companies studied there
were typically four levels of management dealing with the routine
control of the production system.
The technique of organisational analysis used here, therefore,
allows the joh or organisational designer to calculate with precision
the effects of specific design changes upon the rest of the
organisation. The roles of first and second line supervision may
become completely redundant where routine control operations have
heen completely transferred to operators. The tasks that remain,
at routine control level, are those concerned with co-ordination.
First and second line supervisors are likely, therefore, to become
"co-ordinators". It would he necessary to carry out a full
organisational analysis (rather than the partial analysis described
here) in order to explore in detail the potential role of the
traditional supervisor as a co-ordinator.
Summary of Case Study Findings
It has heen suggested here that the ten step method of
organisational analysis, presented first in Chapter 4 above, has
a number of advantages as a basis for joh and organisational design,
and in more conventional personnel management areas. The analysis
can he used to identify potential joh and organisational design
changes and can also he usecfe|to calculate the effects of these
changes upon other positions in the organisation. An examination
of existing job design techniques (see Figure 2.7, above) shows that
they rely on more or less ad hoc methods'for producing job and
organisational design changes. The method of organisational analysis
described here provides a means of systematically examining the
entire range of options open to the job or organisational designer.
It is also an advantage to be able to calculate, using this method,
the effects of given changes on other jobs in the organisation.
The model indicates potential "ideal" solutions, i.e. "ideal"
job or organisational designs. It has not been argued here that
these ideal solutions be imposed upon new or existing enterprises.
These are rather the long term objectives towards which job and
organisational design should be steered, and a number of suggestions
as to how this steering can be gradually moved in the right
direction have been provided.
The relationship between the types of job and organisational
design changes suggested here and job design objectives is
comparatively straightforward. Allowing operators to perform
routine control operations is clearly giving operators more
responsibility. Giving operators control over more control factors
is one way of increasing responsibility. Giving operators the
planning control operations to perform is also an increase in
responsibility. Autonomy is increased by withdrawing supervisory
assistance. Autonomy can, therefore, be measured by identifying
which control operations are still performed partly or wholly by
supervisors. Operators may be autonomous in that they have complete
routine control over one control factor (e.g. task distributions);
they may be autonomous in performing all the routine control operations
for their operating system; they may be autonomous in performing all
the planning control operations for their operating system; and
there is a multitude of intermediary stages between these basic
points. Growth in competence is obviously encouraged by expecting
operators to take over larger portions of the management function.
When this type of change is introduced gradually, it can generate
a sense of advancement in those affected.
The technique of organisational analysis presented here and
the model upon which it is based solves to a large extent the
problem of making job design objectives operational, that is of
producing suggestions as to how specific jobs can be given more
"responsibility" or "autonomy" and so on. The general model of
organisational control used here makes this a fairly simple task.
